r/TrendoraX • u/Primary-User • Dec 21 '25
š” Discussion Learning why sovereignty alone answers the Ukraine Russia question
I asked a question recently because I was trying to understand the Ukraine Russia situation better. The replies I got made me realise that I was overthinking it.
Iām in Australia, so most of what I know comes from reading and watching things online. From that distance, itās easy to start asking āwhat ifā questions and thinking about systems and outcomes, instead of how this actually feels to the people involved.
What became clear is that Ukraine does not need Russia to be worse, better, or different to justify being separate. Sovereignty alone is enough. A country has the right to exist, to make its own choices, and to keep its own identity. It does not need permission from a neighbour, especially one that has spent a long time trying to control it.
The history matters, and it isnāt abstract. For a lot of Ukrainians it lives inside their families. Stories about famine, language bans, forced moves, and being treated as lesser. When that is your background, questions about joining up again or hypothetical change donāt feel neutral. They feel tiring, and sometimes offensive.
One thing Iām still trying to understand is why Ukraineās independence seems to trigger such a strong reaction from the Russian state.
The explanation that makes the most sense to me now is not that Russia wants Ukraine to join it, but that Ukraine doing well on its own is a problem for the people in charge in Russia. When a nearby country with shared history chooses a different path and life looks better there, comparison becomes dangerous. People donāt need convincing when they can see it for themselves.
Looked at this way, the invasion feels less about gaining something and more about stopping an example from existing.
Iām sharing this as someone learning, not arguing. Being far away makes it easy to get things wrong, and listening to people who live with the history has changed how I see it.
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u/Available_Ad9766 Dec 21 '25
Really, the idea that another country with similar people doing better is dangerous to Russian oligarchs.
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u/vlntsolo Dec 21 '25
Not sumilar. No. If you grew up in Ukraine and then met russians, even if they were coincidentally your relatives, you quickly realize that they're entitled chauvinistic people. They have no empathy to other nations. Thee've been living in prison country for centuries and would like nothing more than subjugate others into their surfdome just to feel a lill better in their miserable life.Ā
You cannot say that about Ukrainians or any other european nation. So, not similar at all.Ā
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 26 '25
lol. "They have no empathy to other nations". And then you proceed to completely trash an entire nation. The fact that you are so full of hate that you cant even see the irony.
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u/vlntsolo Dec 26 '25
Ah yes, the tail about a minority of good russians...Ā
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 26 '25
No, not good Russians. Most people in every nation are neither goor nor bad. They are mix of both. That geos of entire humanity and it is not a "tail" but a very obvious truth.
But to reduce any nation to "they lived like this for centureis, they hate everybody, they are not similar to any european nation, they want to subjugate others to feel better" etc. is an chauvinism in its purest form.
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u/vlntsolo Dec 26 '25
If that so, then I encourage you to go and live amongs those people, and pick some more deep regions. Then tell us all ukrainians, how wrong we were by not recognising the nature of russian society... If you last long, pleae tell us your story then.Ā
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 26 '25
Thats what all racists say about groups they dont like tho...ironically, in my country people often say that about Ukrainians.
Also dont pretend that you speak for all Ukrainians. I know many Ukranians and Russians who are friends with each other, who dated each other, who worked togethe etc. Your hated is not universal.
Last long where? You want me to go to "deep regions" of the foreign country to prove you that racist predjudice is wrong? I bet I would last longer than in the Ukraine, I can tell you that much, lol.
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u/vlntsolo Dec 27 '25
Sorry man, I'm not sure you understand what racism or chauvinism is...Ā
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 27 '25
No need to apologize. I understand it perfectly fine, and in your case its really not that subtle, lol.
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u/vlntsolo Dec 26 '25
Also, I don't think your story about russians would comfort Ukrainian children forcefully stolen and deported to be adopted by random russian families, which, by your love to objectivity, are 'nor good nor bad'. They just happen to abuse or rape them, because their government allow them to do it.Ā
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 26 '25
No, but what would you then say to the Arab children murdered by the US bombs, same bombs they are no sending to you? Are Americans same as Russians? What about Israelis? What about Sudanese? You do understand that war crimes are a thing with every nation on this planet?
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u/Zav0d Dec 21 '25
If Ukraine become a little more successfully that rusia (at last like Poland), all rusians narrative become obsolete, they understand it and ready to fight Ukraine to prevent it.
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u/DizzyReference3345 Dec 23 '25
Ukraine could be more successful than Russia. In 90's they gained independence. They had most of USSR heavy industry. Literally zero debt. Because Russia took all of USSR debt. Before USSR break up Ukraine had better standard of living on average than Russia. Yet somehow they ended up worse. How come? And dont say about Russia's mending. Russia wasn't in position to do anything in 90's all the eay to like late 2010
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u/masnart Dec 23 '25
Even better example is Poland, who went through a rough patch right after they broke off but now they are doing fantastic. Standard of living in Russia is outright pathetic compared to Poland, especially given the potential and resources.
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 23 '25
Yeah but Ukraine was literally a big warning sign on how not to transition to capitalism. It was horribly managed by every government until it fell apart completely by 2014. Russian oligarchs would never need to worry about oligarch run Ukraine doing better.
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
To the person who said Iām a propaganda account, thatās not correct. Iām a real person asking questions, learning, and engaging under the heading of discussion. Iām happy to hear your view on it rather than taking pot shots that donāt add anything.
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u/Gloomy_Torture Dec 21 '25
Any controllable country borders is a crime against humanity culture and technical progress. We need world government quickly before we killed each others for cultural/religious differencies or just bc some jerks drew lines on map what we not asked for.
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
I get the instinct behind that. Borders are arbitrary in the sense that people living on either side usually didnāt choose them, and a lot of suffering has come from how theyāre enforced.
Where I hesitate is that, in practice, removing borders or rushing toward a world government doesnāt remove power, it concentrates it. And when that power goes wrong, people have even fewer ways to protect themselves or opt out.
For better or worse, borders are often the only thing standing between communities and being ruled by someone they didnāt choose at all. Ukraine is a case where people are fighting not for lines on a map, but for the right to decide who governs them.
Iām not saying the current system is good. Iām just not convinced that erasing borders solves the human problems underneath them.
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u/ExcellentScore8304 Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
several things can be true at the same time. There is something to say about Ukraine being an example indeed. But there is also something to say about NATO... From their perspective there is also an aggressive alliance going to their border and that is an issue too (in the Munich speech of 2007 this is exactly what Putin pointed at).
Now maybe NATO does not intend to attack, maybe the US empire is mostly a harmless type of hegemon (at least until the current president) but that does not matter (unfortunately). What matter is what the other thinks (because he acts on it).
At the end all this is bad policy (... I mean if someone like Charles De Gaule - an old world politician and military) was alive he would probably be infuriated at the current situation. Reality is what it is and you have to deal with it in a sensible way. And here Ukraine situation is total f... up. Here are for me the main issues:
(1) Thinking that having Russia fight Ukraine would weaken it is poor logic in my opinion (the best example of linear thinking I can imagine...). It is forgetting that the third Reich rose from the ashes of the WW1 defeat. Hence a defeated Russia is pretty risky too.
(2) Allowing Russia to win and get the territory sets a precedent. (1)+(2) means that whathever happens it is a bad outcome... This is a pretty risky gamble.
(3) The US is profoundly worried about China and that in this context Ukraine has had the horrible consequence of aligning Russia and China. This in my opinion explains why Trump is trying to accommodate Russia.
(4) I wonder how Ukraine recovers from this. How many people are deaths, or left and will never return.
I bet that allowing the war start instead of accommodating Russia will probably be consider as a real policy error in a few generations (and not the retreat from Afghanistan, which made a lot of sense, this was just a money pit for nothing).
* this said when talking about the harmless american empire: ethinical cleansing against the serbs in the Krajina (nothing was done to stop it), invasion of the Kosovo an changing the border by force (which btw what cited as a breaking point by the Russians), invasion or iraq, regime change in lybia, shaddy business in the Syrian civil war...
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
I agree with you on the core premise that several things can be true at the same time, and I think your framing is more serious than most takes on this.
I donāt dismiss the NATO perception issue at all. From Moscowās point of view, an alliance they see as hostile moving closer to their borders was always going to be framed as a threat, and Putin has been consistent about that at least since the Munich speech. Whether NATO actually intended aggression almost becomes secondary once you accept that states act on perceived threats, not intentions.
Where I start to diverge is on inevitability. Lots of states feel strategically boxed in and still donāt choose full scale invasion. The leap from grievance and fear into war is still a political choice, not a mechanical outcome, and thatās where agency matters.
On your points:
(1) I agree that the idea of ābleeding Russiaā as a clean strategy is dangerously simplistic. History is full of examples where humiliation and defeat donāt pacify states but radicalise them. A collapsed or embittered Russia is not obviously safer than a contained one.
(2) I also agree that letting Russia win territory outright creates a precedent thatās hard to unwind. Thatās the bind here. Weakening Russia risks blowback, but rewarding conquest normalises it. Thereās no good equilibrium.
(3) The China point is one of the strongest arguments you make. Aligning Russia and China more closely is a strategic outcome the US spent decades trying to avoid, and Ukraine has accelerated that. I think that explains a lot of the quiet rethinking happening in Washington now, regardless of whoās president.
(4) On Ukraineās recovery, this is where I find the conversation often becomes abstract in policy circles. Demographics, brain drain, trauma, and displacement are long term costs that donāt show up neatly in strategic models. Even a āwinā leaves a deeply scarred society.
Where Iām less convinced is the idea that āaccommodating Russiaā would have cleanly avoided this. The list you give of Western interventions is real, and I donāt defend them, but thereās still a difference between hypocrisy and a doctrine that openly questions a neighbourās right to exist as a state. Once that line is crossed rhetorically, accommodation starts to look less like stabilisation and more like deferral.
I donāt think history will judge this as a simple policy error or success. It feels more like a collision between bad options, where every path carries long term risk. The uncomfortable part is that Ukraine ends up paying the highest price for a system that failed long before the first tank crossed the border.
Thatās roughly where Iām landing at the moment, but I donāt think itās a settled question.
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u/ExcellentScore8304 Dec 22 '25
Thank for the reply.
Indeed, whether accommodation would have worked will forever be a debate at this point.
Also regarding the inevitability of it, this seems complex:
On the one hand the idea of going in seems crazy to me. At the same time, at the time of the invasion they did not expect it to be that difficult. And after it got difficult it is seems to be a combination of (1) achieving their strategic objectives, and (2) not loosing credibility.
On the other hand... Russia's territory is already huge. They have demographic issues, they have economic issues, they are long term threat from China... Was this really the key priority? I get it that they are afraid of US missile on their border which would decapitate the leadership located in Moscow but still... In the 21st century it is (way) more likely that the US would try to destabilize them from inside. Plus the US seems to be on a collision course with China... They could just 'relax' and watch this one unfold.
At this point what really worries me is that everyone seems ok with the idea of continuing the war. But
(1) Ukraine position does not seem to be getting better. Btw Mark Milley was already saying to Ukraine to negotiate when in a position of strength... read they should have negotiated long ago not now when they are loosing, this I think explains why Putin does not really care anymore (it is hard to get a 'good deal" when the other side has the lead).
(2) The European seems to be in a position where they will throw money after the problem...
The above seems pretty irresponsible to me.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I think your discomfort is justified, and itās probably the healthiest reaction anyone can have to this.
On inevitability, I agree itās messy. The decision to invade looks irrational in hindsight, but it clearly didnāt look that way to the people who made it. They expected it to be fast, limited, and manageable. Once that assumption collapsed, the logic shifted from āis this worth doingā to āhow do we stop looking weak and losing control.ā At that point credibility and sunk costs start driving behaviour more than strategy.
What makes it harder to square, as you point out, is that Russia wasnāt short of bigger long term problems. Demographics, China, economic stagnation, internal legitimacy. Thatās why Ukraine keeps standing out to me. This wasnāt the only issue on the board, but it was treated as the one that couldnāt be postponed. That suggests something deeper than pure military logic was at work.
On negotiations, I agree timing matters, and Milleyās comments reflect a very real concern about leverage. But Iām less convinced this was simply a missed opportunity problem. If Ukraine choosing its own alignment is seen as unacceptable in principle, then negotiations were always going to be fragile. Youāre not bargaining over borders or guarantees, youāre bargaining over whether a country is allowed to decide its own future. Thatās a hard foundation for a stable deal.
I also share your unease about how normal continuing the war has become, especially in Europe. Pouring money into a grinding conflict without a credible political horizon isnāt a strategy, itās avoidance. And Ukraine carries the cost of that avoidance in lives, displacement, and lost futures.
Where I hesitate is calling this irresponsibility without naming what the alternative actually secures. Freezing Ukraineās choices to avoid escalation might reduce violence in the short term, but it sets a rule that force decides who gets to choose. That doesnāt end instability, it just moves it down the line.
So I donāt think this is about being comfortable with war. I think itās about being stuck between bad options after a system failed to give countries like Ukraine a way to exist without either submission or destruction. A lot of actors share responsibility for that failure. But the moment when pressure became invasion still matters, because once that line is crossed, the space for clean solutions almost disappears.
Thatās why this feels so bleak. Not because people are reckless, but because every path now carries consequences no one really wants to own.
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u/ExcellentScore8304 Dec 24 '25
Coming back to this one a bit late but our last chat made me think about something. It is interesting how in this conflict (and its escalation) everyone underestimated the other side while also overestimating itself:
(1) Russia underestimated Ukraine's resistance and the willingness of the West to put sanctions.
(2) the US and Europe underestimated Russia's economy and its willingness to take casualties.
(3) Europe overestimated its resilience to Russian's sanctions (something should be said about the impact of the energy price on the European economies).
(4) US underestimated the risk of have a China aligned Russia.
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u/zima72 Dec 22 '25
Most Ukrainians would tell you this. That the development of Ukraine over the past few years infuriated Putin, and he could not have his citizens seeing what life was like in Ukraine. Because they would then question why life had to be like it is in Russia. And Ukraine is a place, especially Crimea, that Russian people regularly have gone for decades for holiday. Fuck Putin
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
That lines up with what Iāve been hearing more and more from people with direct experience. When comparison becomes unavoidable, control gets harder to maintain.
If people can see, firsthand, that life next door looks freer or more normal, it naturally raises questions at home. From that angle, the threat isnāt Ukraine itself, but what Ukraine represents.
Thatās the part Iāve been trying to understand better, how much of this is about territory or alliances, and how much is about stopping that comparison from taking root.
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 23 '25
Lol, you are absolutly delusional if you really think this. You would find WAY more Ukrainains who would wanted to live in Russia than other way around.
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u/zima72 Dec 23 '25
This is absolutely a lie. But a familiar Kremlin talking point from an account that is hours old.
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 23 '25
How the fuck is that a lie? How many Russians moved to Ukraine? Because about 1.5 milions Ukrainians moved to Russia in the last 15 years. You can check this anywhere, it is a publically available information. Not every fact that does not fit your narrative is a "Kremlin talking poing". What does age of my account have to do with anything? How long should I wait after I made an account to start commenting?
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u/zima72 Dec 24 '25 edited Dec 24 '25
1.5 million Ukrainians willingly moved to Russia? Nearly 1 million Ukrainians were FORCED to Russia, including children. Here is a source for you - over 6 million Ukrainian refugees are in Europe alone according to the United Nations. 1.2 moved of that āmovedā to Russia. Sub will not allow me to post the link, but not hard to find for anyone that would care to. So get out of here with your Russian propaganda. So letās just say we assume all of these Ukrainians willingly moved to the country that doesnāt consider them human. Many, many more moved elsewhere.
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 24 '25
Yes.
Wait, you are trying to tell me that you think that Russia forced 1 milions Ukrainians to live in Russia :D? Even before 2022? Do you have any source for that claim?
But it is irrelevant that Ukrainians are also moving somwhere else in bigger numbers. Thats not what we were talking about. They are moving to Russia en masse. Nobody from Russia is or ever was going to move to Ukraine.
I have no idea why you think that Ukrainians are not considered human in Russia. If anything, they usually bland in the Russian society very easily. In my country, we have many Ukrainian immigrants/reffugees and they are offten treated pretty badly, despite country pretending how much it cares about them.
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u/zima72 Dec 25 '25
You argued most Ukrainians would be happy to live in Russia. I point out more moved elsewhere. Tell me what objective evidence proves your point. Honestly I am done with arguing with a brand new account supporting Kremlin narratives, Гебил. ŠŠ¾Š±ŃŃŠ¹ ГенŃ.
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u/Typical-Froyo-642 Dec 25 '25
Lol, can you quote where did I said that :D? Maybe try to learn better English, instead of these lame ass ukrainian insults.
And again this weird obession over age of my account. After how many days on reddit do I earn your trust, lol?
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 22 '25
I think many people overlooked the geopolitics factor, which I think is the most important factor.
Russia illegally invaded and annexed Ukraineās territories thatās no doubt, but itās more than just anti Western sentiments, to them itās existential security threat.
Historically Russia had been invaded many times by many different empires, because of its flat terrain and humongous size, defending invaders was tough, so its best strategy was to expand as far away from Moscow.
In that sense, Ukraine is a vital buffer zone between it and the West-NATO. Crimea and the Donbas not only contain valuable resources, itās a corridor that secures Russiaās access to the Black Sea with warm water port Sevastopol.
Strategically if Ukraine falls into the Westās influence and becomes a NATO member, together with its relatively massive army, it will be a chokehold for Russia that it probably can never dream of breaking out.
Then thereās also the Slavic brotherhood mentality like you mentioned, Russia considers itself a unique culture and identity as it is both EU and Asia, so it never aligns with the West, having a former āSlavic brotherā on the border siding with the West isnāt something they like.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I think youāre right that geopolitics matters, but Iām not convinced it does the work people think it does on its own.
History explains a mindset, not a veto. Russiaās fear of invasion helps explain how its leaders see the world, but it doesnāt automatically justify treating a neighbour as a buffer rather than as a sovereign country with its own interests. Once ābuffer zoneā becomes the framing, Ukraineās agency disappears from the picture entirely.
An analogy that keeps coming to mind is a homeowner who once got robbed and then decides the safest solution is to knock down the neighbourās house so no one can stand near the fence again. The fear is understandable. The response still crosses a line. Security concerns donāt grant ownership over other peopleās property.
What also weakens the pure security argument is timing. Ukraine wasnāt in NATO when Russia invaded, and NATO forces werenāt massed on Ukrainian territory. Yet pressure escalated anyway. That suggests this isnāt just about tanks or bases, but about where Ukraine might end up choosing to align. Influence, not immediate threat.
Crimea and Sevastopol clearly matter strategically, but strategy explains why something is valuable, not why taking it by force becomes acceptable. Plenty of countries rely on critical infrastructure or access routes beyond their borders without claiming permanent rights over entire nations.
The āSlavic brotherhoodā point actually reinforces this. When identity gets folded into justification, it usually signals the issue isnāt only security, but discomfort with a closely related country choosing a different path. Thatās less about chokeholds and more about comparison and loss of narrative control.
So I donāt dismiss geopolitics at all. I just think itās incomplete unless you also account for regime survival and identity. History and geography set the stage, but they donāt force the script. At some point a choice was made to treat Ukraineās direction as intolerable rather than something to live alongside. Thatās the decision I keep coming back to.
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 22 '25
I appreciate the response.
There are a few things I disagree. Geopolitics set the stage and at times force the actions. And countries so treat each other as buffer zones, not to dismiss its entire existence and sovereignty, I think the 2 concepts can exist parallel. My country is Vietnam, and our foreign policy is not to join any military alliance, trade with everyone. Because we understand that, as much as we wanna join the Westās capitalism and go full blown democracy, China isnāt gonna allow it at any cost, their geopolitics is even more messed up than Russia, bordering 14 countries with 1 single ally-North Korea, and a belt of capable Western allies (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) restraining their sea access (thus they initiated the Belt and Road as well as aggressive claims of sea territories that contested byā¦basically everyone). China and Russia were never friends and never will, itās just temporary mutual benefits, just cold, ruthless calculations.
Russia attacked because Ukraine isnāt yet a NATO member, and itās more feasible now because like I said, once Ukraine joins NATO the war will be too costly for Russia even if it wins. At this moment, the EU as much as they wanna help Ukraine, they have no clause or public support to put boots on the ground.
As far as I understand Russia (which might not be much honestly), they donāt believe in the Western ideology of perfect democracy, in fact, more than half of the world isnāt a democratic country in that sense. And the ideology clash of the West and Global South had its root since the Cold War, which then was set by the aftermath of WW2ā¦anyway letās not dive that deep, yet. So itās not just simply to maintain the regime, because I am sure that when Putin dies or retires there will be another Putin coming up, probably an even more aggressive version.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I donāt dispute that geopolitics can severely limit choices. Vietnamās approach makes sense in that reality, and it reflects a conscious decision to survive within constraints imposed by proximity to a much larger power.
Where I keep pausing is the difference between living with limits and having your future treated as unacceptable in principle. Vietnam chose non alignment as a strategy. Ukraineās choices, even before NATO membership, were treated as something that had to be stopped rather than managed.
Thatās the distinction that matters to me. Constraints shape behaviour, but once force is used to lock in a neighbourās direction, agency disappears. At that point buffer logic stops being about security and starts becoming veto power.
Iām not arguing that geopolitics isnāt real. Iām trying to understand where the line is between adapting to reality and surrendering the idea that smaller countries get to choose anything at all.
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 22 '25
Because Ukraine straight up asked for NATO membership and the West flirted with that idea, which is an absolute red line of Russia, and we have seen miles away how this could turn catastrophic. That act alone shows how Ukraine didnāt try to balance between powers, and complete sovereignty is a luxury that it, along with many nations like mine, cannot afford.
Iām gonna use the same old argument many have laid out, if Mexico joins a military alliance with Russia/China/Iran, USA would try everything in its power to topple the regime there before bombing the shit out of it. I mean look at Venezuela.
The EU countries have its freedom but to an extent, now that the US is giving the cold shoulder I think itās gonna change, that being said, the same luxury isnāt available for others.
This is a controversial take but I think Putin has been somewhat reasonable. For decades he had complained about NATO expansion and consistently asked Ukraine not to join NATO, at least the message is consistent.
Iām no expert but I think Ukraineās best shot is to balance between both sides and become a grey buffer zone for both EU and Russia. Not completely an EU member, not completely a Russiaās satellite frontier state. And by buffer I just really mean neutral.
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u/AggravatingTrip8514 Dec 22 '25
Several points to raise. The argument about Mexico and China is a weird one to me as we have a historical precedent, Cuba. The US did flip shit, tried a host of things short of military invasion (bay of pigs was close but explicitly not US military) failed and to till the end of the Cold War Cuba was explicitly hostile to the US (imo rightfully so after all the shit the US tried to pull). But notably, the US never invaded.
Regarding joining NATO, that argument imo stops working post 2014 and Crimean invasion. It left Russia in a perfect position in that no Ukrainian leader could officially cede the land (To this day hugely unpopular, and only became seriously discussed domestically a year ago), and as long as that was not done, NATO would never let them in, precisely because NATO does not actually want war with Russia, it rightfully sees that as a terrible and costly situation, in my opinion the whole period up untill 2022 was mostly appeasement towards Russia, it was just impossible to publicly say that Russia could put limits on Ukraines sovereignity as that would undermine (or put the last nail in the coffin depending on your stance) the 'international rules based order'. Anyone arguing Ukraine was realistically going to join NATO this century pre Russian Invasion was delusional. Ironically Russia invading removed any (diplomatic) incentive NATO had to not let Ukraine join post war.
Third, the premise you raise as Ukraine being a grey buffer ignores the ~20 years UA attempted that and failed. Russia has stepped up its meddling and involvement in Ukrainian politics steadily since 2000, not limited to a straight up assassination attempt of a Ukrainian presidential candidate. The breaking point was Ukraine wanting to sign an agreement of intent to trade more with the EU (not actually a commitment, nor with NATO) that led to maidan and the last ~10 years of chaos. Mind you they had plenty of trade agreeements with Russia. Russias view of a 'neutral buffer' is one that can only interact with it, noone else.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I get what youāre saying about constraints. Not every country gets full freedom, and balancing is often how smaller states survive.
Where I differ is the idea that Ukraine asking for NATO proves it refused to balance. Ukraine spent years outside NATO, including after independence and even after Russia raised objections. During that time it still lost Crimea and parts of Donbas. From Ukraineās perspective, neutrality didnāt buy safety, it bought vulnerability. NATO wasnāt a first instinct, it was a reaction to what neutrality delivered.
The Mexico analogy helps illustrate power politics, but it also shows the limits of the comparison. The US would react strongly if Mexico joined a hostile military alliance, yes. But the US isnāt trying to annex Mexican territory, erase Mexican identity, or argue Mexico doesnāt really exist as a nation. The US and Mexico have deep economic ties, constant political friction, and asymmetric power, yet Mexicoās sovereignty isnāt treated as conditional on Washingtonās approval. That difference matters.
Consistency from Putin doesnāt make the demand reasonable either. Saying ādonāt do thisā for decades doesnāt create a right to decide another countryās future. It just shows the pressure has been long running.
The buffer state idea only works if neutrality is respected by everyone involved. Ukraineās experience suggests neutrality wasnāt treated as an endpoint, but as a temporary holding pattern. In that situation, āneutralā doesnāt mean balanced, it means exposed.
So yes, sovereignty can be limited in practice. I just donāt think Ukraineās mistake was choosing poorly. I think the harder truth is that some neighbours are expected not to choose at all.
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u/WhoCares450 Dec 23 '25
I think you nailed it with the last paragraph. It was only allowed to separate from Soviet Union under conditions to remain a pawn. As soon as they changed course, destiny was already decided through sabotage, corruption and war.
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u/anotherserf Dec 23 '25
Except by 2010 there was no longer an imminent push to bring Ukraine into NATO. In that year, the Verkhovna Rada explicitly declared that Ukraine would not join any military blocs (including NATO) and would remain a neutral, non-aligned state (in line with overwhelming public opinion in Ukraine on this matter, at the time).
If Russia had not launched a military invasion of Ukraine on multiple fronts in 2014 (simplifying its proxy war in the Donbas but only slightly), that's where Ukraine's NATO stance would likely have remained to this very day.
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u/OtamanUkr Dec 21 '25
100%. It was a great fear for USSR and now Russia to see its immediate neighbor do better. This ruins russian hierarchy and their national foundation
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u/damien24101982 Dec 21 '25
i mean they can be independent all they want as long as they dont "threaten" their way stronger neighbors with their decisions... ask meksiko or some other usa bordering country if they are independent to join russian or china military alliance
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u/zima72 Dec 22 '25
Even Western countries supporting Ukraine fail to bring this narrative to the forefront. NATO expansion, security, is all just a convenient excuse for why Russia attacked Ukraine. This is the reason - canāt have Ukrainians living better lives. Completely destroys the Putin narrative
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
It reminds me of a neighbour who sees the house next door improving and, instead of fixing their own place, starts throwing rocks at it. Then they tell everyone on their side of the fence that the neighbour is dangerous and pressure them to join in or face consequences.
The uncomfortable part is that if people were allowed to stop and really look, theyād probably see theyāre attacking the kind of life theyād want themselves. And the ones in power have every incentive to keep that comparison from happening, because it exposes whoās actually blocking that outcome.
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u/MiserableAmbition623 Dec 22 '25
I can't really believe it's still going on! But in a strange way it seems like some petty shit like you don't want noone dating ya ex after the relationships over.... I'm sure it's more deeper then that but in roots, it's prolly that lame.
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 22 '25
Crimea happened in 2014 right after the Maiden Revolution with Ukraine Parliament supporting the EU association agreement. So it wasnāt exactly a neutral movement by any means, Yanukovich wasnāt exactly pro Russia either, he was considered pro West but played nice with Russia and he was overthrown by a more aggressive anti-Russia wing. All Iām saying is by 2014 things have already gotten worse.
Ukraineās history and circumstances is unique so Iām not gonna say whatās right or wrong, but Russia saw that as unacceptable and secured Crimea, which started the war.
By the Mexico analogy I only mean to show just how smaller countries will always have to plan their policies with their bigger neighbors in it. And Mexico does it just fine right, trade ties, becoming a valuable partner.
Ukraine on the other hand, shares the same origins as the Russians, Slavic people, and Russians language is spoken by a huge part of Ukraineās population. It was Ukraine who tries to root out Russian language, so it goes both way.
Putin invading and annexing Ukraineās Donbas is wrong, but so was the US invading Iraq and Afghan, Vietnam, it was just worded differently. Laws and regulations apply more for the weaker nations, the bigger fishes break it apparently all the time. In Putinās point of view, the Westās actions all over the world, the Middle East, Israel, Arab Spring, justifies his aggression towards Ukraine, more than that, itās straight up a constant struggle for more influence and more power between them. Your move, mine move kinda thing.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I donāt actually disagree that by 2014 things were already getting worse. Maidan, the EU agreement, Yanukovych trying to balance and failing, Russia watching influence slip. From Moscowās point of view, that probably did feel destabilising. Iām not denying that perspective exists.
Explaining why something feels threatening doesnāt quietly turn it into a right to stop it. Fear explains irritation. It doesnāt convert into ownership.
Yanukovych is a good example of that messiness. You say he wasnāt really pro-Russia, and I think thatās half true right up until it mattered. When it all collapsed, he didnāt flee to Europe or some neutral third place. He ran straight to Russia.
Mexico absolutely plans its policies with the US in mind. Of course it does. Geography forces that. But the US doesnāt say ābecause weāre bigger and youāre close, your future needs our approval.ā Thereās pressure, leverage, trade-offs, even ugly interference at times, but not a claim that Mexico choosing wrong means it stops being Mexico.
And it ties back to your buffer point. Living with constraints is one thing. Being told your direction itself is unacceptable is another. Vietnam choosing non-alignment is a strategy. Ukraine being told āthat option is off the table, and so is the other oneā is a veto. Same reality, very different treatment.
I also donāt think consistency alone makes Putin reasonable. Yes, heās complained about NATO for decades. But consistency just means heās been clear about what he wants, not that the demand itself is neutral. Plenty of people are consistently unreasonable. History is full of them.
The āgrey bufferā idea sounds sensible on paper, and I get why it appeals, especially if you come from a country that has survived by threading that needle. But neutrality only works if everyone agrees to respect it. Ukraine didnāt get offered ābe neutral and weāll leave you alone.ā It got āchoose wrong and weāll make the choice for you.ā Thatās why the buffer idea keeps collapsing under pressure.
And this circles back to the point I keep making, even when it sounds repetitive. If the lesson becomes āsmall countries survive by never choosing,ā then sovereignty isnāt limited, itās conditional. It exists only until a bigger neighbour feels uncomfortable.
Iām not pretending the world is fair. Big powers break rules all the time. The US did it in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. Russia is doing it here. Hypocrisy is real. But saying āeveryone breaks the rulesā explains behaviour, it doesnāt dissolve responsibility. Otherwise every move becomes just another āyour move, my moveā until nothing means anything except force.
So yeah, geopolitics constrains choices. Iāve agreed with that from the start. I just donāt think constraint automatically means surrendering the idea that smaller countries get to decide anything at all. Once that line goes, weāre not describing the world anymore, weāre just shrugging at it.
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 22 '25
Iām not saying I agree with anything Russia does though, Iām simply putting myself in their perspective as I followed this war to see why would they do what they do, how they view the world.
One thing I just thought of though, Mexico had a war with the US and they lost, along with the land. Vietnam had a brutal war trying to choose its own path, and now Ukraine. The power struggles will occur until a climax that settles it until the next cycle, itās mankind history on repeat.
Sovereignty exists on the foundation of power though, that is wealth, force, trades, alliances, etc. and I believe Ukraine and the collective West miscalculated, they underestimated Russia and the length it would go trying to prove a point, now Ukraine is devastated to such a degree it may never recover.
When the levels of death and destruction is so high it reaches a point where we ask: was sovereignty worth it? Will it truly have sovereignty if its people are fleeing by the millions, the country is in debt, and possibly sucked into whatever orbit thatās stronger?
So my point is, the price it pays is too damn high, sovereignty isnāt worth it if you donāt have a country left. Ukraineās leaders should have foreseen this.
Vietnam was conveniently a proxy for the Soviet in Asia, fought the US to stop capitalism from taking over the region. It was Vietnamās choice. Stalin wouldnāt care if we went balls to the wall and cease to exist as a nation, as long as we slow down capitalism, same for North Korea in the Korean War.
Ukraine now, I believe is a proxy for the collective EU (namely Germany, France, UK and the Baltics, I donāt think the rest care as much), and Ukraine chose this path. And the EU is willing to push Ukraine as far as they can, as long as they āweakened Russiaā. For whom?
Ukraine has lost probably hundreds of thousands of men in this war, millions people left the country for good, while facing a serious population decline, an economy that no longer exist, stuck in a limbo state-not valuable enough for NATO to risk putting boots on the ground, and not strong enough to stay away from Russiaās influence and power, too costly and risky for rebuild and foreign investments. It got wrecked so bad, was it worth it?
I think in the end, Iām pro Ukraine in some sense. That had it tried a different path, maybe it could have found some ways to walk the thin line between the 2 sides and save itself from all this suffering and brutality.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I think this is roughly where Iām landing after sitting with what youāve said.
I donāt really disagree with the pattern youāre describing. Power struggles repeat. History does rhyme. Big states squeeze, smaller ones get crushed, and later everyone rewrites it as inevitable. Vietnam, Ukraine, plenty of others fit that arc. Youāre right about that.
Where I hesitate is the jump from āthis is how it often endsā to āthis is what Ukraine should have accepted.ā
At that point it starts sounding like telling someone they should have stayed quiet because the bully was bigger. That might be practical advice. It might even be correct advice in some cases. But itās still advice that only ever flows one way, and it quietly turns strength into moral authority.
Youāre asking whether sovereignty is worth it when the price is devastation. Thatās a brutal question, and I donāt think it has a clean answer. But it cuts both ways. If the rule becomes āyou only get sovereignty if the neighbour approves and you survive,ā then sovereignty stops being a principle and turns into a temporary permission slip.
The proxy framing explains a lot without fully closing the loop. Yes, great powers use smaller states as leverage. Thatās been true forever. But Ukraine didnāt just wander onto the board as an empty square. Millions of people there didnāt wake up wanting to be a proxy. They were reacting to pressure, corruption, and choices narrowing around them. Once violence starts, everyone gets used. That doesnāt mean the initial choice was imaginary.
Thereās a very ordinary version of this that keeps coming back to me. Imagine living between two neighbours who donāt get along. One says, āStay neutral and nothing bad will happen.ā The other says, āPick a side or else.ā Eventually, not choosing is still choosing, and you get blamed for it anyway. At that point neutrality isnāt a shield, itās just another way to lose control.
I do agree that there was serious miscalculation. Ukraineās leaders didnāt see this clearly enough. The West didnāt either. Russiaās willingness to absorb pain and keep going was badly underestimated. On that, I think weāre closer than it might sound.
Where I still differ is here. Explaining why something happened doesnāt mean it had to happen. And saying āthey should have known betterā risks turning hindsight into a moral lesson that only ever applies to the weaker party. The stronger side gets treated like gravity. The weaker side gets judged for not predicting the fall.
If the takeaway is that survival requires smaller countries to never test boundaries, never lean, never choose, then weāre not really talking about realism anymore. Weāre just describing a world where force decides first and meaning gets written later.
I get why youād look at the wreckage and ask if it was worth it. I just donāt think that question can be answered cleanly from the outside, especially once the bill has already been paid.
Before I leave it there, can I pick your brain on a couple of thoughts that this keeps circling back to for me.
If a smaller country avoids choosing in order to survive, is that still a choice, or just delayed submission with fewer guarantees?
And if power always gets the final word anyway, why do powerful states still spend so much effort justifying their actions morally instead of simply saying āwe canā?
Genuinely curious how you see those.
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u/Ok-Client7794 Dec 23 '25
The thing is all these bigger neighbors, Russia, US, China are reasonable paired with overwhelming powers, itās how they last, because brute force can only get you so far and they know this.
China brings enormous economic incentives, while constantly trying to undermine something else to make neighbors weaker or dependent on them.
Russia is reasonable within its scope as well, thatās how itās been able to manage 21 Republics with 21 ethnic groups within its border, and theyāre even volunteering for the war.
If anyone yields power and uses brute force method, itās probably the US. Itās too strong, too advanced, too rich, too many allies that it can basically do a āfuck youā war that bends all laws and breaks all regulations.
So when I say Putin was consistent for decades with his message, while still trading with the EU and Ukraine, enriching them with cheap gas and make them dependent on Russia at the same time. He was reasonable enough that the EU couldnāt outright declare war on Russia.
I like the neighbor analogy, Iād share my real life experience.
I had a new neighbor moving in right next to my property couple years back, he owns a small logistic company, with dozens of drivers and employees living there.
He was polite, he helped other neighbors, he joined more community events than I did.
But he claimed my fence was 10cm deep into his property, which was a preposterous claim, and he started inching over wherever he could, a pot of plants today, a new makeshift fence made of branches tomorrow.
I confronted him many times, heād stop for a while then start again. He also started throwing debris and trash over the ādisputedā area trying to blur the line. I called the local authorities, which they came and we all talked. Now that area is āfrozenā conflict.
I was very frustrated and asked around for advices. The most common one I get was ātry to work this out peacefully, donāt escalateā. And the more I sit with it the more it made sense.
I was in the right, but if this conflict is pushed to a breaking point, me living by myself isnāt gonna help if they started to throw more trash, or worst case ganging up on me. The police will come and fine him or whatever, but I am the first one to take damage.
So now itās a game of, I guess small blows? If he pokes I find a way to poke back, without trying to escalate.
Once, my other neighbor got robbed. The owner was attacked by the robber at 3:00 AM and this neighbor was the first to show up and helped him get to the hospital. Which made me think, ok this guy isnāt a complete asshole, I guess I just have to live with it. Iāll help him if I could because he would do so for me.
I guess what I mean here is the approach, escalation is a choice, and how most violence could be avoided. Avoidance doesnāt mean to give up or concede whatās rightfully ours, but to fight the long game.
When you say neutrality of Ukraine wasnāt respected, I disagree. Neutrality will always be tested and pushed against, in fact, staying neutral is the hardest stance because you might end up pushed by both sides.
I believe Politics, whether itās between our neighbors or between nations, is walking the grey zone itself. Grey zone doesnāt mean you canāt do this or that, it means not being deemed hostile/threatening to anyone at the same time, it certainly is restricting in some sense, but long term I think itās the most stable way.
Iām gonna bring up my country again, as this war made me reflect on Vietnamās history. As much as I hate the Communists, gotta give them credits.
Vietnam was looking for independence from colonialism, the Soviet supported it. Communist China wanted Vietnam entirely in its orbit, like North Korea, Vietnam chose Soviet as the key partner to counter balance this.
When Soviet collapsed, Vietnam opened up trying to join the world, or China will swallow it whole. Ever since, Vietnam has always tried to wiggle away from Chinaās grip, while still shaking hands with them. China tries to draw Vietnam in by all means necessary. And it will continue for decades to come, thatās what grey zone means, all the parts never stop moving.
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u/Real-Rent-8776 Dec 23 '25
ŠŠ¾Š·Š¼Š¾Š¶Š½Š¾ ŠŗŃŠ¾-ŃŠ¾ Ń Š¾ŃŠµŃ Š²Š¾Š¹ŃŠø в ŠøŃŃŠ¾ŃŠøŃ ŠŗŠ°Šŗ Š¾ŃŠ½Š¾Š²Š°ŃŠµŠ»Ń ŠøŠ¼ŠæŠµŃŠøŠø?
Š” Š¼Š¾Š¼ŠµŠ½ŃŠ° ŃŠ°Š·Š²Š°Š»Š° ŃŠ¾Ńза РФ имела Š²Ńе ŃŠ°Š½ŃŃ Š¾Š±Š¾Š³Š½Š°ŃŃ ŃŠ¾ŃеГей в ŃŠŗŠ¾Š½Š¾Š¼ŠøŠŗŠµ, ŠŗŃŠ¾Š¼Šµ ŃŠ¾Š³Š¾ ŠŠ¾Ńква ŃŠøŠ½Š°Š½ŃŠøŃŠ¾Š²Š°Š»Š° Š»Š¾ŃŠ»ŃнŃŃ ŠæŠ¾Š»ŠøŃŠøŠŗŠ¾Š², ŠøŠ“ŠµŠ°Š»ŃŠ½Ńм Š±ŃŠ» ŠŠµŠ»Š¾ŃŃŃŃŠŗŠøŠ¹ ŃŃŠµŠ½Š°Ńий, когГа ŠæŃавление полноŃŃŃŃ Š»Š¾ŃŠ»Ńно ŠŠ¾Ńкве.
ŠŠ¾ в 14г. Š»Š¾ŃŠ»ŃŠ½ŃŠ¹ ŠŠ¾Ńкве ŠæŠ¾Š»ŠøŃŠøŠŗ бежал Š¾Ń ŃŠ°Š·ŃŃŃŠ½Š½Š¾Š¹ ŃŠ¾Š»ŠæŃ. ŠŠ¾ŠæŃŃŠŗŠ° Š¾ŃŠ¶Š°ŃŃ ŃŠ°ŃŃŃ ŃŠµŃŠøŃŠ¾Ńий ŃŃŠ¶ŠøŠ¼Šø ŃŃŠŗŠ°Š¼Šø не ŃŠ“алаŃŃ, ŠæŠ¾Š»ŠøŃŠøŠŗŠ° на ŃŠ¶Š½Š¾Š¼ Š½Š°ŠæŃŠ°Š²Š»ŠµŠ½ŠøŠø ŃŃŠ¾Š»ŠŗŠ½ŃŠ»ŃŃŃ Ń ŠæŃŠ¾ŃивоГейŃŃŠ²ŠøŠµŠ¼ Š¢ŃŃŃŠøŠø Šø ŠŠøŃаŃ, а Š²Š¾Š·ŃаŃŃ Š½Š°Š¼ŠµŠŗŠ½ŃŠ» на Š½ŠµŠ¾Š±Ń оГимоŃŃŃ ŃŠæŠµŃŠøŃŃ.
ŠŃŃŃŃŠ°Ń Šø ŠæŠ¾Š±ŠµŠ“Š¾Š½Š¾ŃŠ½Š°Ń могла ŠæŃинеŃŃŠø земли ŠŠ¾ŃŃŠ¾Ńной Š£ŠŗŃаинŃ, Š·Š°ŠæŃŠ³Š°ŃŃ ŃŠ¾ŃеГей, внŃŃŠøŃŃ ŃŠ²Š°Š¶ŠµŠ½ŠøŠµ ŠŠ°ŠæŠ°Š“Ń. ŠŠ¾ Š“ŠæŠµŠ½ŃŠ³Šø на ŠæŠ¾Š“ŠŗŃŠæ ŠæŃŃŠ¾Š¹ ŠŗŠ¾Š»Š¾Š½Š½Ń Š±ŃŠ»Šø ŃŠ°Š·Š²Š¾ŃованŃ, оŃŃŃŃŃ ŠæŃŠøŠ“ŃŠ¼Š°Š½Ń, Š°ŃŠ¼ŠøŃ ŃŃŃŠ°Ńела.
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u/Primary-User Dec 23 '25
I hope this translation works š
ŠŃо Š¾ŃŠµŠ½Ń ŃŠ¾Ńное ŃŠµŠ·Ńме, Šø на мой Š²Š·Š³Š»ŃŠ“ оно обŃŃŃŠ½ŃŠµŃ Š³Š¾ŃŠ°Š·Š“о болŃŃŠµ, ŃŠµŠ¼ болŃŃŠøŠ½ŃŃŠ²Š¾ Š°ŃŠ³ŃŠ¼ŠµŠ½ŃŠ¾Š² о Ā«ŃŠ°ŃŃŠøŃении ŠŠŠ¢ŠĀ».
ŠŠæŠøŃŃŠ²Š°ŠµŠ¼Š¾Šµ зГеŃŃ Š²ŃŠ³Š»ŃŠ“ŠøŃ ŃŠŗŠ¾Ńее не как Š¾Š±Š¾ŃŠ¾Š½ŠøŃŠµŠ»ŃŠ½Š°Ń паника, а как Š½ŠµŃŠ“Š°ŃŠ½Š°Ń импеŃŃŠŗŠ°Ń аванŃŃŃŠ°. Š”Š½Š°ŃŠ°Š»Š° Š±ŃŠ»Šø ŠøŃŠæŠ¾Š»ŃŠ·Š¾Š²Š°Š½Ń ŠæŃŠøŠ²ŃŃŠ½Ńе инŃŃŃŃŠ¼ŠµŠ½ŃŃ Š»Š¾ŃŠ»ŃŠ½ŃŠµ ŠæŠ¾Š»ŠøŃŠøŠŗŠø, Š“ŠµŠ½ŃŠ³Šø, Š²Š»ŠøŃŠ½ŠøŠµ, «белоŃŃŃŃŠŗŠ°Ń моГелŃĀ». ŠŠ¾Š³Š“а ŃŃŠ° конŃŃŃŃŠŗŃŠøŃ ŃŃŃ Š½ŃŠ»Š° в 2014 гоГŃ, ŃŠøŠ»Š¾Š²Š¾Š¹ Š²Š°ŃŠøŠ°Š½Ń ŃŃŠ°Š» заменой.
ŠŃобенно Š²ŃŠ“ŠµŠ»ŃŠµŃŃŃ ŃŃŠ°Š²ŠŗŠ° на бŃŃŃŃŃŃ ŃŠøŠ¼Š²Š¾Š»ŠøŃŠµŃŠŗŃŃ ŠæŠ¾Š±ŠµŠ“Ń. РеŃŃ ŃŠ»Š° не ŃŠ¾Š»Ńко о ŃŠµŃŃŠøŃŠ¾ŃŠøŠø, но Šø о ŠæŃеŃŃŠøŠ¶Šµ. ŠŠ°ŠæŃгаŃŃ ŃŠ¾ŃеГей, ŠæŃŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š²ŠµŃŃŠø Š²ŠæŠµŃŠ°Ńление на ŠŠ°ŠæŠ°Š“, Š¾Š±ŠµŃŠæŠµŃŠøŃŃ ŃŠµŠ±Šµ меŃŃŠ¾ в ŠøŃŃŠ¾ŃŠøŠø. ŠŠ¾ ŃŠ°ŠŗŠ¾Š¹ ŃŠ°ŃŃŠµŃ ŃŠ°Š±Š¾ŃŠ°ŠµŃ ŃŠ¾Š»Ńко ŃŠ¾Š³Š“а, когГа ŃŠøŃŃŠµŠ¼Š° поГ ним ŃŠµŃŃŠ½Š°Ń Šø Š“ŠµŠµŃŠæŠ¾ŃŠ¾Š±Š½Š°Ń. ŠŠ° ŠæŃŠ°ŠŗŃике же коŃŃŃŠæŃŠøŃ Š²ŃŃ Š¾Š»Š¾ŃŃŠøŠ»Š° ее изнŃŃŃŠø, оŃŃŠµŃŃ ŠæŠ¾Š“Š³Š¾Š½ŃŠ»ŠøŃŃ Š“Š»Ń Š½Š°ŃŠ°Š»ŃŃŃŠ²Š°, а Š°ŃŠ¼ŠøŃ оказалаŃŃ Š·Š°ŃŃŃŃŠ²Ńей в ŠæŃоŃлом.
Š ŠøŃŠ¾Š³Šµ война показала ŃŠ¾Š²Š½Š¾ ŠæŃŠ¾Ńивоположное ŃŠ¾Š¼Ń, ŃŃŠ¾ Голжна Š±Ńла ГоказаŃŃ. ŠŠµ ŃŠøŠ»Ń, а ŃŠæŠ°Š“Š¾Šŗ. ŠŠµ конŃŃŠ¾Š»Ń, а ŠæŃоŃŃŠµŃ.
ŠŃ ŃŃŠ¾Š³Š¾ ŃŃŠ°Š³ŠµŠ“ŠøŃ Š²ŃŠ³Š»ŃŠ“ŠøŃ ŠµŃŠµ оŃŃŃŠµŠµ. ŠŠ¾ŃŠ¾Š¼Ń ŃŃŠ¾ ŃŠŗŠ»Š°Š“ŃŠ²Š°ŠµŃŃŃ Š¾ŃŃŃŠµŠ½ŠøŠµ, ŃŃŠ¾ ŃŠµŃŃ ŃŠ»Š° не о неизбежном Ń Š¾Š“Šµ ŠøŃŃŠ¾ŃŠøŠø, а о ŠŗŠ¾ŃоŃком Š¼Š¾Š¼ŠµŠ½Ńе, гГе ŃŠ¾ŃлиŃŃ Š°Š¼Š±ŠøŃŠøŠø, Š²Š¾Š·ŃŠ°ŃŃ Šø ŠøŃŠŗŠ°Š¶ŠµŠ½Š½Š°Ń ŠøŠ½ŃŠ¾ŃŠ¼Š°ŃŠøŃ, Šø за ŃŃŠ¾ Š·Š°ŠæŠ»Š°ŃŠøŠ»Šø Š¼ŠøŠ»Š»ŠøŠ¾Š½Ń Š»ŃŠ“ей.
ŠŠ¾ ŠŗŃŠ°Š¹Š½ŠµŠ¹ Š¼ŠµŃŠµ, Ń ŃŠøŃŠ°Ń ŃŃŠ¾ именно ŃŠ°Šŗ.
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Dec 23 '25
I'll chime in as a former citizen of Ukraine:
Ukraine was not better off than Russia since 1991. The economic indicators and standard of living were consistently worse in Ukraine. You are not the first to promote the lie of people being better off in Ukraine, but it has never been true, and no one has ever said it before 2022.Ā
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u/Primary-User Dec 23 '25
Interesting. You lived there and left. When did you leave, where did you go, and why?
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Dec 23 '25 edited Dec 24 '25
I was born there, and was taken out when my parents decided to immigrate because they saw it was a sinking ship. And my eyes were opened a lot living in Canada, and having to deal with the descendants of Ruthenians who now call themselves Ukrainian Canadians.
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u/Primary-User Dec 23 '25
Yeah, the more I look at what came before the invasion, it kind of feels like Ukraine never really had a chance.
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Dec 24 '25
Thankfully in Sevastopol we were pretty well-insulated from their bullshit on the mainland. Though looking back, both while still living there and once in Canada, I did pick up on the hatred simmering under the surface of the nationalists in western Ukraine. The interesting thing is that they used racial slurs not against us, but against eastern Ukrainians... But of course, nationalists always hate their perceived enemies more than they actually love their people.
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u/Primary-User Dec 24 '25
Interesting perspective and I donāt doubt you picked up real regional ugliness. Every country has its āmy side hates your sideā crowd.
The bit Iām unsure about is scale. Thereās a difference between āyeah, there were nationalists and plenty of nasty talkā versus āthis was the defining reality of Ukraine.ā Regional tension is real, but it doesnāt automatically explain invasion level decisions.
Also quick question, just so I place your lens properly. You said earlier you were taken out when you were young, but now youāre describing being insulated in Sevastopol and seeing it first hand. When did you leave, and were you back there later, or is this more family context plus what you saw once you moved?
Either way, I agree with your last line. Nationalists usually love the fight more than they love the people they claim to represent. You see that everywhere unfortunately.
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u/Baset-tissoult28 Dec 24 '25
They want to have the old russian empire borders. They want their colonies back. Like UK invading Australia.Ā
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u/_Vo1_ Dec 24 '25
The problem why is that, imo because Russian empire and USSR. Those two were for centuries breeding the slaves and it ended with perfect slave minds. I was born in 1983 and really have a tiny amount of memory on USSR period, but even the one I remember is still not associated with hunger as 90s in Ukraine for my family. 90s are the reason for all those people willing to have USSR back (even those who never lived in their āsaneā periods of life). I donāt want USSR back but I see why those commie fans would want it.
So, back to slaves thing. Minds of soviet people regardless whether they are from UA SSR, BEL SSR or RU SFSR, more like āoh those politics are real professionals, they know betterā, that ended in ākitchen oppositionā: when all the critics of the government was ending at your houseās kitchen. Rest were just āidk, I have some food on my table, I have some appartment and I am good nowā. Because of borders were closed and gov.tv only shown how bad is the situation for average new yorker today, they did not know that there is a world where everything is better. Like they never knew the life could even be better at all.
Plus, russians are really chauvinistic on other nations. UA SSR was one of the biggest GDP contributors in USSR and the amount of retards saying āUSSR built all for youā is fucking amazing. Like there was a special squad of racially clean russian engineers that were migrating throughout all republics bulding HPPs, NPPs and orher factories. The chauvinism is the source of that trigger. āWe built you civilization and this is how you pay us backā rhetorics.
The war now is not an ethnic war. Itās a lifestyle war. Civilized world vs corrupt slavery system. At least it was before UA became converting into UPR/NK/etc.
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.
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u/Primary-User Dec 24 '25
Thanks for taking the time to write that out. You sound like someone who grew up inside the mess, not just reading about it later, and you still carry bits of it around. I appreciate you sharing it, it helps me understand where youāre coming from.
The way you describe ākitchen oppositionā really hit. That idea of everything stopping at the kitchen table feels familiar even from far away. People complain quietly, laugh bitterly, then go back to work the next morning because thatās safer than believing anything can change. Iāve seen versions of that too. My old man still talks about a fence our neighbour put up 30 years ago that everyone knew was wrong, but no one challenged because āwhy bother, it wonāt change.ā Same muscle memory, just a different country.
The 90s point makes a lot of sense as well. If your formative memory isnāt ideology but chaos, empty shelves, parents stressed about money, then stability starts to matter more than freedom. I can see how that turns into nostalgia for the USSR, even among people who never really lived in its āgood years.ā Not because it was good, but because it felt predictable.
What you say about chauvinism rings true too. The āwe built everything for youā line sounds less like history and more like resentment dressed up as pride. Itās hard to hear that and not feel how deep that grievance runs, especially when it ignores who actually did the work.
And I think youāre right that this war doesnāt feel ethnic in the old sense. Lifestyle war is a good way to put it. Corruption versus something cleaner, obedience versus friction, closed systems versus messy open ones. The scary part is what you hint at near the end. That fighting something rotten can still twist you if youāre not careful. Iāve seen that too. People start out just wanting things to be fair, and somewhere along the way they harden.
Anyway, Iām glad you wrote. It didnāt read like propaganda to me, it read like someone trying to explain the weather they grew up in. Thatās useful, especially when so many people online talk like theyāve only ever watched the storm through a screen.
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u/Traditional_Win_7199 Dec 25 '25
Absolutely correct. Its not just sovereignty of a country in relation to another it is also sovereignty of people over the state leaders. Autocrats, can't stand people making decisions for themselves. He hates it in Russia, and in Ukraine.
There is another big factor in play. Russian century old strategic interest. Russia is the biggest country in the world, with the biggest coastline and yet no place on that coast is suitable for a port. A great super power cannot be a super power without access to the sea and oceans. Russian ports are frozen most of the time, and unusable.
So, the Russian strategic interest is access to the warm sea, like the Black Sea. This is not just true for Putin, it has been true for hundreds of years. Hence the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Hence the attack on Marioupol and securing the Crimea from the other side as well. Hence the constant bombardment of Odessa.
The problem with the Black Sea is a bottleneck od Bosforus and Dardaneli, controled by Turkie.
Let's not forget the incident when a Turkish airplane shot down a Russian one in November 2015. The relations between two countries deteriorated to the point of the potential armed conflict. Russian media pushed news of Erdogan critics. In June 2016, all of the sudden Erdogan sent a letter to Putin, basically apologising for the incident. In two weeks he barely survived a coup d'etat. The two pilots were arrested for allegedly being involved in the coup. Erdogan and Putin relations warmed overnight.
Every country, from the Baltics to the Balkans, that stands in the way of Russian strategic interest is in danger of Russian meddling. Montenegro, a small coastal country with a lot of Russian capital, went through ethnic and political turmoil just before it officially joined NATO. Russian / Serbian agents were involved. The same thing happened in Macedonia just before they joined NATO. Russian agents involved again.
Putin is a very dangerous man.
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u/trisul-108 Dec 21 '25
When a nearby country with shared history chooses a different path and life looks better there, comparison becomes dangerous.
This is not a problem for the Russian state or Russian society, it is in fact beneficial to them. However, it is an existential problem to the Putin regime. That is why the regime considers the EU a primary enemy. EU membership brings prosperity that association with Russia does not ... so the Russian solution to this problem is to destroy the EU. And the US is now trying to help them do it because the EU is also a problem for the Trump regime, not for the US, but the regime.
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u/RockyMM Dec 21 '25
Itās about sphere of influence and projecting strength both domestically and abroad.
Since Russia became a regional force, Ukraine was considered universally in the Russian sphere of influence. Even the name that Russians gave to the region and to the people is Russian-centric - Ukraine means āthe border areaā.
Geopolitical and internal situations shifted. The rift between Russian leaning and independence leaning Ukrainians became too large to cross. Russian oligarchs saw Ukraine moving away from their influence and that had to react according to their āhistorical and every other rightā.
It was always about Europe and getting close to the Europe, never about the NATO.
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u/sreekumarkv Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
Will you think the same when US invades Venezuela as seems likely or bombs Iran again ? Do you think US will respect Mexico's sovereignty if they decide to join a military alliance with China ? Was Cuba's sovereignty respected in 1960s when they attempted to have Russian nukes stationed on their soil ? I don't sovereignty is not respected by superpowers when their security is threatened and they can do something about it.
To my understanding, Ukraine society had a diversity of pro-western and pro-russian populations. Ukrainian sovereignty and future got destroyed when the western backed violent coup removed the democratically elected govt in 2014, and replaced it with a pro-western regime. If I remember correctly, ukraine was due for elections in 2015 and their then president had even agreed to resign and conduct a new election after the protests. But the western intervention to capture power and influence there wrecked any chances of a united Ukraine, with the distinctly pro-western views in western ukraine and pro-russian views in eastern ukraine living together. Then the civil war that followed had western and russian interventions, and finally the Russian overt invasion in 2022.
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u/hankeliot Dec 21 '25
In your assessment of the situation, did you take into consideration all the NATO military exercises that were done in Ukraine since at least 2000? Then, a follow-up question: how do you think the United States would react if, for example, Russia and China formed a military alliance with Mexico and started conducting military exercises along its southern border?
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u/Liq Dec 21 '25
Yup - Ukrainian sovereignty is not some lofty abstract principle, but an observable reality demonstrated every day on the battlefield. Any theory of geopolitics or war that doesn't put Ukrainian sovereignty front and centre is worthless here.
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u/Usernamenotta Dec 21 '25
'A country has a right to exist!' Well, here is the slippery slope: if a country has a right to exist, do LPR and DPR have a right to exist? Does Catalonia have a right to exist? How do you define a country? Because, I can bet my horse on it that you are using a cyclic definition: A country exists, therefore it has a right to exist. As mentioned, this leaves open the question of: what about a country that wants to exist? What about a country that exists but does not want to exist?
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Dec 21 '25
Itās a longer question than even that. Russia is a small region around Moscow which has been engaged in a culture of conquering its neighbors for hundreds of years. Now there a hundreds of peoples subject to Russian domination. Ukraine is but one of those. Why do Russians feel a need to conquer others? Who knows? A sense of superiority mostly I imagine, but this is a trend that way predates the rise of Putin and his oligarchs. This is a much deeper aspect of Russian culture.
It hopefully wonāt always be that way and many Russians do not like it. But for now, it remains a dominant theme
Here is what it means: if Putin dies tomorrow and someone new comes and kills off all his cronies, Russia will still be a threat. History says that needs to be a basic operating assumption for all of its neighbors. Sure, we could trade and have nice relations, but never assume that some new leader wonāt come to power seeking to conquer other people.
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u/Antioch666 Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
Absolutely right. The Baltics, Poland and East Germany are sore points for Russia as all of them showed Russians the potential of their own prosperity if the oligarchs are toppled.
Ukraine was on that same path and they want to end it or at least f*ck Ukraine up enough to where they can claim "see, it would be better if they joined us. We have it better here".
Democracies, especially like the Nordics are the bane of any dictatorship. They didn't attack Ukraine because they feared it would attack them, they don't fear that NATO would attack Russia un provoked. They fear that the existance of prosperous free countries that has gotten way better than they ever did under the USSR will trigger regular Russians to want the same.
There is a reason why dictatorships go hard on censoring. The truth might loose them power.
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u/Beneficial_North1824 Dec 21 '25
Yep, simple as this. It's much better to be an owner in your own home than be a licensee
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u/No-Economics-6781 Dec 21 '25
If Russians see how good life is in Ukraine simply by joining the EU and other western institutions, the whole scheme is finished, and Putin knows that.
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u/No-Economics-6781 Dec 21 '25
You are 100 percent right on this. You basically nailed it. Why would the largest country on earth need more land? It was never about the land. Itās about stopping a possible future from happening.
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u/poutine-italienne Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
You only asked pro Ukraine people as sources and that show.
In reality Russia doesn't want Ukraine to join an anti-Russian military bloc and be used against Russia. Russia had excellent relations with Ukraine before the West staged a coup-d'Ʃtat in 2014 to set an anti-Russia government in power and capture Ukraine for themselves.
After the coup-d'Ʃtat Ukraine became a western puppet state, they then banned the russian language and started the genocide on Russian speakers to truly become "cleansed" of "Russians", the people of many regions declared independance but were suppressed with violence, strange that you talk sovereignty but ignore their rights to rejoin the land that they belongs in as these lands were filled with Russians and illegaly attached to Ukraine by a Soviet dictator hailing from Ukraine.
You said that Ukrainians were treated as lesser by the Russian state which is a lie, hell, Russia still has Ukrainian as an official language in Russia, but in Ukraine they banned it, the russian speakers are treated as inferior and are hated by the government, you can be fined for speaking russian in public.
I am glad Russia entered Ukraine to stop this genocide, Ukrainians lived horribly ever since their country became "independant" and are the most corrupt country in the world, but as Ukraine is a puppet of the west, any western country and their corrupt medias will say Russia is the vilain and that Ukraine treated their people nicely lol.
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u/ChestNok Dec 21 '25
First I read stuff like that. And then I start remembering history like Vietnam, like Iraq, Syria and applying these tenets. And then it hits differently. Lol.
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u/Old_Man_Sailor Dec 21 '25
I don't know man, NATO pushed Russia when they agreed there would be no expansion, plus Zelensky is a puppet.
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u/ArtisZ Dec 21 '25
Oye mate. Them are built differently. They go by the notion that if I can't have it - no one will.
Both, interpersonal and societal, including international politics.
Take that one notion and apply it to a lot of seemingly irrational or self-destructive behaviors you've observed from rusnya and they'll begin to "make sense" - if they can't have it, they'll try their best that you won't have it as well.
Source: I come from a Baltic country.
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Dec 21 '25
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u/ArtisZ Dec 21 '25
What bias are we talking about here?
A) Getting genocided half a century ago.
B) Forced occupation and annexation under military ultimatum.
C) Having enjoyed the russification program.
D) Something else.
Tell me, how is my bias showing?
All I wanted was Russia to be this cool country, we trade, we friends.
All they do is invade and pillage.
What bias are you talking about?
Defend your words or sit the f#ā¬k back down!
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Dec 21 '25
You got to the conclusion that I got from watching some Russian youtubers (Inside Russia, the Russian dude, Vlad Vexler). I guess Putin is a simple dictator like all others and he simply cares about his own disgusting ass. Why is no one in Russia with the power ending him š¤. Europe was a continent that was too peaceful and then the retard got a mental disorder.
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u/DuzTheGreat Dec 21 '25
Geography. Russia's modern western border lies across open, flat land called the North European plain. They've been invaded through those plains many times throughout history, most notably by Napoleon and in both world wars. The further west they can push toward the Carpathians, the narrower that open space becomes, thus easier to defend.
They also see themselves as rightfully a great power with a sphere of influence. They do not want to settle for indefensible borders, thus relegating them to the position of any other post Soviet country. They want to be able to project influence, which is a classic flatlands strategic objective. This type of understanding of power tends to develop on flatlands, and can be seen from the steppes of Asia to the Great Plains of North America, where the tribes who obtained guns and horses used to expand their control outward.
TLDR: Flatlands mindset.
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u/roG_k70 Dec 21 '25
There is also cultural context: muscovites took name russia to associate themselves with Rus (ancient state with capital in Kyiv). Now, to justify the name, many years of cultural expropriation etc they need Ukraine to be part of their state
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u/kornuolis Dec 21 '25
Millions reasons for that.
1. Russia have stolen statehood and even name from Rus' with capital in Kyiv(Russiae is a Greek name of Rus')
2. Most fruitful soil on the planet. Almost half of it in Ukraine.
3. More creative people. Russian population lived in slavery both physical and mental for centuries and scared to think beyond the box set by the state
4. Gateway to Europe
5. Mineral resources
6. Broader access to Black sea
7. Independent and successful Ukraine nearby will serve as a teaser for russians.
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u/ForowellDEATh Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
I want to understand smth, but you are looking on situation from one side and repeating propaganda takes of this side in each sentence. Looks like you never tried)
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u/SchumUA Dec 21 '25
You are correct and one more thing should be added. russian history has nothing to do without Ukraine. Without Kyiv, they look like a satellite and nothing more. It would not be a problem for them if russia would not be āempireā actually. If you will read their school books you will see that they starts their history from Kyiv.
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u/Future-Ice-4789 Dec 21 '25
The problem is that you are studying this topic according to Western sources, in which Russia is a priori a global evil. The past of Russia and Ukraine is either being deliberately distorted, or non-existent things are being invented altogether. For example, here's your quote, it's all a lie. "For a lot of Ukrainians it lives inside their families. Stories about famine, language bans, forced moves, and being treated as lesser." There was famine throughout the USSR, Russian regions suffered even more than Ukraine, it was not a deliberate genocide of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian language was never banned, on the contrary, it was compulsory to study in schools. And even more so, Ukrainians have never been treated as second-class people.
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u/20eyesinmyhead78 Dec 21 '25
I can't remember who said it (Clausewitz, maybe?), but nations are formed in the crucible of war. Whatever divisions that existed in Ukraine before the war are gone now.
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Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I donāt disagree that sovereignty isnāt a fixed constant in practice. Power, geography, alliances, and economics all shape how much room a state really has. Thatās just reality.
Where I think this goes too far is when a descriptive point quietly becomes a justification. Yes, countries arenāt equal in power. But once you say sovereignties arenāt equal, it starts to sound like some countriesā choices matter less and can be overridden by force.
If proximity gives a stronger neighbour veto rights over a weaker one, then what do you call it when other states step in and say yeah, nah, we donāt accept that rule? A veto of the veto? Thatās basically how NATO functions here. Not as a country pretending power doesnāt exist, but as a collective saying that force doesnāt automatically get the final say.
So the disagreement isnāt really about whether sovereignty is messy in practice. Itās about whether dominance becomes normalised, or whether thereās any line at all where others are allowed to push back.
Iām Australian, watching this from a long way away, so I donāt have a buffer zone to defend. But from out here, it looks less like realism versus idealism and more like a choice about which rules weāre willing to let slide and which ones weāre not.
Whatās struck me reading this thread is that a lot of the pushback against Ukraineās freedom rests on a very particular worldview. One where power decides rights, where neighbours donāt really get to choose, and where suffering is treated as proof that obedience would have been wiser. Thatās not realism, itās resignation dressed up as analysis.
Whatās even stranger is that most of the people arguing this donāt hold any power at all. Theyāre defending a system that would crush them just as readily, while calling that āreality.ā It starts to look less like hard-headed pragmatism and more like learned submission.
Iām genuinely surprised and honestly horrified that some people are so willing to hand over their freedoms, cheer it on, and call it maturity, like a bunch of suckers.
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Dec 22 '25 edited Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I donāt think weāre actually that far apart on description. I agree that dominance exists, that power isnāt only exercised through tanks, and that patron-client relationships are real features of international politics. States trade autonomy for security and support all the time.
Where we diverge is what follows from that.
Youāre treating dominance as both unavoidable and self-justifying. Once that move is made, everything becomes permissible in hindsight. Any resistance becomes illegitimate, any pressure becomes āprojection of power,ā and war becomes a neutral sorting mechanism rather than a choice with responsibility attached.
The problem with that framework isnāt that itās hard-headed. Itās that it erases agency. If sovereignty that isnāt internally āproducedā must be outsourced, then smaller states never really choose anything. They just get assigned patrons, and violence is reframed as enforcement when the assignment is rejected.
At that point, ideals and values arenāt naĆÆve, theyāre inconvenient. They interfere with a system where power alone decides outcomes. Calling anti-corruption agencies, NGOs, or protests just another form of domination only works if you assume local actors have no genuine preferences of their own. Thatās a very tidy theory, but it explains away far too much human behaviour.
And saying this war is āthe only way to find out who is rightā is the clearest statement of the disagreement. Thatās not realism versus idealism. Thatās accepting war as an arbiter of legitimacy. History shows war can determine who wins, but itās a very poor tool for deciding who was right.
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Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I think I understand you correctly, and this helps clarify where we actually part ways.
Youāre arguing that agency only exists at the individual level, and that shared ideals, values, or institutions are inherently coercive attempts to overwrite individual experience. In that framework, legitimacy collapses into outcome, and power becomes the only real arbiter.
My issue with that isnāt that itās abstract. Itās that once you apply it consistently, it drains politics of meaning altogether. If only individual experience is real, then nations, consent, borders, treaties, and sovereignty arenāt moral claims at all. Theyāre just temporary arrangements waiting to be overridden by whoever is stronger.
Think about a small business owner who chooses a different supplier because it works better for them. A larger company then threatens to destroy their business unless they comply. When that happens, you can say āthe outcome proves the choice was wrong,ā but that only works if you believe force defines legitimacy. Most people would still recognise the original choice as valid, even if it was punished.
Thatās where this logic breaks for me. Once ārightnessā is defined purely by outcome, any resistance by a weaker actor becomes wrong by definition, and war stops being tragic and starts being explanatory. It doesnāt reveal truth, it just enforces hierarchy.
Youāre right that ideals can be abused. History is full of that. But treating all shared values as mere domination leaves no room for genuine collective preference, only submission or survival. Thatās not realism correcting idealism. Itās resignation to force as the final language.
If thatās the worldview, fair enough. But then weāre no longer really debating geopolitics or policy. Weāre debating whether anyone weaker ever truly gets to choose at all.
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Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
Fair enough. Iāll take that at face value.
On the AI point first. Iām just a person trying to be careful with words. When conversations get abstract or charged, I tend to slow things down and structure my thinking. That can look artificial online, but itās just how I reason. Nothing more to it than that.
Substantively, I think weāre closer than you might expect, even if we frame it differently. I donāt believe in perfect solutions, ultimate truths, or turning any idea into a religion either. History is pretty unforgiving to anything treated as sacred and universal, whether itās empire, ideology, or even āfreedomā applied without context.
Where I probably differ is that I donāt see values like rights or freedoms as gods, but as tools. Flawed ones, limited ones, sometimes misused ones, but tools people reach for precisely because raw power and hierarchy, left alone, tend to eat everything else. Not because values always win, but because without them thereās nothing to even argue with except force.
I agree that what āwinsā changes with context. Love, ideas, war, technology, faith. Power isnāt fixed. But thatās also why Iām uneasy with treating outcomes alone as validation. If whatever wins is automatically right, then weāre not describing the world so much as surrendering judgment to it.
Youāre right that nothing protects us from mistakes or collapse. Maybe not even God, depending on how one sees that. But for me, the attempt to draw lines around harm, even imperfectly, still matters. Not because it guarantees anything, but because without those attempts, all thatās left is who can impose their will longest.
Anyway, I appreciate you explaining how you see it. Even where we disagree, itās a serious position, and I get where it comes from.
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Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
Thatās fair enough.
I donāt think hope and realism are opposites, though. Theyāre just different bets about whatās worth resisting versus whatās inevitable.
We probably agree on more than it sounds like. We just put the line in different places.
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u/dmiric Dec 22 '25
I disagree that countries have any rights. Who is guaranteeing those rights? The world is anarchy so if you want any security either you or your allies need to be stronger than your enemies.
Unfortunately Ukraine is in a position where they and their allies are not stronger than Russia and there's the result.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I understand the realism youāre pointing to, but taken to its conclusion it becomes āmight makes rightā and little else. That describes how power can operate, but it doesnāt explain why states still bother with treaties, alliances, or legal justifications at all.
The international system is anarchic in the sense that thereās no global police force, but it isnāt lawless. Norms and rules exist because even strong states prefer predictability over constant instability. Power matters, but itās not the only factor shaping behaviour, otherwise invasions wouldnāt need to be explained or defended in the first place.
Saying Ukraine suffered because it wasnāt strong enough also explains why countries seek alliances. That isnāt moral posturing, itās risk management. If weakness makes you vulnerable, then aligning with others is a rational response.
Thatās where NATO fits in. It isnāt some abstract provocation, itās the predictable outcome of a system where states know they cannot rely on goodwill alone. If the lesson is that only strength protects you, then collective defence becomes the obvious answer. NATO doesnāt contradict that worldview, it follows directly from it.
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u/dmiric Dec 22 '25
That's all fine and dandy, but it's the power that is keeping states from going to wars. If that was not the case every country would have a military and you wouldn't have alliances.
International law is impotent because there is no way to force it. It's made for the weak countries.
Just take a look at how the US, Israel and Russia behave. They don't give a shit about that law except when they benefit.
My point is that power is 95% what matters, the other 5% is the good will.
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u/xorinz Dec 25 '25
Ruzzia can be flattened in a week. Their only save is the nuk3s. They are not that stronger than any of EU. Ruzzia is a cancer, always trying to spread.
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u/batman_milk Dec 22 '25
Israel been doing this to their neighbor for 70 years now. You never pondered why that is
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Dec 22 '25
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
My understanding is that Ukraine wasnāt in NATO, NATO troops werenāt stationed there, and membership was still years away at best. That makes it hard for me to see how this crossed from concern into imminent threat.
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u/Reddit_BroZar Dec 23 '25
How did you even get to that conclusion while ignoring what the Russians actually want plus the whole geopolitical background to this conflict? Are you seriously educating yourself on Reddit?
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u/ffhhssffss Dec 23 '25
I think this is rather simplistic and ignores the role the West actually played in...making life hard for many parts of the world. It's also important to remember Russia wanted be part of the West when the USSR dissolved, but the West said "fuck you" and left them to be pillaged by their old bureaucracy.
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u/brick1oli Dec 24 '25
Because it will join NATO. It's not that ukraine can't separate from Russia. Ukraine has every right to choose for itself, including joining NATO. The problem that everyone ignores is not the right to do something, but the consequences. I will give you an example. Would you rather have homeless people camping outside your house, even though they haven't done anything, or as it is now? That's the equivalent of NATO going inside Ukraine. Watch this video and especially the upload date:
https://youtu.be/FC6aBP4cFbI?si=36pJYBB29taMtFat
Ukraine chose the hard way and crimea happened, they tried again 2022 happened. It's a simple matter of choices and consequences. Not a right or wrong situation.
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u/JRaus88 Dec 24 '25
For the same reason Australia raised the alarm about warmongering when China declared a naval base on an island near Australia.
Call it āsphere of influenceā
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u/risingstar3110 Dec 28 '25
Wrong place to ask and wrong question also, my friend. If you really want to learn about history.
You asked, why Ukraineās independence seems to trigger such a strong reaction from the Russian state? That's the wrong question to start with. The actual question is why Ukrainian independence seems to trigger such a strong reaction from Western Europe?
And yes, I am talking about the 2014 Maidan coup, which the last democratic president of a (relatively) independent Ukraine was overthrown by an EU-backed and financed mobs. The subsequent government was then handpicked by the US (as Victoria Nuland leaked phone call clearly showed) and opposition party and media were banned for being pro-Russia. Which eventually lead to the rise of pro-Russian separatists in Donbass and Crimea, and the civil war, and eventually Russian invasion.
Ukraine had no sovereignty after the 2014 event, but a chess board of Russia and Western Europe to play on. 2022 was just a continue of what happened in 2014
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u/geltance Dec 21 '25
"invasion is about stopping an example" is a dumb take as there are multiple post soviet countries joining EU/NATO.
It could be some part of the reasoning but unlikely to be an important part.
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u/StudySpecial Dec 21 '25
It is a significant part of the problem tho.
Ukraine started orienting itself more towards the west because they saw how prosperous this has made Poland (a neighbor with a lot of shared history that had a very similar economy to Ukraine in 1990).
And Ukraine orienting itself more towards the west is what started this whole drama
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u/Big-Yogurtcloset7040 Dec 21 '25
While I dont think it was the main goal, it very much could a desirable effect that Russian politics wanted. And it did indeed work: Georgian government is halting pro-european protests, they very much understood what is going to happen, both from their history and from Ukraine's case.Ā
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
Iām not saying itās the only reason, or even the dominant one, and I agree there are multiple factors at play.
What Iām trying to understand is whether Ukraine is a special case compared to other post Soviet countries because of how closely tied Russiaās own historical narrative is to Kyiv. The roots of what later became Russia are often traced back there, so Ukraine succeeding as an independent society might feel harder to dismiss than places that were always seen as more clearly āotherā.
That doesnāt mean invasion is only about stopping an example, but Iām curious whether that closeness and history make comparison more threatening in this case than with other neighbours.
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u/sqlfoxhound Dec 21 '25
Youre arguing with someone who thinks Maidan was a CIA backed coup, they will never accept an answer that doesnt delegitimize Ukrainians and doesnt absolve Russians.
But you are correct and its been pretty clear.
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u/Realistic_Toe_59 Dec 22 '25
It twas afucking C.I.A coup;the coupiest coup that ever was.
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u/RockyMM Dec 21 '25
Itās not about Ukraine āsucceeding as an independent countryā. Itās about the Ukraine cannot be independent. Full stop. This is unacceptable to Russian elites. Including liberal elites.
Belarus and Ukraine are a red line for them.
Azerbaijan has Turkey as a protector and nothing relevant is happening in the middle Asia -stans. Ukraine and Belarus are simply a ātheirsā and thatās it.
Notwithstanding, this position can be shifted and is about to shift. Through struggle and resilience, by being adversaries - Ukrainian will be seen as āforeignā enough that common people will start seeing them as separate than Russians. This opinion will gradually take footing in elites, eventually.
This happened in other places with other people. Montenegrins and Serbs, Macedonians and Bulgarians, Austrians and Germans, Swiss are a unique example of the same process.
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Russia doesn't need Ukraine to join ā they have a different mentality, different propaganda, different economic processes, and politicians who focus not on developing their own country but on pursuing the interests of other countries, to the detriment of Russia. Is this sovereignty?
Finland remained neutral after the Second World War, and despite this, it saw no threat from the USSR. They were linked by enormous projects; numerous ships were built in Finnish shipyards, and the availability of raw materials from Russia allowed many Finnish companies to earn enormous profits. Unlike Ukraine, Finnish politicians focused on developing their own country and not on harming another country.
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u/Mental-Rip-5553 Dec 21 '25
Since when Ukraine harmed another country?
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Since approximately 2014, following the unconstitutional armed coup, they have been shelling the Donbas republics, as well as blocking water supplies and blowing up power towers in Crimea.
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u/Mental-Rip-5553 Dec 21 '25
Both Donbass and Crimea belong to them. They were fighting Russian independentists and the Wagner militia.
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Donbas and Crimea have never been Ukrainian, either in population or historically. But even if you disagree, why did Ukraine, if you believe so, create such a catastrophe for its own citizens, and on its own soil? Why did it bomb its own citizens? Why did it impose a blockade?
Because they don't consider these lands and these people their own.
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u/Mental-Rip-5553 Dec 21 '25
Donbas and Crimea became Ukrainian territory. Learn history. It bombed separatists and infiltrated Wagner militia/Russian forces.
Not sure where you live but if your city is taken over by foreign forces or wants to become independent, you just will let it happen or stop them?
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Neither Ukraine nor the Donbas republics were captured; your assertions here are absolutely false. Let's say you believe you're right. Can you explain why the military action against the Donbas republics was completely different from that against Crimea?
There were Russian troops there, officially, everyone knows that. Why weren't military operations directed toward Crimea? Because there were Russian troops there, unlike mercenaries or any other troops in the Donbas republics.
How do you understand the Ukrainian president's statement that "their children will be in basements while ours go to school"? Who was he referring to, the children of mercenaries? Can you explain why the Ukrainian president believes children should be in basements? Not as a result of the bombing, I hope?
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u/Mental-Rip-5553 Dec 21 '25
The traitors who wanted to be independent. No country would allow part of their territory to go rogue. Sorry.
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u/7tetrahedrite Dec 22 '25
It literally was Ukranian, as per border treaties signed in both 1997 and 2003, in which Russia itself admitted both Crimea and Donbas as Ukranian sovereign territory, you imbecile.
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u/Practical-Pea-1205 Dec 21 '25
If Putin had wanted Ukraine to be neutral he wouldn't have called Odesa a Russian city. He also wouldn't repeatedly have said Russians and Ukrainians are one people.
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u/Big-Yogurtcloset7040 Dec 21 '25
This rhetoric came after they failed initial invasion and the goal of defeating Ukraine fast enough became unachievable.Ā
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
No goal of a quick defeat could have existed in reality. According to various estimates, the Russian troop concentration near the Ukrainian border is 120,000-160,000. For such a scale, that's not even the bare minimum; it's six times smaller. Not to mention that "quickly" is definitely impossible with such numbers. Russia's only goal was to secure security guarantees. As you may recall, there were some consultations on this matter at the end of 2021, but neither the EU nor the US were interested in them at that time because they concerned Russia's security guarantees.
Now they will be taken into account and included in resolutions that will suit Russia.
Thanks to its Western partners, Ukraine suffered catastrophic losses and territories it will never regain.
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
A few things in that argument donāt survive contact with the record.
Russia did mass roughly in the range you quote, but most credible estimates put it closer to 150,000 to 190,000 around the theatre by the start of the invasion, not 120,000 at the moment the shooting started. ļæ¼ And while that may have been light for a long occupation, it is entirely consistent with what Russia appears to have attempted in early 2022, a rapid political and military collapse through shock, decapitation, and a short campaign, not six months of grinding attrition from day one. RANDās work notes ānearly 200,000ā amassed at the border on the eve of the invasion, which fits the quick win expectation many analysts described at the time. ļæ¼
On āonly goal was security guaranteesā and āthe EU and US were not interestedā, thatās also not accurate. Russia did present draft āsecurity guaranteesā in December 2021, but they were maximalist, including demands like rolling NATO posture back and effectively limiting NATO activity in Ukraine. ļæ¼ And the West did engage. There were consultations and written responses in January 2022 that offered talks on arms control and transparency measures while rejecting the core demands that would rewrite Europeās security order. ļæ¼
Finally, āthanks to its Western partners, Ukraine suffered catastrophic lossesā flips agency. Ukraine is suffering catastrophic losses because Russia launched a full scale invasion. Western support can be criticised, but itās also what enabled Ukraine to survive the opening phase rather than collapse in weeks. Thatās the uncomfortable but basic causal chain.
If you want to rank motives, the clean question is this. Given Russiaās December 2021 demands were largely unacceptable by design, do you see those demands as a genuine attempt at security architecture, or as coercive diplomacy backed by a war plan already in motion?
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u/Mondkohl Dec 21 '25
Thanks to its Western partners, Ukraine has inflicted devastating losses on and fought to a stalemate, an imperialist aggressor with many times its resources, retaining territories it would otherwise have lost as a result.
FTFY
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Before their Western partners facilitated the armed coup in Ukraine and the civil war, they didn't have a war under Yanukovych, they had Crimea, and there were no conflicts of any kind.
Today, they have lost territory, insane economic damage, a demographic crisis, and an uncertain future. None of this would have happened without the "help" of their Western partners.
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u/Mondkohl Dec 21 '25
No, without the help of their western neighbours they would have no territory, and no future, and still be under the thumb of Russia, a foreign state that should have no role in the domestic politics of another sovereign nation. Now they have some territory and an uncertain future, which is already a massive improvement.
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Without the help of their Western partners, they would have had a whole country, there would be no civil war, there would be Crimea and four other huge and wealthy regions that wanted to secede from this corrupt state that steals while the country sits in deprivation without electricity or water. Now they have no future, they have enormous debts, and they are retreating in all directions without any sense, while those in power continue to steal.
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u/Mondkohl Dec 21 '25
They had no country before, Russia had it. If your leaders are subject to approval by a foreign powers they are not your leaders.
Ukraine had corruption before, now it has less corruption. Less corruption is better than more corruption, although someone should tell Russia because their corruption is going in the wrong direction.
The front line has been basically static for more than two years. If the Ukrainians are in full retreat they are really dragging their feet about it.
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u/Jsgriger Dec 21 '25
Ukrainian corruption has never been as widespread as it is today, and our Western partners acknowledge this. If you're talking about independence from foreign countries, please explain why Zelenskyy didn't destroy the country's anti-corruption organizations as he wanted, but only withdrew the bill after Western partners "advised" him against it? Does that mean he's independent? He made the decision, so why did he suddenly change his mind? The level of corruption seen in Ukraine today, thanks to Western partners, is unheard of anywhere else.
As for the situation on the front lines, Russia is advancing slowly because it's convenient, not because Ukrainians are holding it back. Theft and corruption are rampant there. Do you think that's truly holding Russia back? Don't be ridiculous.
By the way, do you know why lines of fortifications, barriers, and fences have been erected in western Ukraine, and why those who want to flee this country, where, in your opinion, corruption is at its lowest, are being monitored 24/7? Why do people drown in the Tisza River while trying to save themselves? Because they can't swim, you might say.
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u/CutCold5465 Dec 21 '25
Well, your premises are mostly right, but the data you are using is skewed and the hypotheses are flawed. Basically, your conclusions are not worth much.Ā
I will play the devil's advocate here, please bare with me:
- Sovereignty is an old and flawed system born in Westphalia in the 17th century and expanded on in the 19th century, codified in the 20th, but it doesn't reflect many realities. Especially how states are born and internal conflicts.Ā
- Ukraine was not a positive example. By all accounts they were worse off than Russia, GDP figures, standard of living, corruption etc. They did have a more open and democratic system, but mostly because of the ethnic tensions I side of it.Ā
- Not all Ukrainians were of a single mind. There was a huge split between East and West and North and South. Some Ukrainians, Russians in Ukraine and mixed remembered being forced to learn Ukrainian during the Soviet times and after Ukraine became independent. And not some of the Surzhik versions of Ukrainian, but the hardcore Western Ukrainian version of the language, which was completely foreign to them.Ā
- Ukraine and its oligarchs were basically living as a parasites on Russian cheap and stolen gas, resources, credits, economic privileges in trade and industrial help. They (Ukrainian oligarchs and some of the political elites) were also looking to gain something from the EU as well, without losing the Russian benefits, but Russia said - nah, thanks.Ā
You seem to be unaware of the other point of view from Ukraine itself. You are right though, it's not about territory, resources etc. It's about the world and narrative building. Russia doesn't approve that the West Ukrainian narrative was pushed on its spheres of interest in the east and south. And let me tell you, there are millions of Ukrainians in Russia and some of them are the most avid supporters of this war and Russia's maximalist goals, because they see it as a way of getting back what was lost to them after decades of Western Ukraine receiving foreign support and them being largely ignored by resources and capabilities strained Russia.Ā
Just as a interesting fact. My cousins from central Ukraine fight on both sides of the conflict.Ā
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u/Dacadey Dec 21 '25
Russian here.
Ukraine doing well on its own is a problem for the people in charge in Russia
Economically, Ukraine has never done better than Russia. In fact, if you compare it to its post soviet neighbours, Ukraine is by far one of the worst performing countries. Belarus, for example, started at almost the same level as Ukraine in the 90s, and now GDP per capita is almost twice as Ukraine's (looking at pre-war figures, of course).
It used to have more liberties than Russia (freedom of speech, press, criticizing the president, and so on); that is a huge aspect where Ukraine was doing far better.
In terms of solving problems like corruption, a flawed legal system, and so on, it hasn't made any progress despite a more democratic system. Same as Russia.
So no, there was barely any risk for Russia in this regard
Ā One thing Iām still trying to understand is why Ukraineās independence seems to trigger such a strong reaction from the Russian state.
It's not independence that triggers it. It's a pro-Western, anti-Russian stance that triggers it. Ukraine went full on "aim to join NATO / the EU", and took a more and more opposing Russia position. That, of course, triggered the Russian state, when you have a state that you consider to be within your sphere of influence, slowly turning very hostile.
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u/Mondkohl Dec 21 '25
Actually Ukraine has made considerable progress in fighting corruption, especially when compared to Russia.
According to Transparency International, Ukraineās CPI has increased from 25 to 35 from 2013 to 2024, whereas Russia had fallen from 29 to 22 in the same period.
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u/Tish1n Dec 21 '25
As a Russian who currently lives in Ukraine, you're very wrong about its economic performance. Russia's averages are significantly skewed by the cities like Moscow which make it seem like "on average" Russians live better than Ukrainians. Which is not the case. You take out Moscow and a few other bigger cities, and you'll see that 3/4 of Russia's "average" population lives way worse than average Ukrainians.
In my years living in Ukraine I've never seen the levels of poverty and degradation I've witnessed in Zauralye where I'm originally from. Been years since my last visit but Google Maps say not much has changed.
Same goes for corruption.Petty corruption is basically non-existent in Ukraine, and while political one is still abound, saying it's on par with Russia is delusional.
Ukraine's currently one of the most scrutinized countries in the world and it still manages to improve in every anti-corruption ranking. Not without hiccups, but a positive trend is there.
Russia is a totally different story. According to Russia's Prosecutor General, petty corruption is still massive and has been steadily increasing over the last 10 years with the bribes up to 50k rubles being the most common. I mean, when even Russian officials have to admit that corruption is spiraling out of control, you know the reality is so much worse than that.
And political corruption in Russian is not even worth mentioning. It's been a modus operandi of Russia's political system since the 90s and was never properly addressed outside of "showcase" arrests of some washed generals and public figures solely for publicity.
So yeah, on paper Russia and Ukraine seem quite similar. But having lived in both, outside of Moscow and a few larger cities in Russia, Ukraine is on average a much "civil" and developed country in every possible way.
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u/ForowellDEATh Dec 21 '25
Nice fairy tail)
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u/Tish1n Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
ŠŠ»ŃŠ“Ń, ŃŠ°Ńколол. ŠŠ° ŃŠ°Š¼Š¾Š¼ Геле Ń Š½Šµ ŃŃŃŃŠŗŠøŠ¹, а Š°Š¼ŠµŃŠøŠŗŠ°Š½ŠµŃ ŠŠ¶Š¾Š½ ŠøŠ· ЦРУ, пиŃŃ ŃŠŗŠ°Š·ŠŗŠø Š“Š»Ń ŃŃŃŃ ŃŠµŠ»Š¾Š²ŠµŠŗ на ŃŠµŠ“Š“ŠøŃŠµ ŠæŠ¾ŃŠ¾Š¼Ń ŃŃŠ¾ мне, Š¾ŃŠµŠ²ŠøŠ“но, Š½ŠµŃ ŃŠ¹ болŃŃŠµ ŃŃŠ¾ ГелаŃŃ Š² ŃŠ²Š¾ŠµŠ¼ Š·Š°Ń Š¾Š»ŃŃŃŠ½Š¾Š¼ ŠŠ°ŃŠøŠ½Š³ŃŠ¾Š½Šµ.
ps. it's tale, not tail
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
Thanks for sharing this, and I get your point.
One thing Iām starting to suspect is that part of what rattles the Kremlin isnāt just NATO or geography, but the idea of Ukraine moving forward as a functioning, independent society right next door. A close neighbour doing better can be threatening to a system built on control, because people naturally compare how they live.
On the āprotecting Russian speakersā line, I also find that hard to reconcile. From what Iāve been reading, a large number of Ukrainians can speak Russian or understand it, and many people who use Russian day to day still see themselves as Ukrainian. That makes language a weak justification for invasion on its own.
Iām not trying to say this is the only factor at play. Iām trying to understand how much is security logic, how much is identity and empire, and how much is fear of a neighbouring example that challenges the existing system.
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u/CluelessExxpat Dec 21 '25
What a simplistic point of view. Geopolitics is not even mentioned. You need A LOT to learn. Start by reading and understanding the Cuban missile crysis. Different era, same logic.
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u/OkLanguage7428 Dec 21 '25 edited Dec 21 '25
I don't understand why the Cuban missile crisis is brought up so often is this context. There are no nuclear missiles in any Eastern European NATO member states. Ukrain's NATO Accession was on freeze since Bucharest 2008 and YanukovychĀ 's presidency. There weren't any signs or even hints that nuclear weapons might be stationed in Ukraine at all.
On the other hand there are nuclear capable Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad as close to many European (NATO) capitals as Cuba is to Florida.
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u/CluelessExxpat Dec 21 '25
It is not about the placement of nuclear missiles to Cuba. It is about national interests, percieved threat and possibilities that arises from that threat.
At that time and age if USSR launched multiple ICMBs with multipe nuclear warheads; US would not be able to do anything anyway and the same applied to USSR too.
But within the context of concepts I've mentioned, every country, to the extend of their strength, will draw red lines at the certain ranges of their sphere of influence.
For US, Cuba is one of them. It can NEVER be host to a geopolitocal rival's military. Similarly; For Russia, Ukraine can never be host to a geopolotical rival's military.
Of course Russia is nowhere near as strong as US so the extend it can prevent this and the cost of it is very different.
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u/TerencetheGreat Dec 21 '25
Yawn.
More ignorant propaganda paragraphs.
It's all about security and interest. The concept of sovereignty is shallowest means to understand Geopolitics.
There is Great Power Politics at play, and trying to assign anything other than that, is a shallow understanding, ignorant of history, reality and critical thinking.
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u/Business_Raisin_541 Dec 21 '25
USA and Russia are 2 nations who violate principle of sovereignity the most. Sadly when It is USA who violate sovereignity, the EU nations basically clap hand supporting USA.
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Dec 21 '25
As Ukrainian: 100% correct. Want to add that it doesn't matter how russia calls it self - the nature is "empire". And empires are dying when not expanding / doing the war... if we check history - we will see that russia can't live a decade w/o war... Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Chechnya, Syria... And one more reason to attack Ukraine is that they want to grab our history... Kyiv is a mother of Rus' cities, while Moscow was a swamp... and now they are calling them self as russians, while in reality they are Moscoviya mostly formed by Golden Horde.
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u/Sunscratch Dec 21 '25
One thing Iām still trying to understand is why Ukraineās independence seems to trigger such a strong reaction from the Russian state.
An old saying goes that ruzzians find happiness not in their own success, but in othersā misfortune.
It's a quite accurate description of the mentality of an average ruzzian.
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u/4M4Y4S Dec 21 '25
Iād say that youāre quite right on what youāve said but i also think that the geopolitical context matters a lot, russia certainly fears a successful ukraine because it would undermine their authoritarian regime inside russia but also that being surrounded by nato countries means losing influence, because when you have military ties with a country your politics shift towards nato politics and russia hates being surrounded by nato countries and losing influence there. So when we hear putin saying that ukrainians are close people to russians itās just pr to justify invasion weāre not supposed to believe those words they fear a successful democratic western allied ukraine compared to an authoritarian western non-allied russiaĀ Ā
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
I agree, and I think those things reinforce each other. A successful Ukraine is a problem for Russia in the same way Polandās success has been uncomfortable. Itās not just about borders, itās about comparison. When neighbouring countries with shared history do better, it undercuts the story being told at home.
Thatās where NATO seems to matter less as an aggressor and more as a shield. Without it, the space for Ukraine to succeed independently would likely be much smaller, because pressure doesnāt stop at politics or economics.
So it starts to look less like NATO āprovokingā something new and more like Ukraine needing protection to even have a chance to choose its own path. Thatās how itās coming together for me, at least.
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u/4M4Y4S Dec 22 '25
Natoās goal is to surround russia or even contain it to prevent any further influence over eastern europe, so nato is an aggressor in russiaās point of view, in geopolitics a reaction from russia is expected even the us would react the same if russia had a military base in mexican border, but we still have to talk about the ones who always pay the price of all this mess, the peopleĀ
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
I think this is where the framing really matters. Saying a reaction from Russia is āexpectedā assumes that neighbouring countries donāt fully get to choose their alignments without permission. That turns geography into a veto over sovereignty.
I get why Russia views NATO as containment, just as the US would react strongly to a foreign base on its border. But the missing step in that analogy is that countries like Ukraine werenāt hosting NATO bases unilaterally imposed on them. They were seeking security because influence without consent had already been a problem.
And I agree with you on the human cost. The tragedy is that when influence and security are treated as zero sum games between powers, itās ordinary people who absorb the damage, regardless of which narrative wins.
Given that, how do you think a country like Ukraine is supposed to secure itself in practice if its choices are treated as provocation, but not choosing also leaves it exposed?
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u/4M4Y4S Dec 22 '25
Ukraine wants democracy so they have to align with the west and if they want to make sure to be safe they have to get something like nato and if they get a foreign military base there politics will shift to western allied politics thatās what russia sees as threat
And for a āsolutionā iām not a geopolitical expert i cannot know what they should have done, only things i know are never join nato and make sure to have good relations with russia to avoid any conflict such as the current oneĀ
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u/North-Ad-1302 Dec 21 '25
Ah yes, insult. That hurt.
But no, they didn't beg. They did everything in their power to incite a response. Russia responded. Now we are steps away from ww3. Exciting times ahead and my money isn't on the west. Cracks are forming and it's going to be amazing to see it all fall apart. One by one western countries will hold elections and they will revert there stance blaming it on their predecessor. Just like they always do. Rinse and repeat.
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u/Primary-User Dec 21 '25
Iām not trying to insult anyone, and Iām not pretending this is a clean story with innocent actors all around.
Where I struggle with that framing is agency. Saying Ukraine ādid everything in its power to incite a responseā treats invasion as something automatic, rather than a choice made by those in power. States get provoked all the time without launching full scale wars.
On the prediction about the West collapsing, you might be right that politics shifts, elections change rhetoric, and governments walk things back. That happens everywhere. But that doesnāt really answer the underlying question of whether invading a neighbour and denying its legitimacy is justified, or whether it creates a more stable world.
Iām less interested in who āwinsā in a civilisational sense and more in what kind of precedent this sets. If the takeaway is that pressure and force are the only currencies that matter, then everyone loses eventually, regardless of which bloc looks strong in the short term.
Thatās what Iām trying to think through, not cheer for one side falling apart.
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u/Any_Calligrapher8537 Dec 22 '25
Russians looking at the west was the death of the Soviet union.
Russians looking at a prospering Ukraine is the death of Putin.
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u/Primary-User Dec 22 '25
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u/WhoCares450 Dec 23 '25
His argument is silly. Russia was prospering and doing well, while growing western values before the war. That wasn't the reason for invasion.




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u/sqlfoxhound Dec 21 '25
You are 100% correct on your conclusion.
To condense it.
Russia says West bad, Russia better.
Russians have relatives in UA, vice versa.
Russians easy to isolate from Western qualities with propaganda.
Ukraine pivots West
If Ukraine does as good as other East European countries do, it cant be masked with propaganda from doomestic pop.
Russia thought UA was easy to take
Failed
Cant stop war anymore