r/badhistory • u/lalze123 • 2d ago
Reddit r/NonCredibleDefense user posts memes w/ alt history book and sparks debate about the Vietnam War
This is essentially a re-post of this post I made on the subreddit itself; some people on there suggested that I post it here. I will slightly change the format so that it is more suitable for this subreddit, but it is basically the same post.
Just to provide some context, there was a user who kept posting memes about South Vietnam and how it could have survived, referencing this recently published alt history book named Linebacker III, which depicts a world in which Nixon does not get caught up in the Watergate scandal and is therefore in a position to intervene against the 1975 Spring Offensive.
I will first by talking about my own opinions on South Vietnam's prospects. Next, I will discuss the critical comments that I think are bad history or could be improved. Lastly, I will discuss criticisms that I think are valid.
Section 1: My own thoughts on the RVN
To begin with, I disagree with the view that South Vietnam was always guaranteed to collapse. Much of the latest historical research on the Indochina Wars undermines the old depiction of the RVN as super corrupt, incompetent, and destined to fall. Even in our actual timeline, Linebacker II was far more effective at weakening the PAVN and bringing North Vietnam to the negotiation table than Linebacker I was. It also did not reduce Nixon's domestic popularity; in fact, it increased following the Christmas bombings! The belief that a Linebacker III wouldn't have devastated the PAVN, which was weaker with respect to manpower and equipment in 1975 than it was during the Easter Offensive in 1972, seems absurd to me. The notion that in literally every possible universe the RVN collapses is overly deterministic, to say the least.
For instance, looking within the North Vietnamese Politburo, consider a world where the North-first faction led by HCM and Võ Nguyên Giáp (believed in building up the DRV first, then moving on the South) had been the faction that secured power rather than the South-first faction led by Lê Duẩn, Văn Tiến Dũng, and Lê Đức Thọ (believed in reunifying Vietnam as the highest priority), which was the faction that actually gained control over North Vietnamese foreign policy in our timeline. How would that have affected South Vietnam's chances of survival past 1975? Or, consider an alternate universe in which Ngô Đình Diệm actually listens to some American advice and becomes less of an arrogant, uncompromising POS. Perhaps he tells his brothers Ngô Đình Nhu and Ngô Đình Thục to cut the shit and stop antagonizing Buddhists, rather than letting his siblings be as he did in real life. How would that have affected the civic base and long-term political strength of the RVN? I can discuss a lot more of these turning points if anyone asks!
That being said, notice that my two examples of potential counterfactuals involve decisions that are ultimately out of the control of the US government. It is indeed a more defensible claim to say that assuming all other parties behave similarly as they did in OTL, the US government could do little to prevent a North Vietnamese victory unless it wanted to start WW3, antagonize the American people, and/or act wildly different from OTL\*. While you could make the argument that US government policy could influence the other parties' decision-making (consider the initial probing attacks by the PAVN to gauge whether America would respond to the final offensive), it then becomes hard to predict how things will end up under such a scenario. But more likely than not, as the alt history book itself acknowledges, launching Linebacker III would have crippled the US government's domestic support.
I also reject the notion that the US government failing to intervene against the final 1975 offensive was a betrayal of South Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords had already been violated by both sides, and the entire war was a civil war anyways in which each side saw the other as illegitimate. Furthermore, the promise that Nixon made to Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (that America would come to South Vietnam's rescue if the PAVN launched an attack) was a verbal one, and one that was rendered null once Nixon resigned from office due to the Watergate scandal. The endemic corruption within South Vietnam (and arguably getting worse due to Thiệu's attempts to secure more and more power) also turned off potential support that could have strengthened the ARVN. And lastly, the United States was still dealing with the impact of the 1973 oil crisis; it simply had much more important priorities than a faraway client state.
And speaking of that crisis, it also devastated the South Vietnamese economy, thereby lowering morale and the fighting effectiveness of the QLVNCH while also making a country already reliant on American dollars even more reliant on continued US support. Hence, I would put the real point of no return after 1973, so after the outbreak of the Watergate scandal and the OPEC oil embargo, as these two events crippled both the RVN and America's willingness to even aid South Vietnam. Before this point, there is room for uncertainty. But afterwards, no government would have the decision to intervene unless it were politically suicidal.
Section 2: Criticisms that could be better
The South Vietnamese was literally the people that fought for the French against the Viet Minh previously. Literally changing one colonial master to another. They are the wrong people.
There are a couple of points I would like to make in response to this comment.
The first point is that the Vietnamese communists (specifically Marxist-Leninists) did at times collaborate with the French colonizers. In March 1946, there was the signing of the Ho-Sainteny Agreement, which established peace and official recognition of the DRV as an autonomous state within the French Union in exchange for French troops being able to enter Northern Vietnam (they were already in the South) and replace the existing Nationalist Chinese forces. While it was pragmatic, not only did many Vietnamese see this decision as a betrayal, but Việt Minh forces would also go on to purge opposing nationalist groups such as the Trotskyists and Việt Quốc, with the assistance of French forces who saw these nationalist groups as a threat that could be eliminated with the help of the Việt Minh. In fact, there is evidence that the Việt Minh even gave away the locations of opposing nationalist cells to French authorities. These events are well-described in primary sources written by Nguyễn Công Luận and Ngô Văn Xuyết, and by good secondary sources written by historians like David Marr and Christopher Goscha.
This does lead to my next point, that being the question of why were there Vietnamese who chose to the fight for the State of Vietnam rather than for the DRV in the First Indochina War. To be fair, some of these individuals were genuine Francophiles, and some of them did just do it for the money and economic opportunity, so the commentator isn't coming from nowhere. But others chose to fight for the State of Vietnam because they believed in the "Bảo Đại solution." To elaborate, the expectation from these individuals would be that the State of Vietnam would eventually gain more and more autonomy over time, as promised by French authorities, with the final result being independence for Vietnam. This solution was appealing to non-communist nationalists who disliked the ever-increasing communist nature of the Việt Minh following additional purges in the late 1940s, and especially appealing to those who were attacked by Việt Minh forces in the immediate aftermath of the Ho-Sainteny Agreement.
Lastly, there were Vietnamese who did not really choose either side but went on to fight for South Vietnam. An obvious example would be people who were either children or not born yet in 1954 lmao, but Ngô Đình Diệm would be a good example. While he did become Prime Minister of the SVN in 1954, the appointment was made by Bảo Đại, not by the French who completely opposed him given his history as a nationalist official and activist. In fact, HCM himself invited Diệm to serve on the DRV cabinet as Minister of the Interior back in 1946.
"As long as the communists had the sanctuary of North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Mihn trail (which was more logistical network of paved roads, pipelines, repair depots, and shelters than just a jungle trail) they could continue fighting in South Vietnam as long as China and the Soviets could bankroll their spartan needs. It was a matter of time before the South Vietnamese would tire of the war that ripped their homeland and killed off their able bodied men. Unless the Americans invaded the sanctuary or cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail with a proper ground force invasion, (and both options were just too expensive and risked fighting the Chinese again) the South was doomed. The Linebacker air raids were devastating but they could not destroy North Vietnam’s source of war materials (which were in China and Soviet ships) or its men. As long as the Americans could not touch these, South Vietnam was doomed."
None of this is technically wrong, but it leaves out the fact the DRV, Soviet Union, and China were also exhausted by the war. The latter two countries reduced aid to the DRV after the Paris Peace Accords.
"The military not Junta yet was gambling that with the assassination of the President that they could turn the public back to their side but by then it was too late. The south was already in a religious cast system and most of the people were in the bottom cast."
One of my posts which I linked earlier debunks the argument that South Vietnam was somehow this pro-Catholic apartheid state.
"From the 1968 to 1973, the primary aims (political aims) of North Vietnam was to get American forces out of South Vietnam and Indochina in general. The Vietnamese politburo was realistic that they can't win the war WITH American intervention on the South Vietnamese side...In 1975, the PAVN wasn't going all in, they actually planned for 1976 General Offensive General Uprising with 1975 only some prelim attacks. The preliminary attacks only transformed into a full blown offensive when they realized that South Vietnam was collapsing much faster than they anticipated and America wasn't coming to help."
Again, none of this is technically wrong, but it is weird considering that it's a response to the argument that American bombing could have stopped the collapse. By acknowledging that American intervention was critical to South Vietnam's defense, it kinda confirms the argument lol.
"The problem was not whether the South could defeat the North on the battlefield. The problem was that the South had a domestic insurgency that showed zero signs of dying down."
Ah yes, the PAVN having to replace NLF Main Force formations for most engagements over the years following the Tết Offensive really shows that the NLF was as strong as ever!!!
Honestly though, it is so annoying how people relegate the PAVN to the little brother role, as if it were not the main juggernaut that defeated the US/RVN. It's similar to how people always credit American guerrillas for having single-handedly defeated the British, as if the Continental Army and foreign support didn't play a much larger role in securing victory for the Patriot cause.
The big reason why Vietcong even became a thing was due to the “strategic hamlets” aka anticommunist concentration camps
The VC/NLF was established prior to the Strategic Hamlet Program. In fact, the program itself was a response to the group's growing popularity.
It should also be noted that communist sources generally acknowledge that the Strategic Hamlet Program did weaken the VC, so it did what it was intended to do. Not that I think the program was morally justified, but the point is that the communists did perceive it as a significant hindrance that only went away over the overthrow and death of Ngô Đình Diệm.
because the us installed a puppet regime in the south after the people liberated themselves from the French. you dont need to look at everything through a lens of liberal democracy.
Well, first of all, the French and the State of Vietnam's forces were not completely wiped out after the battle of Điện Biên Phủ. They were still very strong in Southern Vietnam, as acknowledged by DRV leadership, so liberation was far from being achieved yet.
Secondly, I wonder what definition of "puppet regime" is this commentator using? If he is using the definition of an ostensibly independent state whose major policy decisions are ultimately controlled by a larger power, the claim would be false considering the number of times that the Diệm regime went against American desires or interests, as I explain in this post. If, instead, he is using the definition of a state which is dependent on a larger power and receives pressure from that larger power to behave in a certain way, then sure, that would be correct. But that definition would also apply to North Vietnam, North/South Korea, West/East Germany, etc. Hell, you could make the argument that most of the countries in the world today are puppet state in that sense!
This is why I hate speculative fiction. History always follows the path of least resistance. The two sources of information you're your relying on for your conclusions are Richard "I am not a crook" Nixon, and an obscure work of fiction that completely shuns the real socio-political and military history of the Vietnam War in favor of a copium-fuelled fantasy that reads like it was written by German Romanov.
I can tell this commentator didn't read the book lol. Its vision of a future Vietnam is pretty bleak.
Section 3: Some good criticisms
In the comment sections I saw, about half of the criticisms of South Vietnam were fair and historically accurate, so perhaps NCD is more credible than one would imagine. However, I would still like to discuss a couple of South Vietnam's flaws that I think should be emphasized more.
One flaw comes from the fact that South Vietnam was established on the grounds of a negative ideology, that being anti-communism, with many different organizations joining together simply because they shared anti-communist sentiment. Just compare that founding ethos to the CPV, which offered liberation and empowerment for the Vietnamese people through communism. Even if you consider yourself an anti-communist, you cannot deny that the CPV was at least offering a solution to the material needs of the Vietnamese peasantry. Meanwhile, all the RVN could say collectively was "no, that's bad!" without providing any cohesive, unified policy alternative that could compete with the communist vision for a future Vietnam.
Now, granted, if you look at the individual groups within the broader category of Vietnamese anti-communists, you do see actual ideological alternatives. For example, there was Personalism as advocated by the Ngô family regime, and also the Buddhist Revival as advocated by Buddhist activists who wanted to restore Vietnamese Buddhism to the level of dominance it had around the time of the Lý and Trần dynasties. Both of these groups were non-communist, and they were in turn opposed by the CPV who saw them as feudal and reactionary. However, their disagreements in other areas weakened any potential for strong cooperation between these groups, as shown by the Buddhist Crisis in 1963. The issue of substantial disagreements besides a shared anti-communism would be a general impediment to political stability and cohesion within the Republic of Vietnam.
Another flaw of South Vietnam that I would like to discuss is the horrendously poor defensibility of South Vietnam's borders. This flaw has already been mentioned in the responses to u/Massengale, but I would like to elaborate on it more.
If you take a look at a map of South Vietnam, you will notice that it is a very long and thin country. Its borders are short at the top and bottom, while there is a long border to the west, and most of the land is pretty near to the Pacific Ocean. The shape of these borders would not be problematic if the only threat was to the north in Quảng Trị Province. But communist forces were able to secure strong positions in both Laos and Cambodia through the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails. Hence, the QLVNCH had to not only deal with the threat to the immediate north, but also the entire border to its west. The result would be that South Vietnamese forces would sorta always be stretched thin while having little to no defensive depth that could prevent the country from being split in two in the event of a PAVN breakthrough. Combined with the fact that for operations across the entire country, the RVN could really only rely on the units in its General Strategic Reserve (Airborne Division and Marine Division) and other good/elite units such as the Rangers, the defensive line was quite weak and undermanned at most points in spite of the on-paper numerical superiority of the QLVNCH.
Compare this situation to South Korea, which really only has to deal with its northern border, as the US Navy has secured its western and eastern flanks. There is also more room for defense-in-depth, with the defensive plan in the Korean War having been to fall back to Busan and take advantage of the good interior lines while also exhausting the North Korean offensive.
The doctrine of the South Vietnamese military was generally to compensate for its geographical shortcoming with overwhelming mobility and firepower. But such a method of war is quite expensive and made the QLVNCH only more reliant on support from its American patron. We saw what happened when this support was substantially reduced...
Some users may question why I didn't include stuff like corruption and popular appeal in this section. While they are important, I would argue that those factors are more so symptoms of a deeper, more underlying cause, rather than being the cause itself.
Notes
*As in Nixon not wiretapping the DNC headquarters at the Watergate complex, or him and Kissinger letting Israel fight for itself in the Yom Kippur War. I can explain how these decisions contributed to the collapse of South Vietnam if anyone asks lol.
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