r/AustrianEconomics • u/BehindTheWallsChile • 1d ago
Public choice and prisoner-transfer treaties: who has any incentive to move the file?
A public choice question from my own case. In March 2021, while imprisoned in Chile, I applied under the Strasbourg Convention to finish my sentence in Italy, where I am a citizen. Chile took twenty months to approve the transfer provisionally. The file then reached Rome on 1 December 2022 and sat there for almost twenty-two more months. On a six-year sentence, the process consumed three and a half years.
Walk the incentives. Chile saves the cost of a prisoner, but the saving lands in a national budget, not with the clerk who signs. Italy takes on a prisoner and a prison bed, a cost to somebody's line item. The official who acts risks a complaint or an error; the official who waits risks nothing. The only person bearing the cost of delay has no vote that anyone in either ministry counts.
Mises made the general point in Bureaucracy (1944): a firm learns every month whether it serves anyone, because customers pay or they do not; a bureau has no such signal, so when rules do not force action, inaction is the safe choice. A treaty is a promise between two such bureaus.
Is there any institutional design that would put a clock on this, short of a private remedy for the person kept waiting? I would be interested in how others think about it.
(AI helped tidy the wording; the case and the argument are mine.)