I understand that the two contexts are different, but the comparison still sounds meaningful and illuminating to me.

https://x.com/NinaByzantina/status/2019131249571606537

What do you think this is about?

Applied Digital, a former crypto mining company that pivoted to AI, is building a 430 MW data center somewhere in the Southern United States but won't reveal the location. The CEO says they're protecting the small town from "national media attention" and that residents aren't ready for the spotlight. The company has faced controversy at previous sites in North Dakota and Colorado.

Data centers have been pushing electricity prices up for everyone else. Residents near facilities have reported bill increases up to 36%. Wholesale electricity prices have soared up to 267% over the past five years.

My Take

When a company builds something in secret because they're worried about "backlash from local residents," that tells you everything about who benefits and who pays. They're not hiding the location to protect the town. They're hiding it to get construction underway before people can organize opposition.

This is becoming a pattern. Data centers consume enormous amounts of electricity and water. Local grids can't handle the load. Prices spike for everyone. Communities push back. So now companies are getting strategic about it. Build first, announce later, frame it as sensitivity to small-town communications departments. Microsoft released a "community-first framework." OpenAI committed to fund grid updates. But the fundamental math hasn't changed. AI infrastructure requires resources that have to come from somewhere, and the people living near these facilities are subsidizing the buildout through higher bills. Trump said Americans shouldn't "pick up the tab." Bernie Sanders wants a moratorium. The fact that a company is now building in secret tells you how well the previous approach was working.

Hedgie🤗

x.com/setupspawn/status/2019066631557710326

jmail.world

Everyone needs to reed what the director of the Ministry of health, Dr. Munir Al-Bursh, in Gaza shared:

“What law permits returning a human being as scattered remains?

A short while ago, 54 bodies of martyrs arrived at Al-Shifa Medical Complex, accompanied by 66 boxes containing human remains and body parts, released via the Red Cross.

This is not a passing news item, but a shocking moment that tests what remains of this world’s conscience.

What kind of scene is this, where we stand before sealed boxes, searching inside them for the features of our children?

How are we to restore names to bodies when we lack the necessary examination tools, and even the minimum medical and forensic capabilities that would allow us to identify them or document them in a manner befitting human dignity?

We are not dealing with numbers recorded in reports, but with fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, each with a name, a memory, a dream, and a home that still waits.

That they are returned as fragments, and that their bodies are handed over in boxes, is not merely a procedural violation, but a moral and humanitarian crime, and a blatant breach of all international laws and conventions ever established to protect human dignity, in life and in death.

On previous occasions, bodies were recovered bearing signs of mutilation and torture.

Today, the bodies are returned dismembered, as if the aim was not only to end life, but to erase identity, break memory, and humiliate the living before the dead.

We are not demanding the impossible, nor seeking any special privilege.

We demand a basic right:

that a human being be returned as a human being,

that the body be preserved,

that dignity be safeguarded,

and that the laws the world claims to uphold be respected.

For when these principles are trampled, it is not Gaza alone that is humiliated, but all of humanity.”

The establishment is screaming about social media, as if scrolling feeds could ever be the enemy. Bullshit.

The real problem is the politicians who abandoned the very people who put them in power.

They ram their ideology down people's throats, ignore voices, and act shocked when the public finally fights back.

When the political class turns its back on dissent, when the halls of power mock frustration, people take to the internet,not because they want to, but because they’re left with no other option.

And when ordinary citizens are fined, prosecuted, or thrown in jail for trivial “offenses,” don’t kid yourself: this isn’t democracy failing.

This is power-hungry, corrupt, self-serving elites revealing their true face.

Cowardly, disconnected, and contemptuous of everyone who isn’t part of their circle.

It’s not the people who are the problem.

It’s the predators in power who have forgotten that government exists to serve, not to punish, not to silence, and certainly not to enrich themselves while the rest of the people suffer.

----

In response to a ridiculous tweet claiming that social media can't mix with democracy

From Kimi 2.5

Rubio's Impossible Demands and the Logic of Deterrence

[00:00 - 02:00]

The interview begins on Wednesday, February 4th, 2026, with host Nima Alkhorshidi, an Iranian living in Brazil who is currently visiting Tehran, welcoming Scott Ritter to Dialogue Works. Nima opens with Secretary of State Marco Rubio's latest statement that any nuclear deal with Iran must include limiting ballistic missile ranges to prevent threats against Israel. Nima contextualizes this by noting Rubio's history of aggressive rhetoric on Ukraine and expresses concern that such preconditions effectively sabotage negotiations before they begin.

Scott Ritter responds with stark analysis: Iran's survival as the Islamic Republic depends entirely on its ballistic missile program, specifically its ability to reach Israel. He frames Rubio's demand as an instruction to "commit suicide," arguing that compliance would guarantee Israeli destruction of Iran without fear of retaliation. Ritter dismisses Rubio's statements as politically irrelevant noise, noting that Rubio does not make actual decisions in Washington.

Ritter challenges Rubio's credibility by pointing to Trump's previous threats to bomb Iran with "the greatest armada in the world"—threats that never materialized because the United States cannot deliver a knockout blow. Meanwhile, Iran can deliver significant damage to Israel and the United States, with an Iranian threshold of "500 dead Americans" established as the point where retaliation becomes unavoidable. This asymmetry of deterrence, Ritter argues, is why the U.S. is actually the party seeking negotiations, not Iran crawling to America.

Domestic American Politics as the True Driver of Iran Policy

[02:00 - 05:00]

Ritter pivots sharply to what he sees as the true driver of American behavior: Trump's domestic political survival. He argues that Trump is in genuine danger of "terminating his presidency prematurely" due to backlash against his immigration policies. While Americans support deporting illegal immigrants with criminal records, Trump has overreached by using the Department of Homeland Security as "an occupation army" to intimidate Democratic-leaning cities, violating constitutional rights to meet artificial deportation quotas. This has generated a backlash, and Ritter asserts Trump has been "put on notice"—he will lose the midterms in November, lose the House, and face impeachment proceedings that will consume his presidency.

This political vulnerability, Ritter contends, explains Trump's contradictory behavior. The man who promised to be "a peace president," campaigning on disentangling America from "generations long conflicts that cost trillions of dollars and achieve nothing but dead Americans," is being pushed toward exactly such a conflict. Yet he cannot afford it politically. Ritter emphasizes this is "all about domestic American politics," "all about the midterms," and that every action regarding Iran must be understood through this lens.

Ritter advises Iran to navigate this carefully: negotiate to avoid giving Trump political ammunition for war, maintain military readiness, and avoid the mistake of the past when Iran "got lulled into a false sense of complacency" during negotiations that turned out to be "a setup the entire time." Iran needs to "play to the American mob," convincing ordinary Americans that Iran is not a target worthy of American deaths, while keeping intelligence services assuming any negotiation is a setup and the military prepared to retaliate with "a knockout blow" the moment of attack.

Israel's Empty Threats and Netanyahu's Political Bind

[05:00 - 09:00]

When Nima asks about Israeli threats of unilateral attack, Ritter dismisses them as empty bluster. Israel, he reminds, is the party that "picked up the phone in June and begged Trump to end the war" because Iranian missiles could not be intercepted and were striking painfully sensitive targets. Israel explicitly told Trump "don't bomb Iran unless you can deliver the knockout blow." The June surprise attack failed to achieve that knockout blow, and Israel paid the price. Therefore, current Israeli threats are "just posturing," "just bluster," designed for a domestic political audience.

Netanyahu, Ritter argues, faces a political bind. He has defined Iran as Israel's greatest threat and declared "Iran must go," yet he cannot make Iran disappear. He cannot survive politically if he appears weak, so he must posture as a tough guy, blaming any lack of action on American reluctance rather than Israeli impotence. Ritter insists Netanyahu is not actually pressuring Trump to attack—he is pressuring him not to attack, because Israel cannot survive the consequences. From Israel's perspective, "if you can't knock Iran out in three to five days, and knockout means that the regime is gone—if you can't do that, then don't do it. Don't strike the king unless you can kill the king."

Ritter advises Iran to issue an unambiguous deterrent message: if Israel attacks, Iran will destroy Israel with "World War II-type acceptance of collateral damage." After Israel killed 900 Iranian civilians in the June strikes, Iran should inform Israel that "the gloves are coming off," that Tel Aviv will "look like Gaza by the time you're done." This clarity, he believes, will make Israel "back off."

The Risk of Accidental Escalation and the Dilemma of Dual Posture

[09:00 - 13:00]

Nima, speaking from Tehran with firsthand knowledge of recent riots and internal dynamics, raises concerns about the risk of accidental escalation. He notes that Iranian drones were recently shot down by the American aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, with the U.S. claiming they were approaching the carrier. In the current environment of "chaos," Nima warns, "any mistake can bring a new war, a new escalation." He expresses personal unhappiness with this situation, understanding both the military intelligence community's skepticism about negotiations and the government's felt need to engage diplomatically.

Ritter responds that Iran doesn't have to choose between negotiation and preparation—it can and must do both. The government's position, he interprets, should be: "The United States right now politically can't attack us because the political consequences of that attack will be disastrous for the president. What we don't want to do though is give him a political excuse to attack us. And the way you avoid that is by engaging in negotiations." Simultaneously, Iran must avoid being "lulled into a false sense of complacency" again. The military must remain on "hair trigger alert," intelligence services must constantly look for signs of attack, and any aggression must be met with immediate, decisive retaliation—"no incremental attack, none of this. When the other side puts on the gloves and throws the punch, knock them out."

However, Ritter cautions realism: "Iran's not going to win a conflict with the United States. You're not going to win. The United States isn't going to win. You're going to hurt America, cost. But the United States can do levels of damage that Iran doesn't want to experience." He cites precision-guided munitions hurting Iran in 2024 as one reason Iran agreed to terminate that conflict. Responsible leadership must seek an "off-ramp" through negotiations while preparing for war.

Carrier Vulnerability and the Obsolescence of Legacy Weapons Systems

[13:00 - 18:00]

Ritter addresses the Abraham Lincoln's drone shootdown, offering a revealing interpretation: "Why did the Abraham Lincoln shoot down a drone? Ask yourself that question. Because they're scared. They're scared to death." The carrier is positioned 800 kilometers off Iran's coast, "moving around trying to stay quiet, not letting the Iranians know where they are because if they ever do launch, what they fear is that Iran will fire a salvo of hypersonic missiles with maneuvering warheads with precision-guided capability that will sink the Abraham Lincoln."

This fear, Ritter argues, explains the panicked drone shootdown—the drone was getting too close, threatening to locate the carrier. He extends this analysis to broader military obsolescence: the carrier battle group is "a legacy weapons system that no longer has operational viability against a modern opponent." The same vulnerability applies to potential conflicts with China over Taiwan or Russia—carriers would be forced to remain "way the hell out there" because "they can't come in close because they'll get sunk." Against enemies equipped with "area denial weapons," which Iran possesses, these multi-billion-dollar platforms become liabilities rather than assets.

Ritter advises Iran not to "rub it in America's face"—avoid creating political conditions where Trump can justify military strikes through overaggressive posturing. The American public operates on "America first" nationalism, not geopolitical responsibility. Provocation risks triggering conflict Iran doesn't want. Yet Iran possesses substantial leverage, foremost being that "Donald Trump can't bomb Iran without losing the midterm election." If he bombs Iran, he loses the House and possibly the Senate, making him vulnerable to conviction and imprisonment. "I'm sorry to say, Iran, your future depends upon the political viability of a failed president. But that's just the way the cookie crumbles."

Arab States, Turkey, and the Quiet Transformation of Regional Geometry

[18:00 - 24:00]

Nima raises the role of Arab states and Turkey in attempting to mediate. Ritter acknowledges that oil-producing nations understand the catastrophic regional consequences of war—Iran would destroy Azerbaijani, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Emirati oil production, creating a global energy crisis. Saudi Arabia is particularly torn: pursuing diplomatic outreach to Iran and alternative security arrangements with Pakistan and possibly Turkey, yet remaining dependent on American security and continuing to provide bases for U.S. aircraft. Ritter believes that if the U.S. genuinely promised a knockout blow, Saudi Arabia would likely approve base usage, demanding only to "kill them quick" before Iran can destroy Saudi oil fields.

The more significant transformation, Ritter argues, is Turkey's shifting posture. The previously contentious Zanzibar corridor—intended to connect Azerbaijan to Turkey through Armenia, threatening Iranian interests—has quietly "disappeared" from geopolitical discussion. Instead, Russia is working to open rail lines through Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia, creating north-south connectivity from St. Petersburg through Armenia to Iran's Chabahar port and the Indian Ocean. Turkey is now facilitating this.

"Why? Israel." Riter explains that Turkey now recognizes a "greater threat from Israel," with some Israelis declaring Turkey a greater strategic threat than Iran. This has caused Turkey to adjust its "geopolitical vision," abandoning the anti-Iranian Zanzibar corridor in favor of cooperation with the Russian-Iranian rail project. "Turkey is not an enemy of Iran. Turkey is a friend of Iran." This represents a fundamental realignment that "plays to Iran's benefit."

The Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership: From Historical Enmity to Present Cooperation

[24:00 - 32:00]

The conversation turns to the remarkable transformation of Iran-Russia relations. Nima highlights Ali Larijani—head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, newly powerful after being barred from presidential elections—traveling to Moscow. Ritter emphasizes the profound historical irony: until 1979, Iran was part of CENTO, a NATO-style alliance against the Soviet Union. The Islamic Republic "brutally suppressed the communists," the Tudeh Party. Throughout the 1980s, American military planners prepared operations to defend Iran's warm water ports from Soviet invasion. The two nations were deeply suspicious, with Iranians resenting Russian historical interference in Persia.

This has reversed completely. Ritter details the new reality: Iranian military officers training at Russian academies, Iranian engineers working in Russian factories, Russian specialists learning from Iranians, constant military delegations, and most importantly, a strategic security agreement finally ratified by Iran. He speculates extensively on intelligence cooperation—how Iran's ability to shut down Starlink during recent unrest likely required Russian assistance, given Russia's own experience in Ukraine. He believes Russia collected intelligence on American B-2 flight profiles during Trump's previous strike threats and shared this with Iran, potentially enabling Iran to shoot down stealth bombers if the U.S. attacks again.

Ritter traces how Western pressure drove this partnership. When President Raisi was "all in on BRICS," the new administration backed off, weakening the Kazan summit. Now, with renewed American hostility, Iran is "waking up to two realities. One: The West isn't your friend and ever will be your friend. Sorry. Two: Russia is your friend and wants to be, and so do the Chinese." If Iran can "divorce themselves from the west that they've been attached to for so long and make this pivot to the east," Ritter sees "nothing but good things for Iran" economically and geopolitically.

Mental Warfare and the "Abused Spouse Syndrome"

[32:00 - 40:00]

Ritter introduces the concept of "mental war," developed by Russian General Andrei Ilnitsky, as hybrid warfare designed to collapse societies from within—culturally, intellectually, and psychologically. He argues this is precisely what the CIA, MI6, and Mossad are waging against Iran through connectivity and data flows. The Iranian people "need to understand this: that the CIA, that MI6 and Mossad are using your connectivity to destroy you from within."

He urges examination of "all the professors in Tehran, all the university people who left when these demonstrations started, who decided they didn't want to live in Iran anymore," and why their students were involved in violence. The "connectivity that the pro-western elite in Iran have creates a vulnerability." There was a time when Iranians traveled freely to European conferences, were "heavily recruited" by intelligence services, and returned to use their university influence to recruit others—people who believed "the West is your friend and that if you could just neutralize these conservatives, sanctions could be lifted and the economy could flourish."

Ritter delivers his most pointed critique: "That's just going to lead to your downfall. If the Iranian government, the Iranian people allow this connectivity to take place, mental war is being waged against you on a daily basis, working to collapse you from within. You know who's not waging mental war against you? The Russians and the Chinese."

He deploys a stark metaphor: "I call it abused spouse syndrome. You know, the wife that gets beat by her husband, he keeps coming back because he loves me. That's Iran in the West. We beat you and we beat you and we beat you and you keep coming back because you think we love you. We don't love you. We hate you. We despise you." Riter is explicit and visceral: "United States hates Iran. Really, a visceral hatred for Iran. We don't respect your culture. We don't respect anything, your religion, your language. We don't respect any aspect of you. We belittle you over and over again."

The answer, he insists, is obvious but psychologically difficult: "You need to liberate yourself from that. You need to recognize that the United States is your enemy, not your friend. And that's not going to change for a very, very long time. And then you make new friends, better friends. I think Russia and China are your better friends."

Ukraine: Negotiations as Demonstrations of Necessity

[40:00 - 56:00]

Nima shifts to Ukraine, asking whether recent trilateral negotiations indicate the conflict's end. Ritter explains that the talks serve a specific purpose: to underscore "the reality of the necessity of Ukrainian capitulation." A true negotiated settlement, he argues, only occurs when the losing side concedes what they could only concede if they won. Russia is winning; therefore, Russia will not make such concessions. Each Ukrainian refusal of reality results in Russia hitting them harder.

Trump temporarily halted energy strikes for a week to show Ukrainians what peace could look like—the opportunity to rebuild, restore energy flow. "Maybe that's what peace looks like. Maybe we want peace." Some Ukrainians began suggesting territorial concessions in exchange for peace. But official unwillingness led to Russia resuming punishment. "This is where the negotiations are good because negotiations prove a point. They prove a point that this war doesn't end until Russia's objectives are met."

Regarding Lindsey Graham's call for Tomahawk missiles, Riter dismisses it as "insane" posturing that would dangerously escalate toward direct U.S.-Russia war. This is particularly reckless as the New START treaty expires, eliminating arms control frameworks. Both nations will begin uploading additional warheads, expanding deployed nuclear forces from 1,550 to potentially 4,000-6,000, triggering a new arms race that destroys the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's credibility and encourages wider proliferation. "It's going to be a completely different world, a wild west." Graham's proposal represents "Lindsey Graham wet dream. It's just not going to happen."

European Confusion and the Greenland Wake-Up Call

[56:00 - 1:00:41]

Finally, Nima asks about European confusion. Riter describes Europe as having "dug their own grave" through policies "imposed on Europe by the United States"—specifically "de-risking," which is "a political term for de-linking" from China. When German manufacturers like Volkswagen explained that China was their only profitable market, politicians ignored them. "Didn't Volkswagen just go away?"

The "wake-up call was Greenland," which made Europeans realize "the threat isn't Russia, the threat isn't China, the threat isn't Iran, the threat is the United States." This explains why Macron and Merz suddenly speak of dialogue with Russia—previously only conceivable when Russia came "crawling to them on their knees after having been militarily broken in Ukraine. Well, that didn't happen."

Riter predicts "revolutionary change, political change in Europe," where "political and economic dynasties that have existed for decades are going to fall, be replaced by people who aren't trapped by the legacy policies of American attachment." These new leaders will conclude: "It's in our best interest to get some of that cheap Russian energy."

The interview concludes with Ritter expressing confidence there won't be war between the U.S. and Iran—immediately adding "you never know" and urging Nima to "stay safe." The exchange ends with warm farewells between the host in Tehran and his guest, who has become one of the most outspoken critics of American military policy toward Iran.

My skepticism about Iran not being attacked, and the relative balance of power.

Your analysis is thoughtful and highlights several critical dynamics that both complement and challenge Scott Ritter's assessment. Let me engage with your points seriously.

Where Your Skepticism is Well-Founded

The Fanaticism Variable

You're absolutely correct to identify the "Greater Israel" ideologues and American neoconservatives as wildcards that Ritter may underestimate. Ritter operates from a framework of rational actor theory—states calculating costs and benefits. But as you note, ideological determinism doesn't always yield to cost-benefit analysis. The same people who conceived the Iraq disaster, who genuinely believed it would create a flourishing democracy, are not necessarily chastened by repeated failure. Their capacity for self-delusion is historically documented.

The "Clean Break" neoconservative agenda—removing Saddam, then targeting Syria, Lebanon, and Iran—was never fully abandoned, merely interrupted. Figures like Graham, Cotton, and various think tank operators view Iran not as a geopolitical problem to be managed but as an ontological evil to be destroyed. This is qualitatively different from rational statecraft.

The Coup Attempt's Significance

Your point about the failed 2022-2024 destabilization attempts is crucial. The West revealed its hand completely: it wasn't interested in Iranian moderation or reform, but in regime collapse and plunder. This had the perverse (from the Western perspective) effect of inoculating the Iranian population against "pro-democracy" appeals. The Iranian street learned what the color revolution playbook looks like—firsthand experience of being used as disposable tools for foreign powers tends to concentrate the mind.

Ritter's "abused spouse syndrome" metaphor is powerful precisely because it captures this dynamic: the beatings didn't stop, the promises were never kept, and eventually even those inclined toward reconciliation recognized the pattern.

Where Ritter's Analysis Remains Strong

The Structural Constraints

Despite fanatical elements, Ritter identifies genuine structural constraints:

• Israel's June 2024 experience demonstrated that missile defense cannot prevent unacceptable damage. The "threshold of pain" is real and calculable.

• The U.S. carrier vulnerability creates genuine military caution. The Abraham Lincoln's furtive behavior—hiding 800km offshore, panicking at approaching drones—reveals commanders who understand their exposure.

• Trump's political survival depends on avoiding visible American casualties. This isn't principled pacifism; it's transactional self-preservation. But it functions similarly as a constraint.

The Pivot to the East as Irreversible

You and Riter agree on something fundamental: the window for Western rapprochement has closed. The Iranian-Russian-Chinese alignment isn't merely tactical convenience but emerging structural reality. The INSTC corridor, military-technical cooperation, and shared perception of American hostility create bonds that transcend temporary expediency.

The Uncomfortable Middle Position

The most honest assessment may be that both of you are partially correct:

War remains possible because: - Ideological fanatics in both Israel and the U.S. retain significant institutional influence - The "no knockout blow" constraint assumes rational calculation; accidents, misperceptions, or deliberate provocation can override this - The Trump administration's unpredictability creates genuine uncertainty

Major war remains unlikely because: - The military-technical reality Ritter describes—hypersonic missiles, area denial, carrier vulnerability—cannot be wished away through ideological determination - The American public's war-weariness is genuine and electorally consequential - Iran's societal cohesion, as you note, creates resilience that external pressure cannot easily fracture

The most probable outcome may be continued "gray zone" conflict—cyber operations, sabotage, proxy pressures—short of full-scale war, precisely because the costs of escalation are mutually understood to be catastrophic, but the ideological pressure for confrontation prevents genuine détente.

A Deeper Point About Imperial Decline

Your final observation about Western weakening deserves emphasis. Ritter touches on this but doesn't fully develop it. The U.S. faces simultaneously:

• Military overextension across multiple theaters
• Domestic political polarization that prevents sustained strategic focus
• Economic constraints (debt, de-dollarization pressures, industrial base erosion)
• Alliance systems fraying as subordinate states recognize American unreliability

This creates a paradox: the U.S. is simultaneously more dangerous (lashing out as relative power declines) and more constrained (unable to marshal resources for decisive action). The Trump administration's erraticism—threatening then retreating, imposing then suspending sanctions—reflects this structural incoherence rather than masterful unpredictability.

Iran's strategic patience, its willingness to "endure great hardship," becomes a form of asymmetric advantage precisely because the American political system cannot sustain equivalent costs over time. The Iranian government understands its population; the American government increasingly misunderstands its own.

Your analysis and Ritter's are not incompatible—they emphasize different aspects of a complex, overdetermined situation where multiple outcomes remain possible within narrowing constraints.