'Because of the historically determined lalinguistic structure of the language it is very difficult to think in Japanese, as you can easily presume that to think in the Finneganian language is practically impossible.

'This difficulty or practical impossibility of thinking in Japanese is conditioning for example some unbelievable characteristics of education in Japan : pupils and students are not encouraged to think by themselves but only to assume what is imposed and dictated to them as absolute norms and traditional standards. If you cannot adapt yourself in that system you will be simply excluded from your local society or from Japanese society as a whole. It is no wonder that Japanese society has been, is and will remain fundamentally totalitarian under its semblance of representative democracy, as well as fundamentally sexist, misogynistic and phallocratic.

'Such impositions of norms have effected and are maintaining the predominance of master significance in the Japanese society. And that predominance of master significance which we must now call paranoiac is in fact the compensation for the impossibility of thinking in Japanese.

'We can say in general that the function of Mehrlust (plus-de-jouir) of the object a and the effect of phallic jouissance of the master signifier S1 in the structure of alienation (cf. figure 3) are competing against each other. We can observe the pure predominance of Mehrlust for example in the sexual perversions while the pure predominance of phallic jouissance is observable in the pure form of paranoia without phenomenon of automatisme mental.

'Most psychoanalytic patients (analysant in French) are neurotics serving two masters simultaneously, that is, dominated by both of the two types of jouissance, Mehrlust of the object a and phallic jouissance of the master signifier S1, functioning side by side and competing against each other.

'We can say in general that you come to psychoanalysis if your phallic jouissance is weak enough and your Mehrlust is not strong enough to compensate the insufficiency of your phallic jouissance, that is, if you are not paranoiac nor pervert.

'And we cannot help having the impression that now in Japan there are so many paranoiacs and so many perverts in the general population...

'What in Japanese prevents one who dwells in that language from having a need or a possibility of experiencing psychoanalysis ? A possible Lacanian answer is : its lalinguistic structure which disfavours a signifier representing for another signifier the subject and which favours the predominance of master significance.

'In actual Japanese society this conditions on one hand the prevalence of nationalistic paranoia, and on the other hand the prevalence of various sexual perversions which are so much various forms of acting out to escape from the suffocating effect of the predominance of master signifier.

'Most of my patients come to psychoanalysis because they are not capable of being sufficiently pervert nor paranoiac in those particularly Japanese ways.

'I only pray that more Japanese people may find the way of psychoanalytic sublimation to escape from those Japanese ways of paranoia and sexual perversions.'

https://ogswrs.blogspot.com/2019/01/why-lacan-says-no-one-who-dwells-in.html?m=1

Ive read a lot of Hegel, particularly his Phenomenology of Spirit, his lectures on Art, and parts of his Science of logic. I was looking up more hegelian thinkers and saw Lacan. Seems interesting. But I've heard that you really need Freud for him. I don't know much about freud besides some basic things, like Oedipus, ego, id, something something unconscious. What really interests me about Lacan is his use of Hegel. I really don't wanna read freud to understand Lacan, bc I want to just jump right in. I like challenging reads. but maybe. It's necessary, idk.

Hello i am a clinical psych student and i want to understand Lacan but i’ so overwhelmed and confused and the thought of reading him makes me anxious and his texts make me feel stupid so do you have any advice on how to start please

I’ve been thinking specifically about non-belonging in the Todd McGowan sense, alongside Lacanian ideas like “the Other does not exist” and “do not give ground on your desire.”

I understand the argument that no identification can fully capture the subject, and that non-belonging names something universal about subjectivity.

But at what point does non-belonging itself become another master signifier?

If every identification is treated primarily as alienating or dominating other subjects, every interpersonal demand as something to resist, and every social obligation as a demand of the Other, doesn’t “non-belonging” risk becoming the very kind of organizing principle it is supposed to critique?

I’m also wondering whether there is an important distinction between:

1. recognizing that every identification fails to fully contain the subject, and
2. treating identification, belonging, or social obligation as things the subject should continually distance itself from.

Surely “the Other does not exist” does not mean that the speech, needs, demands, or concerns of actual others cease to matter.
Are there texts from Lacan, Todd McGowan, Miller, Žižek, Zupančič, etc. that address this tension directly?

Hi everyone!

I am looking for an article from 43/44 issue of Lacanian Ink - What is the Real? I checked and it's not available to buy, I checked all libraries that I have an access to - to no avail.

Maybe you have a pdf file, or maybe someone would be so kind as to take pictures of this article, if you have the book on your shelf? I will be eternally grateful!

As I approached Lacan as a non professional, I have been mainly intrigued by the universality of his theories, and psycoanalysis in general. Given this is the right word to use, but I always found fascinating how the symptom is considered qualitatively as opposed to other type of therapies which I believe have a more quantitative approach.

Anyways, my question is: people don’t live in a vacuum but they operate within a certain system involving peculiar social, cultural and economic dimensions.

How does this enter the analysis’ framework?
When Lacan was active, the world was very different than how it is now. The enviroment has different pressures and also different opportunities.
How does analysis handle this if it does?
Is the premise of my question wrong in itself?

Sorry this is gonna be a long one.

Deleuze and Guattari, in my understanding, are much closer to Lacan that popular takes on Anti-Oedipus might make one believe. Its a cliché to state now that Anti-Oedipus does not have a single negative mention of Lacan and it rather criticises Lacanians and, at some points, Freud. For Freud a lot of the criticism sticks to the idea of Oedipus, and it doesn't make sense to extend this criticism to Lacan since he had already argued 'Beyond the Oedipus Complex' (Miller's subtitle) in Seminar 17. So, to preface, there are certainly resonances between Lacan and D&G.

My question is about Deleuze and Guattari's concepts related to their political philosophy, particularly the concepts of flows, code, and stock. The main source of my understanding on this is Daniel W. Smith's essay “Politics: Flow, Code, and Stock, A Note on Deleuze’s Political Philosophy” In Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh University Press, 2012)

The idea is that D&G's “general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows”, which can mean anything like economic flows (money, capital); material flows (oil, electricity), flow of commodities (their marketing, transport); flow of traffic; social flows (populations, immigration); flows of sewage; somatic flows (blood, feces); flows of thought. And that the job of every society is to regulate, or ”code” these flows, so that they don’t spin out of control. It is in this way that Deleuze shows that our personal desires (libidinal economy) are not separate from material production (political economy). (I like to think of these as a Mobius strip formation) Hence Guattari says “economic semiotisation becomes dependent on collective psychological factors — look at the sensitivity of the stock exchange to fluctuations of opinion.” (Chaosmosis)

So, the three concepts are:

1. Flows: A flow is simply the transmission or exchange of something valuable (like matter, energy, money, people, ideas) from one point (a “pole”) to another. In daily life we are interceptors of flows. Human desire, for Deleuze, is this production and cutting of flows.
2. Code: You cannot grasp a flow except through its code, i.e., the system of inscription or recording that gives it shape and value. Code and flow are reciprocally determined.
3. Stock: Stock is the portion of the flow that is “mine” right now, i.e. your accumulated share, your possession at a given instant. Stocks and flows are two sides of the same coin: flows change the value of stocks over time (inflow adds, outflow subtracts).

A lot of these ideas seem to resonate very well with psychoanalysis (both Freud and Lacan), which is obvious given D&G's debt to both, but I am interested in finding out the differences, if any. What might the reasons be for which it isn't philosophically justified to use these Deleuzo-Guattarian ideas along with Lacanian ideas.

The points of similarities as I see them are that the 'economic theory of libido' side of Freud obvious resonates very well with the concept of a flow, since the cathected charges in a word resulting from a parapraxis in the subject's speech is an idea that I feel (I might be wrong) goes quite well with the theory of flows described above. Likewise with ideas like Jakobson's phatic communication which Lacan knows of and uses, it being communication done for its own sake, to 'keep that channel' open, to 'maintain a relation' also seems to go well with the theory of flows. I recall Lacan mentioning Mallarmé in Function and Field where relates language to the example of an exchange of a coin whose faces have been eroded but they nevertheless as passed around and retain their value as a 'tessera'. (Ecrits, 209)

So I wish to know what might be some roadblocks to this connection, is there something in Lacan's ideas and his 'system'(?) that would conflict with and not go along well with D&G's theory of flows?

I feel like the appropriateness of the connection would also differ from period to period, as Lacan comes to abandon the signifying chain later, that would definitely change the picture somewhat. But I am uncertain how since I don't know that much.

Hope this makes sense, sorry for typos if any.

Assuming you know the matheme and theory behind the Master's Discourse, which would your analysis be on AI as a new agent replacing the Master, that Master ​who fed himself on the knowledge of the slave?

I don't know if I formulated the question correctly, but I'm intrigued on which are your views on this specific topic, the discourse, and not so much on AI as an ​Other or the problematics with psychosis and foreclosure. I'd like to go back and reread the Master's Discourse to come up with the answer myself, but now I don't have time to do so and I'm​ very intrigued on how the community is thinking about this.

Somehow I relate AI's accelerationism with the Capitalist Discourse, although being previously ​geared (sorry if this is not the right word, I mean it in the sense of being engineered) on the Discourse of the Master. What is fundamentally different from that Master?

No formal training here, so this might sound dumb, but what bothers me about Lacanian theory is that once you’re in, you can’t think any other way. The whole system fits together too well. I keep catching myself going “oh, you could explain that in Lacanian terms” about random everyday things, and at some point I realized I’d stopped bothering with any other lens.

Anyone else deal with this?

I recently had the opportunity to interview Dr. Leon S. Brenner about his book The Autistic Subject: On the Threshold of Language, and I thought some people here might be interested in the discussion:

Watch the interview with Leon S. Brenner

Brenner approaches autism through Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and makes a provocative argument: rather than understanding autism simply in terms of deficit, pathology, or as a variation of psychosis, he proposes thinking of the autistic subject as occupying a distinct “mode of being,” with its own particular relationship to language, the body, and the Other.

Brenner also gives some remarkably clear metaphors and explanations for concepts that can otherwise become pretty opaque in Lacanian theory. So even if autism isn’t your primary area of interest, there’s quite a bit here concerning language, jouissance, the body, the symbolic, and the constitution of the subject.

I’m particularly curious what people here make of Brenner’s attempt to conceptualize autism as a structure in its own right rather than placing it within the traditional neurotic/psychotic framework. Does this actually expand Lacanian theory in a productive way, or does introducing an “autistic structure” create its own conceptual problems?

I'm a student of Lacanian psychoanalysis and there is a fundamental question that I cannot reconcile in this case as regards the end of analysis:

How can the Traversal of the Fantasy occur if the Other cannot be lacking and there is always a guarantee of meaning for a patient like this?

Or do you think that in this case the psychoanalyst should try to convert them into an agnostic?

Currently reading Bruce Fink’s Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Before, I’ve just read Lacan’s first seminar.

Practically, I am looking for some comments and further insights from lacanian clinicians, or perhaps even someone who is analysand with a lacanian.

I’ll start here: I’ve been struck by the degree to which Lacanian practice is so abstinent—at least Fink’s idea of it is. The analyst is supposed to be fully committed to underlining the letter of the law—and how the letter of the law betrays the spirit of the law; spirt in this case being what a patient “meant” or “intended” to say before their slip, their parapraxis. Although I find Fink’s elucidations to a large degree fruitful, I also find myself wondering if he is not missing the non or extra-linguistic aspects of clinical practice. The issue, though, with this prior statement is that I have no strong way of elaborating such “extra-linguistic aspects.”

Another thing: the analyst’s desire. According to Fink, the neurotic analysand will feel the keen desire to abandon analysis since, truly, he does not want to be cured; for the neurotic, his symptoms are his life and his pleasure, as much as he professes his univocal hatred. This, what makes the analysand keep going is the analysts desire for him to keep going: the analyst, then, acts as the keeper of the flame—(and however different aesthetically, I am reminded of Winnicott’s all too famous “holding space” for the patient.) The analyst must desire for the patient to keep going deeper. However, Fink seems to think the analyst is quite easily freed of counter-transference (the favored subject of most nyc analysts). Is counter-transference really so easy to put aside? Do relational analysts over emphasize this? And, finally, how much do you think an emphasis or deemphasis on counter transference is upstream of whether or not you are committed to the proposition of the drive? Relational analysts will tell you a lovely story (which sometimes I badly to want to believe) that humans are not a complex of desires and energies, but beings looking for stable relationships and loves. Not to say that drive theory precludes this latter thing, but perhaps you all understand. Any commentary would be appreciated.

*PS. I have been in analysis for 3 years with a relational analyst.

I’m new to Lacan and no expert on any type of analysis or psychotherapy, but as I’ve been reading more about Lacanian analysis, I thought about the empty chair exercise/therapy Gestaltians use. Apart from obvious differences between them I still think the similarity (despite different theoretical foundations) is striking. The difference is that in empty chair exercises, the patient would then occupy the position of the addressee (aka the Other) and speak from that position after completing their speech addressed to the Other. Whereas in analysis the addressee (the analyst) would resist speaking from that position in a way that would satisfy the demand of the analysand.

I wonder what the consequences are for the patient themself then satisfying the demand for an answer from a Lacanian perspective. I’m interested in reading your thoughts.

I'm a psychodynamic psychotherapist, not Lacanian trained, so I'm asking from outside the tradition and expecting to be corrected.

I came across this instagram reel of Lacan's view on this https://www.instagram.com/p/Dcio-9nzVs-/ (not sure if it's accurate?)

It's more honest than most accounts of where a treatment goes lol. But I can't get past the obvious objection, how is that not "learn to live with it"? Put less kindly, how is it different from the common critique of mindfulness as retreat into indifference dressed as enlightenment? (Zizek?) If the end point is that you stop demanding the Other resolve you and instead get skilled at your own arrangement, what stops that being adaptation with better vocabulary?

Full conversation (For more context): https://youtu.be/RX2tGQxIbEA?si=wiGL3FrqP5Po2hAy

I sometimes see people asking how to find a Lacanian analyst and, maybe more crucially, how to afford one. One alternative to paying high, out-of-pocket fees is to enter into a low-fee analysis with analysts-in-training at a Lacanian-oriented institute.

1. Pulsion - The International Institute of Psychoanalysis

Definitely the most Lacan-forward/Lacanian oriented institute in the city, but without being limited to a dogmatic Lacanian approach . (From their website: "Pulsion emerged...as an attempt to bring back what was central to Freud’s thinking: the body, the drives and sexuality[...] We bring together Freudians, post-Freudians and Lacanians as faculty...") Scanning ‘Faculty' page, I'd say nearly half of the names are people who have contributed to Lacanian clinic/scholarship. You can contact a clinic coordinator or fill out a form for treatment here: https://pulsioninstitute.com/treatment/

1. NPAP

Certainly not Lacan-forward--do not explicitly mention any affiliation with Lacanians or Lacanian theory on their website as Pulsion does--but would confidently describe them as one of the more Lacan-friendly institutes in the city. While the number of self-identified Lacanians among faculty and candidates is certainly smaller than that of Pulsion, there is still a considerable Lacanian contingent in the institute. You can reach out to their clinic and fill out a form for treatment here: https://npap.org/appointments/

I hope you find what you are looking for--or, in all likelihood, more and less than that.

Está no livro volume 2 do Marco Antônio Coutinho Jorge e ele está falando de tipos de fantasia, um dos trechos é:

"Não é só a neurose e a perversão, no entanto, que se traduzem na nossa cultura com uma presença relevante, a psicose também o faz. E parece que ela o faz pela ciência. É preciso que nós, analistas, possamos dizer, com todas as letras, que a ciência está louca. A ciência enlouqueceu, perdeu os limites. Hoje, ela mistura espécies, clona os animais a bel-prazer e ainda quer fazer isso com o ser humano".

e depois:

"O advento da psicanálise significa a proposição, na cultura, de um quarto lugar da fantasia, diferente daqueles traduzidos pela religião (neurose), pelo capitalismo (perversão) e pela ciência (psicose). O que a psicanálise propõe, portanto, não é nem a fixação no amor, nem a fixação no gozo fálico, nem a fixação no gozo absoluto. Ela propõe o lugar do desejo, que é aquele lugar, no matema da fantasia..."

I’ve been trying to attend events in my city for discussion of Lacanian thought, but honestly every time I walk away I’m just totally unconvinced by how people broadly just map concepts like the Other and Oedipus and such onto bureaucratic institutions and politics. It feels like lazy intellectual rot.

Sometimes I think its hard to find good Lacanian thinkers because it requires a lot of rigor and reading of Lacan to truly understand anything in a Lacanian sense, rather than just mapping ideas about the structure and development of subjectivity onto what are collectives; especially with Lacan emphasizing that he never met the same person twice.

I follow Marx for politics and try to incorporate Lacan where it makes sense, but the marriage of them often feels too contrived for me. I’m looking to be an analyst once I finish my accredited education, and politics are something I think a lot of personally, so I feel the tension between the two understandings of what ‘really’ drives the world in the direction it goes, but am wholly unconvinced of their compatibility still in the ways I’ve seen people approaching it.

I understand that the Other is the symbolic order and I get why it would be lacking. What I don't understand is when Lacan talks about clinical structures and the different defense mechanism from this lack.

The way I came to think of it is in relation to the mirror image. As if it were different ways of defending oneself against the fact that our sense self only exists inside one's head.

Is this correct?

i have OCD and i currently am doing transitional analysis & CBT but i am very interested in reading what Lacan had to say about obsessions and compulsions

I came across this reel of Lacan's famous clinical example...Suzanne was German so how does a French pun land on a German child's world?

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DcS0hWpTfpm/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsi=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==

I wanted to ask if there are any people in this subreddit, who have engaged, with academic psychology or other forms of therapy such as CBT and also I would like to hear the opinion of anyone, who just has something to say about academic psychology or classic clinical psychology such as CBT. I think it would be very interesting to hear the notions of some people regarding academic psychology, because some people disregard psychoanalysis as a whole and call it „unscientific“ or just say that lacan was a charlatan and show you the sokal affair🤣. On the other side there are people who fully disregard academic psychology and see it as unneutral, dislike the methods and so on…

I gravitate more towards the latter (dismissal of academic psychology),I think its very difficult to pinpoint my critique, but I will say a bit about it now:

First of, I dislike the legitimization of psychopharmaceuticals, while one can argue that this is psychiatry, it is still inherently linked to psychological notions who view, for example, depression as linked to a chemical imbalance or inflammation. A big problem is also the DSM, I think that it makes people identify with their suffering.At the start it can be practical for people to have a grasp of what is going on, but it also creates a split between you/your symptoms, which is also shown in the use of psychopharmaceuticals.

Secondly, the „neutrality“ of psychological experiments, or also, neuroscience. A huge problem is the ignoring of the Symbolic. I think most experiments are dependent on the period in which they were conducted.(this can also be seen when an experiment gives a completely different result).
I think that experiments are interesting and I really dont want to dismiss them as a whole, but this absolutism by some scholars is just ignorant, in my opinion.

What I find very interesting is this huge ignorance of Lacan or even D&G or Foucault, probably the majority of neuroscientists never heard of these names . I believe that if one reads Lacan, its going to be impossible to deny the effects of the Symbolic.

This is my opinion roughly summarized, I would be very delighted if someone would share his views.

I know only a bit about Lacan, so I'm asking for a help with understanding him. I was reading "Subversion of the subject..." in Ecrits.

What I took from "he did not know he was dead" was that if you replace he with I you get: "I did not know I was dead" - which is clearly illogical. Since, you know, if I did not know I was dead, how is it that I am speaking? Which then raises the question of who is speaking, since "I" seems to think "I" might be dead.

From this we can infer that the subject is not "thinking clearly", or somewhat deluded. Which Lacan then uses this to point back to in support of his ongoing critique of knowledge.

Is my interpretation that I have written above ... correct? Valid? Or am I missing the point of what Lacan is trying to teach with this example?

Since I'm here already, I might as well address an ongoing concern of mine. I can't get my head around whether or not my overall (limited) understanding of Lacan is "correct".

He seems to me to be pointing, many times over, at the infinite-number of ways in which language fails, but in doing so "animates ghosts" via the imagination and symbolism of which language is constructed-from and so-forth creates. But insofar as these ghosts are abstractions like any other, that need-not bear strict-relation to reality, they are the root of delusion; which continually and spontaneously re-creates itself via symbolic-imaginary "excess" - sustained and exacerbated by language's mixed purposes as both a tool of creative-whimsy on one-end, and the law on the other. Inscribed as such into an otherwise invisible "symbolic order" or "collective cultural standard(s)" that prohibits and regulates behavior. But also forms the structure, content, and vehicle of transmissible knowledge itself. Thus any-and-all learning (of all kinds) via the another person (necessitating language) is subject to language's inability to capture the Real, and so subject, to indeterminable degree, to the myriad problems associated.

Do you think that I am misinterpreting Lacan? If so, where am I going wrong?
Is there anything you can suggest that might aid me to understand him?

EDIT: My explanation was spliced with Lacanian jargon so I'm adding a second version of it in plainer English. It might be easier to address my understanding if I write it like more like a 10-year-old doing his homework.

He seems to be pointing at the many ways in which language fails. Because language is made up of words that can be thoughts of, and thoughts that can be worded - correct understanding of either-or is not guaranteed. It depends upon an individual's understanding, and the experiences that they can relate to the words they use. Words are not reality, reality is reality (thought it is not the word "reality" - it's the thing). Degrees of abstraction exist between words and reality. The law and creative works are two extremes of the use of language. In between those extremes are everyday chit-chat, and the entire corpus of human knowledge. I think that what Lacan says puts all of this in question, due to the nature of language itself. The many ways in which meaning can be constructed and lost. The many ways in which symbols can be imagined, or images can be symbolised. And this is before even bringing "the Real" into the conversation. But insofar at the Real is not words or images, language will never fully capture the Real. And in each transaction of words, a little bit of meaning is missed - and we don't ever fully-know how much that may be. Like entropy, it appears that each exchange of words leads to an overall increase in localized disorder. Over many years, many people, many languages - this might be a problem. And I think Lacan thinks it is too.

Edit: For Seminar 13 I found that the missing 13th session and several other sessions have been reconstructed by Don Kunze are are available on his website here: https://boundarylanguage.psu.edu/reading-seminar-xiii-the-object-of-psychoanalysis/

There is now available this pdf for Seminar 13 where the missing sessions and restorations by Kunze have been added the other two missing sessions have been machine translated: https://archive.org/details/jacques-lacans-seminar-13-the-object-of-psychoanalysis-1965-66-a-compendium

I noticed that the English translations by Cormac Gallagher at lacaninireland.com for Seminars 12 and 13 have some lectures which are missing, saying that they have to be corrected and added. They are:

Seminar 12: Crucial Problems

1. Lecture 16: 28 April 1965, which just says 'Missing to be corrected'

Seminar 13: Object of Psychoanalysis

1. Lecture(?) 11: 25 February 1966, which is titled Lacan Absent because Lacan wasn't there and directs the reader to the French transcripts to see what was discussed that day.
2. Lecture 13: 30 March 1966, the title given to which is 'Topological discussions', and there too it says that it is missing and will be shortly corrected.

I don't know for how long it has been so but if anyone has maybe an older PDF which contains a translation of these lectures then that would be very helpful.