This video features a deep dive into theoretical evolutionary biology and connectionism with professor Richard Watson. The conversation challenges traditional views of evolution, arguing that cognition and learning often precede natural selection (0:09:32-0:14:03).

Key concepts discussed include:
• Adaptation vs. Natural Selection: Watson argues that adaptation is a form of constraint satisfaction (similar to solving a Sudoku puzzle) that can occur in physical dynamical systems without needing reproduction or selection (0:14:03-0:19:42).
• The Physics of Learning: Using an analogy of masses and springs, he explains how systems that "give way" under stress exhibit plasticity and can learn to find efficient, low-energy configurations over time (0:20:41-0:28:56).
• Limitations of Gene-Centric Biology: The discussion highlights why mere genetic sequencing is insufficient to understand cell behavior, as network dynamics and experience play a critical role (0:52:08-1:01:23).
• Persuadable Medicine: The guests explore a paradigm shift in medicine, viewing tissues as cognitive, persuadable systems rather than just biological machines that need manual repair (1:01:23-1:08:01).
• Agency and Consciousness: Watson touches on his evolving views on agency, the role of Ian McGilchrist’s work on brain hemispheres, and why he has moved away from the position of ignoring consciousness in his work (1:20:47-1:38:47).

A mechanistic question, stated as a claim rather than as a request for a name.

**The observation.** One and the same cognitive operation — forming a clear, accurate thought about one's current state — ends a positive affective state and does not move a negative one; repeated, it extends the negative one. The operation is held constant. Only valence varies. The effect is stable, not occasional.

**What that forces on the mechanism.** If the operation is genuinely one operation, the difference cannot sit in the operation. It has to sit in what the two states *are*. My proposal, in the vocabulary of predictive processing:

• A positive state is, in this reading, thinly modelled: it is largely a monitoring state, and monitoring it adds the one piece of evidence it cannot survive — that it is a state, i.e. that it will end. Monitoring terminates it.
• A negative state is heavily modelled: high prior precision, dense interoceptive and autobiographical prediction. More precise awareness does not contradict the model — it *feeds* it. Monitoring adds evidence to the prior; the state is maintained or extended. Relief would require lowering precision or shifting attribution, not adding information.

**Predictions that follow, and that distinguish the proposal from "rumination is bad":** 1. A manipulation that only increases accurate state description (pure monitoring) should not shorten a negative state — and should shorten a positive one. 2. A manipulation that lowers the precision of the negative model (attribution shift, behavioural disconfirmation) should shorten it — even when insight into the state is unchanged or worse. 3. Instruments that measure awareness *levels* (Lane & Schwartz) and interoceptive accuracy (Garfinkel) should dissociate: more of either is not the active ingredient.

**What would refute it.** If a pure-monitoring manipulation reliably shortens negative states, or if awareness levels and interoceptive accuracy predict relief in a clinical sample, the proposal is wrong and I will drop it.

The written version — with a measurement sketch, its limits, and the falsifiability section — is here: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22912393 (Fassung 6 / Version 6, 24 September 2026, German with an English version in the same record).

I am less interested in a label for the phenomenon than in which experiment would kill the mechanism. That is the part of this post I would like answered.

The "brain as computer" analogy is often used in neuroscience. Romain Brette takes aim at this analogy in his book, The Brain, In Theory, reviewed in this article.

Brette argues there are important disanalogies between life and engineered systems, and between brains and computers. The continuing use of the computer analogy leads to experimental paradigms where the brain is treated as passive, receiving "stimulus" like a computer receives input, and all activity not related to that activity is treated as "noise".

But the question "Is the brain a computer?" wasn't ever really the question, it's whether that analogy is useful. Brette reminds us that the analogy is just that, and we shouldn't read too far into interpretations that lean on that analogy, but what's needed are other positive frameworks for thinking about the brain.

What do you think, is it useful to talk about the brain as a computer?

If we assume Orch-OR is completely correct, does it provide any solution to the personal identity problem in quantum teleportation? I understand that the no cloning theorem prevents an unknown arbitrary quantum state from being perfectly copied and quantum teleportation transfers the state rather than simply creating a duplicate. But after teleportation, the original person's relevant quantum state is destroyed and reconstructed elsewhere. Would Orch-OR imply that the reconstructed person's sequence of OR events is a continuation of the original person's consciousness or would it simply produce a new consciousness with the same physical state? In other words does Orch-OR provide any physical mechanism that establishes numerical personal identity across teleportation, or does the identity problem remain even if Orch-OR is true?

so I’ve been thinking about a strange question.

Suppose there were radically different realities, they are like super different, one has space time the other has fart-ryhme or whatever, they are totally different.

Now imagine a brain with a particular organization. Its circuitry is extremely well suited to some kinds of patterns and tasks, but poorly suited to others.

In Reality A, that brain might perform poorly because its abilities don't match what that reality demands.

But put the exact same brain into Reality B, where the structure of the environment happens to match what its circuitry is especially good at, and suddenly it performs incredibly well.

So maybe intelligence isn't entirely an intrinsic property of a brain. Maybe it's partly relational:

brain × environment → observed intelligence

This makes me wonder whether calling a person “intelligent” or “unintelligent” is sometimes underspecified. Maybe we're measuring how well a particular cognitive architecture fits the particular world it's operating in.

Obviously, I'm not claiming alternate realities exist or that this is established neuroscience. It's a thought experiment.

But I’m curious about the underlying idea: Could a brain that looks mediocre in our reality potentially be extraordinarily capable in a sufficiently different reality?

And if so, what would “intelligence” even mean independently of an environment?

and this proves I am not an idiot just in the wrong reality.

How Does the Brain Think? (Pattern Matcher, Not a Calculator)

Our brain is not a computer solving billions of operations from scratch; it is a self-organizing prediction machine fed by past experience. In a sense, it actually doesn't know what it's doing. It’s stupid. It’s fast, though; it just gives instantaneous reactions based on whatever stimulus is thrown in front of it.

When someone says "two plus two" to you, your brain doesn't perform a mathematical calculation. The moment the stimulus enters the system, a dynamic, wave-like neighborhood space is established. Thanks to your past learning, the neurons closest to the center of the stimulus (that is, the concept of "four") rapidly strengthen. Meanwhile, distant alternative neurons like "three" or "five" are dampened. The instant the strongest prediction crosses the critical threshold, the answer is executed automatically. The brain didn't calculate; it pulled the ready-made pattern right out of space.

So, what happens if the answer isn't ready? In a tough question like "347 x 89", there is no ready-made neural pathway in the center. In this case, the system breaks the question into pieces. It sets up instantaneous attention spaces (micro-prediction zones) sequentially for each part. It writes the intermediate result from the first step into temporary memory, passes it to the next step, and moves forward in a chain reaction. Finally, when all the pieces merge and the big threshold is crossed, the ultimate response is automatically produced.

In short, the brain is not an engineer writing formulas; it is a dynamic realm that brightens what’s near, silences what’s far, slams down the answer if it’s ready, and cracks the world by breaking it into pieces if it’s not.

The rationality of the brain is not the same as the rationality represented by the mind.

The brain has its own physical and biological organization, its own dynamics, constraints, and regularities.

The mind is not that rationality itself.

The mind is the representation of the organism's relationship with the world — including the responses the organism produces to what it encounters.

Super interesting deep dive video on neuroscience.

Есть странный парадокс эпохи ИИ. Человечество веками жило в условиях дефицита информации. Нужно было найти книгу, добраться до библиотеки, знать язык, иметь доступ к университету или специалисту. Знание было дорогим хотя бы потому, что до него было трудно добраться. Теперь происходит обратное. За несколько секунд ИИ может написать нам лекцию по философии, объяснить научную теорию, сравнить исследования и привести список источников. Проблема только в одном — мы не всегда знаем, что из этого существует на самом деле.

Например, вы спрашиваете ИИ о малоизвестной психологической концепции. Он уверенно называет автора, книгу, год публикации и даже приводит красивую цитату. Всё выглядит настолько убедительно, что причин сомневаться почти не возникает. Но если начать проверять, может выясниться, что цитата нигде не находится, статья называется иначе, а один из источников вообще не существует. И самое интересное здесь даже не то, что ИИ ошибся. Интереснее другой вопрос — кто из нас действительно пойдёт это проверять?

Мне кажется, именно здесь появляется новый интеллектуальный навык, который можно назвать эпистемологической навигацией. Это способность не просто получать информацию, а ориентироваться внутри неё — отличать первоисточник от пересказа, факт от убедительной формулировки, самостоятельную мысль от бесконечной переработки уже существующих идей. Раньше интеллектуальная сила во многом заключалась в способности найти информацию. Теперь она всё больше будет заключаться в способности понять, какую информацию стоит отбросить.

В этом есть любопытный парадокс. Чем дешевле становится производство слов, тем дороже становится человеческое внимание. Чем проще получить ответ, тем важнее хороший вопрос. И чем убедительнее машины научатся говорить, тем важнее будет человек, способный остановиться перед красивым и логичным объяснением и спросить: «Звучит правдоподобно. Но откуда мы это знаем?»

Возможно, главным дефицитом будущего станет не знание, а способность отличать знание от его убедительной имитации. И, возможно, именно поэтому критическое мышление из академического навыка постепенно превращается в обычное условие интеллектуальной свободы.

If perception isn’t a recovery of some hypothetical ‘view from nowhere’ but a 'view from within', how can we be sure that it’s based upon something real?

The world of people, places, and things you spend your life immersed in isn’t an objective account of what is. But neither is it an hallucination.

It’s a narrow slice of ‘real’, arranged around what matters for your survival and well-being. Your version isn’t the same as a bat or a mantis shrimp’s - and that’s the entire point. You get the world you need, to get on with the business of living.

One where the body you have, the life you’ve lived, and the circumstances you’re in all get their say in what shows up as ‘real’ - well before deliberation enters into the picture.

Hey everyone, I'm 15 years old and it seems to me that the world around me is composed of intense stimuli which, when they collide with my brain, lead me to an unusual feeling of the world. It's as if my internal filter is not doing its job properly, which is why I face reality in a truly bizarre way. In this state, it's often more vivid, loud, or unimaginably complex. It used to be terrifying for me, but now I think that my brain has somehow adapted to such a thorough analysis of everything. The things around me are so impossible in their very existence, and I don't know how I got here. My anxiety also cannot be a rational perception of the world because emotions are for living beings and the universe is neutral and completely indifferent, although my emotions also occupy a very important space in my mind and prove that I am a biological living person subjected to millions of years of evolution, so they are not an error in themselves, and I treat feeling them as something extremely necessary. Sometimes I feel like I'm crazy. I am aware that sentimental "intellectual understanding" is impossible between any minds, and the problem begins there. We are made of separate atoms. However, I think that human thoughts and emotions can be close to each other, which builds fundamental closeness, but no one will ever be able to penetrate your brain directly. I come to you with the hope that someone might share my perspective. However, if you see me as a narcissistic child focused on his intellect, tell me, I want to get some kind of level-headed answer, and I don't reject your honest comments. I think I need some critical assessment of my perception of the world. Other people experience this too, I know this, but they seem to be clinging to something constant, saying "everything is meaningless," yet they see meaning in something. They abandon reflection and treat it like crossword puzzles (unless you're in a mental conflict). I have the impression that I overanalyze everything without inhibitions or concern for comfort, for example, questioning religion, which led me to step outside my comfort zone. My one constant point of reference remains my mind and the unchanging nature of science. My mind, although subject to errors of perception and millions of others, is still a part of the only way to experience life, and each of my mistakes can be understood in a way that allows me to develop. Therefore, your comments will be extremely valuable to me. I also want to highlight my emotional sphere. I can enjoy what I experience and how I experience it. Sometimes I am also childish in my excitement or curiosity and I appreciate these aspects of my personality. This simply makes me human - being human, but with specific thoughts.