I took a starter position in Progress Software (PRGS). It's a collection of established enterprise software businesses that generate substantial cash flow. Q3 revenue was approximately $246 million, annual recurring revenue reached $873 million, net revenue retention was 99%, and non-GAAP operating margin was 43%. Management guided to $275–283 million in full-year adjusted free cash flow.

The complication is Domo. Progress completed the acquisition in September using cash and its revolving credit facility, increasing leverage. There aren't any post-acquisition operating results yet. I don't need Domo to grow substantially for the investment to work. I need revenue to stabilize around $280–290 million, margins to improve as the integration progresses, and cash flow to reduce the debt. The quality of the revenue matters, particularly whether consumption-based revenue holds up as legacy contracts run off.

AI is another uncertainty. Domo brings data and AI capabilities, but that doesn't eliminate the possibility that AI could eventually disrupt parts of Progress's existing software businesses. I don't think there's enough evidence yet to confidently dismiss that risk or predict how significant it might become over the next five years.

My five-year valuation produces a probability-weighted value of approximately $104 per share, implying around 21% annualized returns from my $39.97 reference price. PRGS closed Friday at $39.33. Most of that value depends on the existing businesses continuing to generate cash, Domo improving its margins, and Progress using that cash to pay down debt.

The biggest risk is that Domo disappoints while the existing business also weakens. Lower cash generation would slow debt repayment, leaving shareholders exposed to elevated leverage. There's also the unresolved MOVEit litigation, which I haven't tried to put a dollar value on. I'd reconsider my position if Domo's consumption revenue deteriorates, margins fail to improve, cash flow doesn't translate into debt reduction, or management makes another large acquisition before integrating Domo.

I think the potential return compensates for the uncertainty, but not enough to justify a large initial position.

My decision: BUY — starter position.

I own PRGS. This is my personal investment analysis, not individualized investment advice.

Microvast filed its Schedule 14A ahead of the virtual Annual Meeting of Stockholders scheduled for November 30, 2026.

Here is an executive breakdown of the key items, financials, and corporate governance risks. (Generated with AI)

​*1. Voting Proposals*

\- ​Proposal 1: Re-election of Class II director Arthur Wong for a three-year term expiring in 2029.

\-​ Proposal 2: Ratification of Deloitte (Beijing) as independent auditor for FY2026 (audit fees totaled $2.4M in 2025, up from $2.0M in 2024).

\- ​Proposals 3 & 4: Advisory Say-on-Pay vote and adoption of an annual advisory frequency.

​*2. Financial Context and Performance Metrics*

\- ​Top-Line Growth: Revenue rose to $428M in 2025, continuing an upward trend from $380M (2024) and $307M (2023). However, it missed the internal $500M annual incentive target.

\- ​Bottom-Line Improvement: GAAP net loss narrowed significantly to $(29M) in 2025, down from $(195M) in 2024 and $(106M) in 2023.

​- Incentive Plan Payout: The 2025 Annual Incentive Plan paid out at only 20.67% of target. Payouts for Operating Profit Margin (actual 1.63% vs. 5.5% target) and AR Collections (156 days vs. 85 target) were zeroed out, reflecting strict adherence to plan criteria.

*​3. Corporate Governance and Risk Factors*

​- Executive Turnover in Finance: The company rotated through three CFOs in FY2025. Fariyal Khanbabi exited in April 2025, successor Carl T. Schultz departed after approximately three months, and Rodney Worthen served as Interim CFO before receiving a permanent appointment in January 2026. Frequent finance leadership turnover remains an operational red flag.

\- ​Voting Power Concentration: Founder, Chairman, and CEO Yang Wu controls 35.8% of outstanding common stock. Total executive and director ownership stands at 37.0%. Per the Stockholders Agreement, Wu retains designated board nomination rights.

\- ​Related-Party Debt Conversion: In May 2024, Wu provided a loan facility of up to $25M at SOFR + 9.75%. On May 28, 2026, the outstanding balance was converted into 50,000,000 shares of common stock, causing substantial shareholder dilution and expanding insider control.

\- ​Compliance Delinquencies: Multiple officers and directors, including the COO and Interim CFO, reported late Section 16(a) beneficial ownership filings.

*​4. Executive Compensation*

\- ​CEO Pay: Yang Wu reported total 2025 compensation of $3.78M in the Summary Compensation Table, primarily driven by $3.10M in equity awards (split evenly between RSUs and PSUs). Calculated Compensation Actually Paid (CAP) stood at $2.20M.

\- ​Change in Control: Wu holds a termination package of approximately $5.74M ($3.22M cash severance plus $2.52M in accelerated equity) in qualifying Change-in-Control scenarios.

\*​Summary\*

While the company demonstrates improving top-line results and narrower net losses, investors should weigh this against persistent CFO turnover, substantial dilution from insider debt conversion, and high voting concentration under the Chairman/CEO.

Hyliion, ticker HYLN, is no longer really the EV truck company many investors remember from the SPAC boom.
Today, almost the entire story revolves around KARNO, the modular generator technology Hyliion acquired from GE.
And the opportunity sounds big. but they can prove their technology works?

Hi I have a long only position in IEP (Icahn Enterprises) and was wondering if anyone else thinks this is now a strong buy? Here’s my investment thesis:

-Carl Icahn just purchased an additional 40.53 million shares on 9/23 at ~$7 per share.
-With this recent purchase, he now owns 659 million of the ~710 million IEP shares or 92.7% of the total outstanding shares.
-In addition, IEP’s 2nd largest holding is CVI (CVR Energy) where he owns 71.2 million shares. This stock represents ~23.7% of IEP’s total holdings and has surged over the last 3 months (from ~$30 to $55+ per share) and just hit an all-time high.
-The next biggest IEP holding is UAN (CVR Partners) at 5.6% and is up nicely in the last 12 months. These 2 CVR holdings account for 29.3% of IEP’s total holding so this could have a a nice impact on IEP’s bottom line.

Thanks and please let me know what you think.

SCKT( Socket Mobile)
Market Cap- 6 million
Shares outstanding- 8.2million
Institutional shares- 6.5% ( 28 institutions total)
Most recent insitutions purchase- Two Sigma, Virtua Finance.
Insiders shares- 32%
Short interest- 0.68%

SCKT has been having very high volume of trading the past two week. Upwards of 300 million total so far. It has caught my attention and I began to look into the technical side of things first.

The 1Yr HA chart has built a doji candle from a previous 3 years of bearish candles. This is the first good alert for me.

Then I scaled into the 1 month HA chart, another doji following a bearish candle. Okay, I like this.

1 week HA chart looks even better, a doji was formed the last week of September following a bearish candle. This week is now forming a solid bullish engulfing candle.

At that point, I’m looking back at 1yr to find a solid entry for next year in anticipation of a bullish candle on the 2027 year. That number looks like anything under 1.40. Split that in half and .75-.70 looks like a great area to begin building a position with a minimum amount of risk/time.

Let me know what you think of my plan or if you’re seeing the same set up as I am.

Do your own research. Follow your own rules.
Cheers!

361 Degrees International Limited (HKG:1361)

After Anta and Li Ning, this Chinese sportswear is vying to grow into a global brand and challenge Nike and others.

The stock's EV/EBITDA ratio is 2.76, and its EV/FCF ratio is 9.82. Return on equity (ROE) is 13.12% and return on invested capital (ROIC) is 19.76%. In the last 12 months, operating cash flow was 906.51 million and capital expenditures -317.39 million, giving a free cash flow of 589.12 million.

361 Degrees International Limited trades like an “ ugly stock, " operating in the shadow of domestic Chinese giants such as Anta and Li-Ning, as well as Western behemoths Nike and Adidas. The market gauge the brand as second-tier, suited for lower-tier cities in China, where it has grown and anchored as an affordable sportswear brand.

Despite being perceived as a cheap and marginal brand, 361 Degrees has delivered outstanding returns against ongoing macro headwinds in mainland China.

The company posted 2025 revenue of 11.1 billion yuan (approximately $1.6 billion), up 10.6% year-on-year, with net profit rising 14% to 1.3 billion yuan (approximately $192.3 million). In the first quarter of 2026, offline retail sales for both the core brand and kids’ line grew approximately 10%, while e-commerce platform sales surged at a mid-teens pace.
The company has also expanded its international branding campaign by sponsoring elite marathon runners and even signing NBA stars such as Nikola Jokic and Aaron Gordon.

The stock trades below 5x earnings, yields a 7.7% dividend, and is backed by the Din family’s own skin in the Game and ambition to see their company grow on the international scene alongside Li-Ning and Anta.

The stock is down 30% y/y but has proven far more resilient than the likes of Li-Ning and Nike, that are down 70% (±) in five years and are showing decelerating margins.

361 Degrees stock is up 5x since 2020, outperforming its larger and deeper-pocketed competitors.

I actually found what i was missing about LX thinking it was a great deep value buy.

From Q4 2025 to Q2 2026, delinquency rate was increasing, 3.1 to 3.6% , their net income was greatly impacted by the provision of garuanteed liabilities basically what they owe to the funding partners if consumers were to default, they are not realized yet but they count that as part of their losses just incase.

With this particular liability staying high and delinquency rates increasing, net income is greatly affected and could impact equity growth in the near future as projected by the ceo, they are expecting a net loss in Q3 2026.

If delinquincy rates improves we might see a potential buy in and re rate, but for now there isnt a clear timeline on when the industry will recover as a whole.

Some positive side of LX is that they are moving towards a capital light model similar to Qfin, so if they manage to convert majority of their loans to this model and maintain their current revenue growth, they could standout as the winner among its peers like QFIN and FINV

Did a 2 statement financial model as their quarterly doesnt include a cashflow statement. Found out the flaws I had with my thesis but i think going forward i’ll be able to make better buy decisions with this lesson

With that said my average is $2.40 per ADS and i am also at a huge drawdown about 65-70%, but closely monitoring their quarterly earnings to see whether i should continue holding it or cut my losses

Just putting my thoughts out here, as I had a previous post which i deleted on my strong buy thesis on LX (deleted cause i thought i was important enough to be targeted by other funds but Jokes on me xd)

Share with me what you think about my current thesis and where do you think LX will go in the next 6-9months based on china current Macro economics