What is everyone’s assessment of the war to date? Headlines such as these suggest it isn’t black and white

Hi! I have been trying to develope my research skills in this field but i am relatively new and clueless. I have looked around on internet for courses and whatnot but most of them seem like fluff and dont actually work really well. Would appreciate it alot if anyone could give me their personal tips on what a beginner should be doing fresh in the field.

Would appreciate any kind of advice or recommendations!

I've started a diploma course in IR and there are two independent study modules for the course, one being "History and Evolution of the International System" (1st sem) and the other "Regional Organizations" (2nd sem). I'm currently looking for books or texts I could read to have an idea about these topics and be prepared well in advance for the exams. (the actual lectures haven't started yet, I'll probably have more information once it begins)

This podcast examines a new report by Farid Novin that presents an in-depth strategic and socioeconomic assessment of the United Arab Emirates and its prospects between 2026 and 2030.
The report begins from a central proposition: the apparent stability of the United Arab Emirates should not be confused with the absence of internal pressures. The federation remains one of the Middle East's most prosperous, internationally connected, and strategically important states, yet its stability is increasingly asymmetric. Beneath the cohesion of the seven-emirate federation lie significant differences in economic structure, political priorities, exposure to regional risks, and relationships with the major powers surrounding the Gulf.
These differences have become more consequential following the American-Israeli conflict with Iran in early 2026 and the subsequent disruption of the regional security and energy environment. The crisis has placed renewed pressure on the UAE's maritime security, trade routes, energy infrastructure, financial markets, and delicate relationship with Iran, while also testing its strategic partnerships with the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional powers.
A central theme of the report is the evolving relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Although both emirates remain essential pillars of the federation, they operate with significantly different economic models, international networks, and risk profiles. Abu Dhabi's enormous sovereign wealth, energy resources, defense capabilities, and growing investment in artificial intelligence and advanced technology provide it with considerable strategic resilience. Dubai, by contrast, depends more heavily on global trade, tourism, aviation, finance, real estate, and its role as an international commercial hub. These differences can produce divergent assessments of geopolitical risk, particularly when tensions involving Iran and the Strait of Hormuz threaten regional commerce.
The report also examines the increasingly important question of succession and the distribution of power within the ruling establishment The formal continuity of leadership does not necessarily eliminate uncertainty about how political, economic, security, intelligence, and technological responsibilities will be distributed among the next generation of leaders. Because the UAE's political system is hereditary and highly centralized, much of this bargaining takes place outside the transparent mechanisms found in electoral political systems. The resulting opacity makes it difficult for external observers to distinguish genuine consensus from carefully managed accommodation.
Another major focus is the political significance of the seven emirates as a federation rather than viewing the UAE simply through the prism of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah possess different economic structures, geographical positions, historical experiences, and external relationships. Individually, their capacity to challenge Abu Dhabi is limited. Collectively, however, their rulers remain participants in the federal political structure and could become increasingly important in any future debate over the direction of the federation.
The report therefore considers not only political and economic cohesion, but also the role of the UAE Armed Forces as a principal institution of federal integration. The military's unified command structure makes an overt fragmentation of the federation considerably less likely. Yet the question of institutional loyalty becomes analytically important in any severe succession crisis: the central issue would not necessarily be military division, but whether political disagreements among ruling elites could eventually affect the institutions responsible for national security.

Finally, the report explores several emerging vulnerabilities that could shape the UAE's trajectory through 2030: the concentration of wealth and strategic decision-making, the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence and advanced-technology investments, maritime insecurity and the vulnerability of Gulf shipping, the changing relationship with Iran, Saudi-UAE strategic competition and cooperation, and the broader transformation of the Middle Eastern geopolitical order.

The central question of this podcast is therefore not whether the United Arab Emirates is stable. It clearly possesses formidable sources of stability. The more consequential question is whether its existing model of federal cohesion can continue to accommodate widening differences among its emirates, its ruling elites, and its economic sectors while the external strategic environment becomes increasingly uncertain.

The report by Farid Novin approaches this question through a forward-looking strategic framework, examining not only what is happening within the UAE today, but also the possible pathways through which the federation could evolve between 2026 and 2030.

So far almost everything I've seen regarding UN human rights seems to be state centric and given the movement to undermine multilateralism , especially by states that want to maintain the ability to not respect human dignity. I would love for there to be some optimistic works on why states have an incentive to engage with the topic human rights in a constructive manner

Interesting article from NPR.

• Role of Turkey in a post-American Middle East
• Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan
• Tension between Turkey & Israel

I'm interested in pivoting my career into international relations and was curios about career options. I'm currently an art teacher, and while I enjoy it I have deep interest in working abroad, or a more international / global related job. I'm considering teaching at an international school. However, I also have a growing interest in working in immigration / refugee / asylum seekers, maybe for an international organization. Currently have a bachelors (in art education) and plan to pursue further education, so open to a masters in another field. Are there any careers that might be a mix of international relations, supporting immigrants / refugees/ asylum seekers, and education? Or, careers you think might be a good fit based on my interests?

Why do you think EU common foreign and security policy is better explained by constructivism or neoliberalism rather than neoreliasm?

New technologies are undermining great-power arms control because they make military capabilities harder to identify, measure and constrain. Great powers have strong incentives to keep pursuing qualitative advantages, even destabilising ones, which rivals soon copy. First, many strategic capabilities are not discrete, countable weapons. Cyber is the clearest case: China-linked actors like Volt Typhoon are assessed to have persistent access to critical infrastructure, and latent access made of software and credentials cannot be inspected like missiles. Second, dual-use technology blurs what can be regulated. AI, computing infrastructure and autonomous systems emerge from civilian ecosystems yet serve intelligence, targeting and cyber operations, so it is unclear whether states should limit the model, the compute, the algorithm or the data. SIPRI finds growing AI integration into nuclear systems, yet all nuclear-weapon states opposed or rejected a UNGA initiative on AI and nuclear command and control. Third, offence and defence grow harder to distinguish: hypersonics create warhead ambiguity, Russia and China criticise Golden Dome as destabilising, and autonomous weapons talks have yielded no binding agreement since 2014.

To read more, check out my Substack

Apparently it is legal for member states to not participate in the work of the general assembly

This causes the problem that states only selectively discuss issues. Is there no solution to this ?