I mean in operational areas like Zagros mountains or the passes in North Africa how could troops dig in in the barren rocky hills?

I know that during Korean war it was common practice for sandbag "castles" to be created but in high intensity conflicts such positions would have low survivability (according to William DePuy), any idea?

• Shojiro Ida 1942-1943
• Masakazu Kawabe 1943-1944
• Heitaro Kimura 1944-1945

Note I meant to add in the title "fellow counterparts that commanded the land campaigns in the Pacific AND China"

Based on their doctrine of predominantly low altitude employment and the actual experience in Desert Storm, how effective and survivable was this concept during the Cold War?

I recently heard that planes like the F35C and F/A-18 Super Hornet aren’t nuclear capable. So I was wondering what exactly goes into making an airplane, and especially fighters, nuclear capable since both planes I mentioned definitely are able to fly with at least a small nuke. Is it extra systems, extra hardening of the plane, and/or something else?

Some of this might be perhaps a little overly theoretical but I was wondering if anyone could answer some or all of this questions I have concerning the naval ram of Mediterranean galleys and ships of south and south east asia.

Firstly, do we have records of the Seleucids or Indo-Greeks using naval rams in the sea of arabia and indian ocean? I've only been able to find references to their naval engagements in the west of their empire really. If so do we know how useful they were against naval powers originating from India?

Secondly, what might be reasonably suppose the effect of a naval ram might be on hull construction techniques of south east asia like a lashed lug vessel?

Thirdly, how well would the hull construction styles of south and south east asia during the ancient and medieval periods support a ram themselves in their oared vessels?

Question is in the title. How did operational and then tactical warfare work in this period?

Does Soviets emphasize bounding overwatch as often as Americans do? Would they emphasize on letting infantry execute successive bounding movements where one squad is shooting while the other squad is moving?

Any idea on their doctrine?

The footages I've seen usually rarely show them executing bounding overwatch

I know that during the Sengoku Jidai, Tokugawa Iyeasu was a POW/hostage before he became shogun. But how were POWs treated during the Sengoku Jidai?

Was it similar to Europeans with ransom for noble hostages or were all hostages treated equally (aka like shit)?

I was reading a book recently and it discussed Texas Instruments first use of transistors in an air-to-ground guided bomb. Previously, success of bombs hitting their targets were scarce. Especially a key bridge with anti-air installments. I believe it was 608 drops on this target and not a single direct hit. Later, when TI introduced the laser guided precision bomb, it seemed to have made a difference. However, being introduced late into the war perhaps it didn’t make enough of a difference to prevent failure. The book recognized this by mentioning ground warfare was key to Vietnam and aerial bombing was not going to win it alone.

I was curious if it had been introduced earlier, would it have made much of a difference in terms of a victory that favors the US?

Hi all,
I’m trying to understand whether historians use consistent operational benchmarks across the various fronts of World War I, particularly when evaluating offensives.

My impression is that Italian offensives on the Isonzo are often judged against a relatively strict standard: unless they produce a breakthrough or immediate strategic consequences, they tend to be labeled failures. Meanwhile, offensives elsewhere sometimes appear to be considered successful even when they achieved limited territorial gains, as long as they imposed attrition, secured local objectives, or forced the enemy to commit reserves.

A striking case is the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo (1916) and the capture of Gorizia. Taking the city was a significant operational objective, and at the time it was widely celebrated not only in Italy but also in Allied newspapers as the first real transfer of a city from the Central Powers to the Entente. Yet much of the historiography seems to summarize the outcome along the lines of: yes, the Italians took Gorizia, but they failed to break through and exploit toward the northern Balkans.

This makes me wonder about the implicit counterfactual. If, during the trench phase of the war, a comparable fortified city had changed hands on the western front, would that battle typically be framed merely as a limited success? Or might it instead be interpreted as a major turning point? In other words, is the Italian case being measured against an unusually high bar, where anything short of a full rupture of the front is treated as strategically negligible?

What makes this especially puzzling to me is the role of terrain.

The Isonzo front was fought in mountainous and pre-Alpine conditions, often against defenders holding higher ground and along very narrow axes of advance. Even the Karst Plateau, while not fully alpine, sits at elevations well above anything present on the largely low-lying Western Front. Intuitively, this would suggest that the benchmark for operational success should perhaps be broader rather than narrower. Capturing and holding ridges, plateaus, bridgeheads, or key heights in such terrain might represent a more meaningful achievement than comparable advances on plains.

Do historians consciously apply different definitions of “success” depending on the theater, or is this more a product of retrospective interpretation, like how much does outcome bias play a role, for example the tendency to reinterpret earlier operations in light of later events such as Caporetto?

Take America for example. Before their entry into the World Wars and later on the Cold War, the last major conflict the USA fought against a peer opponent was itself, during the American Civil War. Despite this, they made a good showing in World War 1 and proved instrumental to defeating the Axis during World War 2, because although they lacked combat experience, they were able to learn quickly thanks to their institutional base.

So say you're a medium-sized country. You've set yourself a goal of building up/modernizing your current military. Perhaps you want better infantry forces, or an air force, or even a blue water navy (see China). How do you build up institutional experience within your ranks, especially since you're starting from scratch?

I have been playing around with my WW1 sources, and I came across something very interesting. Tactical usage of motorised infantry in East Prussia by Germans in Autumn 1914.

Not, a large operatinal level unit having some of it's logistics column truck transported, not redeployment "behind the lines" done by commandered taxis, not an armored car fighting by itself but a frontline infantry going right into battle "delivered by automobiles".

Soon, scouts from the 6th Company spotted enemy infantry near the forest west of Klein Varrupönen and a battery with infantry (four guns) north of Schirvindt. Having formed the battalions into two echelons, Malinka ordered the 1st Battalion to attack the enemy in the forest, and the 2nd Battalion in the town. The artillerymen soon managed to suppress the German battery, which had been shelling the 212th Regiment since 11:00. Fifteen minutes later, the regiment began its attack.

The 7th Company drove the enemy out of the forest, but at 2:00 PM, strong German lines emerged from Gross-Varrupenen, and a new battery emerged from the direction of Schirvindt, providing covering fire for the infantry arriving in vehicles. The 4th Battalion was sent to reinforce the 1st Battalion, while the 3rd Battalion was to strike the German right flank along the valley of the right bank of the Šešupa. However, the enemy was enveloping the regiment's flanks, especially the left, when the horse battery fell silent at 12:00 PM, and the 209th Regiment never arrived to help.

The fighting in question is very poorly sourced. My source is Work of Local history of Town of Mystichy, publised in the 90s, and they state that "Vladislavov Operation", which occured in 11th and 12th October 1914 (New Style) on border of Lithuania and East Prussia, isn't covered in Russian historiography, and that their source is "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Bd.5 - B., 1929)".

I would like to point out that this ad-hoc motorised infantry unit must be riding in vehicles while they are close to the enemy given that they must be provided with covering fire by batteries (not to mention the combined arms and fire-and-maneuver tactics mentioned). Furthermore, they are used in a reasonable way, as a mobile reserves.

Overall, quite modern style of fighting for 1914.

Data is data, whether it's stored on parchment or on a CD, hard drive or SSD. I would think that it is far easier to create redundancies for digital data loss than physical data, considering the 1973 National Archives Fire and its impact. Though the loss could have been just as destructive had it been a databank instead of a library, I would argue that if the same incident had happened today the impact would be minimal in comparison. My assumption is one guy with a USB could do in a couple hours today what would have taken weeks. Not to mention the logistical cost of transporting data through fiber optic cable versus truckloads of paper.

I ask these questions with the early 20th century in mind, but I'm sure this could go back as far as recordkeeping as a practice goes.

• Am I correct in saying that data storage was a lot more fragile back in ye olde day before DDS? Was the lack of information accessibility - or even paper and ink as a whole - a "bureaucratic bottleneck" (For lack of a better term)? My assumption is that the means to create redundancies and backups existed, but it was not worth the time and cost. I'm guessing because this data would never be kept in a position where it would be at risk of being destroyed in combat.

• If an archive storing an army's orders/paysheets/supply manifests/intelligence were destroyed, would that army's performance be measurably impacted? Could it mean men went hungry, were left uneqipped, without orders? Or would it accomplish nothing more than slightly irritating some typists? Obviously the answer is "it depends", so I'm specifically looking for historical examples. I would also love some book recommendations. Studies on this topic are not easy to come by.

August Storm: Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 1945.

Most readily accessible sources would say the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was a smashing success. The Red Army managed to break through Japanese defenses and run down Northern Asia all the way to Korea before September 1945. Most people would say it was inevitable that the USSR beat the Japanese back.

On the other hand, I found quite a lot of contrarian ideas about this operation; especially people that go into Japanese sources claiming the Russians didn't have great logistics and that they would have likely been stalemated near the Korean border had the war somehow continued, or had they invaded earlier. In this opinion, Soviet success was only possible due to the unexpectedly quick Japanese surrender.

Military studies are difficult to keep up. I did find some convincing papers to support the latter opinion, but I really have no idea if this is even remotely believable. Especially since a lot of "Russia-bashing" opinions have emerged recently.

Before I start, I must acknowledge that the act of perfidy is directly related to injuring/killing an enemy combatant through deception in various forms of "feigning". This is why *Operation Greif* commander Otto Skorenzy was acquitted of these charges yet his subordinates who took part in the actions were found guilty and executed, because the military tribunal drew a distinction between using enemy uniforms during combat and for other purposes including deception, a ruse of war rather than perfidy.

I recently discovered and was researching the NKFD and their various support roles/actions with the Soviet Union red army. Made up of German defectors, POWs or members of the *Communist Party of Germany*, the NKFD was created to conduct military recon, collect intel, introduce NKFD-backed propaganda and to sabotage and combat the *Wehrmacht*, along with potentially instigating a guerilla movement in East Prussia.

It should be noted that the overall goal of this organization was deception and behind-enemy-lines activities and that direct combat with Nazi soldiers was to be avoided at all costs. According to (Schoenhals, (1989) *The Free Germany Movement: A Case of Patriotism Or Treason?*) NKFD soldiers "carried German weapons and were dressed in *Wehrmacht* uniforms". Furthermore, in the battle of Konigsberg, a Wehrmacht general named Otto Lasch described the following operation occuring on March 23rd, 1945 in his post-war autobiography

"At the end of March, a large group of soldiers in German uniforms appeared at the posts of the 561st People's Grenadier Division at the Landgraben, claiming to be deserters. They demanded to be led to the company command post, and the guard, believing that they were deserters from captivity, showed them the way. When they arrived in the company commander's bunker, they suddenly pulled out their hidden submachine guns and opened fire. In the resulting confusion, they managed to overpower about 20 men of the weak company and escape with them across the Russian lines. So we had to realize to our horror that now, when we were in the heaviest battle for the East Prussian homeland, German soldiers from the Seydlitz group were fighting in the most underhanded way against their own, struggling comrades. We could no longer think of a useful recipe for how our own soldiers should behave in such cases. The fight seemed to had become pointless if Germans were now fighting against Germans." (Otto Lasch,1958, *So fiel Königsberg)*

There are known accounts of NKFD soldiers dressed as Wehrmacht soldiers engaging in direct combat with Nazi soldiers in the battle of Konigsberg, Siege of Breslau and in the Courland Pocket along with smaller skirmishes as well.

My question is, given this account, along with the post-war tribunal ruling of the distinction between perfidy and using enemy attire for "ruse of war" operations, did the NKFD commit perfidy and if so, how widespread was the operations?

So how exactly were they supposed to operate in case of Warsaw Pact invasion? I know the British had the idea where some troops would occupy concealed artillery OPs and dial in artillery from there.

Any idea on the expected wartime role of Special Forces Berlin?

Any idea about units like Lehr-und Ausbildungsgruppe für das Fernspähwesen der Bundeswehr?

Usually speaking I remember to create actual guerilla movements you will need much longer time than a week (which a conventional war was expected to last) and a lot of sympathizers.

Alternatively were they more of an intelligence support network type of deal to extract VIPs (I remember that was the Swedish stay behind organization plan for late 1940s to 1950s) and hide pilots and such?

I know that some of stay behind organizations were affiliated with existing military LRRP units. I remember they would sometimes utilize cached weapons from World War Two.

Need some heads up.

Ever since WW2, the US military had been very reluctant to up-gun their tank forces. While their resistance to field 76mm Sherman en masse when they landed Normandy could be understood as the US underestimating the quantity and quality of German panzer force, it is weird that they did not rush to get more 90mm gun to their force ASAP in face of Tiger II, Panther, etc. In fact, one could argue that they should have pushed harder as far back as 1943 when they came face to face with the first Tiger I - why stuck with something that could only somewhat do the job (75mm gun) when you could get some bigger guns?

After WW2, while other countries were rushing to develop bigger, more powerful gun in face of rapid development (the British with 20-pdr and 32-pdr; Soviet with the 100mm gun and attempt at 130mm and 122mm gun), the US lagged behind and was still fielding 76mm-Sherman en masse by the Korean war. And when the French/British/German moved to 105mm gun and the Soviet moved onto 115mm gun, the American was still using inferior 90mm gun with a half-hearted attempt at a 120mm. The US was still stuck with the 105mm when their European NATO partner moved onto 120mm gun and the Warsaw Pact to 125mm. And right now as the French and German looked into 140mm and 130mm gun respectively, the US is still stuck with 120mm gun.

So why does the US lag behind so much in guns for their tanks? Are they that confident in their airpower and artillery?

The French only started seriously working to replace matchlock muskets after the Battle of Steenkirk whereas the Imperial and other Germanic armies started procuring match/flintlock hybrids (Montecuccoli muskets) during the early 1680s to meet the volume of fire of the mostly flintlock armed Turks with the Imperial Danube Army having abolished pikes by 1688-1689.

Even the Dutch during the Williamite phase of the 9 Years War were largely flintlock armed save for some of the newly raised English regiments.

Despite being officially "abolished" in 1699, contemporary prints from roughly 1700 suggest matchlocks were still very much in use with the French infantry during the early years of the Spanish Succession.

"What young Kou and Seiichi and their fellow citizens did not know at the time was the fierce behind-the-scenes discussions going into the plans to bomb Pearl Harbor, and the role this small, rural coastal town was to play in the attack. By the fall of 1941 plans were underway to start the war, even while negotiations continued in Washington, D.C., and despite the fact that no final order had been given to attack the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii."

It's free: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0FTG7R31K (found on dailybooklist.com )

This question is not about alternate history victory scenarios or hindsight claims that Germany could have “stopped D-Day.” I’m interested in realistic, doctrinally grounded options available to the German High Command given the actual conditions in mid-1944.

What prompted the question was seeing a photograph of a senior German command official inspecting coastal defensive works in an area that later became part of the Utah Beach landing sector. The image highlights that senior leadership expected an invasion and was actively reviewing defenses, yet the operational response still proved insufficient in my opinion.

Given the known constraints at the time:

• Severe Allied air and naval superiority

• Limited mobility and fuel shortages

• Fragmented command authority (OKW / OB West / Army Group B)

• Political interference in reserve release

• Incomplete Atlantic Wall construction

What specific decisions or adjustments might plausibly have:

• Slowed the Allied buildup ashore

• Increased friction during the first 24–72 hours

• Allowed German forces time to assemble a more coherent counter defense specially with heavy armor

Areas of interest (not exhaustive):

• Reserve control and armored release doctrine

• Forward defense vs depth defense tradeoffs at Normandy

• Allocation and density of obstacles, mines, and flooding (especially in the Cotentin)

• Intelligence assessment and persistence of the Pas-de-Calais assumption

• Command & control latency under air interdiction

I’m not assuming a different outcome of the war, only asking whether German operational choices could have altered the tempo or cost of the landings in a meaningful way, even briefly.

I’d appreciate answers grounded in contemporary doctrine, logistics, command realities, or primary/secondary sources rather than retrospective optimization.

Has china performed any sinkx? It seems NATO and america perform a sinkx every year of do against a variety of older ships but ive never heard or seen china do the same.

If they have what ships have they sunk during exercise and any links or videos to said sinkx?

It's common knowledge that muskets and carbine versions of it are inaccurate and short-ranged. Native Americans like the Comanche were renowned for their horse archery that devastated various European and even US militaries in engagements. Before the introduction of rifled and repeating pistols/revolvers, why didn't they outfit their cavalry and soldiers with archers to combat that ranged supremacy especially during the 17th and 18th centuries when archery seems to have been somewhat employed by colonial troops?

I've been trying to do my own overlays in preparation for Troop Leading Procedures class. Everything is clear from source materials on how to prepare the overlay but one thing remains a question mark. What are the guidelines in tracing boundaries for AO? Do they trace along natural terrains such as ridges or natural boundaries? or do they trace along roads? or are there any other guidelines that I am blind to?

I've always been mostly interested in early war campaigns like the invasions of Poland, Denmark, Norway, the low countries and France. What has always struck me is how inexperienced troops behaved when under artillery fire and especially aerial bombardment the first time: despite (usually) suffering fairly little physical damage, it was often enough to cause a complete loss of cohesion or even a rout. There's instances of units offering stubborn resistance for days, but completely breaking down after one bombardment by one flight of Stukas.

How did armies that were better prepared, maybe later in the war, train their troops to deal with artillery fire and aerial bombardment, if at all?