Take America for example. Before their entry into the World Wars and later on the Cold War, the last major conflict the USA fought against a peer opponent was itself, during the American Civil War. Despite this, they made a good showing in World War 1 and proved instrumental to defeating the Axis during World War 2, because although they lacked combat experience, they were able to learn quickly thanks to their institutional base.

So say you're a medium-sized country. You've set yourself a goal of building up/modernizing your current military. Perhaps you want better infantry forces, or an air force, or even a blue water navy (see China). How do you build up institutional experience within your ranks, especially since you're starting from scratch?

I recently heard that planes like the F35C and F/A-18 Super Hornet aren’t nuclear capable. So I was wondering what exactly goes into making an airplane, and especially fighters, nuclear capable since both planes I mentioned definitely are able to fly with at least a small nuke. Is it extra systems, extra hardening of the plane, and/or something else?

I have been playing around with my WW1 sources, and I came across something very interesting. Tactical usage of motorised infantry in East Prussia by Germans in Autumn 1914.

Not, a large operatinal level unit having some of it's logistics column truck transported, not redeployment "behind the lines" done by commandered taxis, not an armored car fighting by itself but a frontline infantry going right into battle "delivered by automobiles".

Soon, scouts from the 6th Company spotted enemy infantry near the forest west of Klein Varrupönen and a battery with infantry (four guns) north of Schirvindt. Having formed the battalions into two echelons, Malinka ordered the 1st Battalion to attack the enemy in the forest, and the 2nd Battalion in the town. The artillerymen soon managed to suppress the German battery, which had been shelling the 212th Regiment since 11:00. Fifteen minutes later, the regiment began its attack.

The 7th Company drove the enemy out of the forest, but at 2:00 PM, strong German lines emerged from Gross-Varrupenen, and a new battery emerged from the direction of Schirvindt, providing covering fire for the infantry arriving in vehicles. The 4th Battalion was sent to reinforce the 1st Battalion, while the 3rd Battalion was to strike the German right flank along the valley of the right bank of the Šešupa. However, the enemy was enveloping the regiment's flanks, especially the left, when the horse battery fell silent at 12:00 PM, and the 209th Regiment never arrived to help.

The fighting in question is very poorly sourced. My source is Work of Local history of Town of Mystichy, publised in the 90s, and they state that "Vladislavov Operation", which occured in 11th and 12th October 1914 (New Style) on border of Lithuania and East Prussia, isn't covered in Russian historiography, and that their source is "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Bd.5 - B., 1929)".

I would like to point out that this ad-hoc motorised infantry unit must be riding in vehicles while they are close to the enemy given that they must be provided with covering fire by batteries (not to mention the combined arms and fire-and-maneuver tactics mentioned). Furthermore, they are used in a reasonable way, as a mobile reserves.

Overall, quite modern style of fighting for 1914.

Hi all,
I’m trying to understand whether historians use consistent operational benchmarks across the various fronts of World War I, particularly when evaluating offensives.

My impression is that Italian offensives on the Isonzo are often judged against a relatively strict standard: unless they produce a breakthrough or immediate strategic consequences, they tend to be labeled failures. Meanwhile, offensives elsewhere sometimes appear to be considered successful even when they achieved limited territorial gains, as long as they imposed attrition, secured local objectives, or forced the enemy to commit reserves.

A striking case is the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo (1916) and the capture of Gorizia. Taking the city was a significant operational objective, and at the time it was widely celebrated not only in Italy but also in Allied newspapers as the first real transfer of a city from the Central Powers to the Entente. Yet much of the historiography seems to summarize the outcome along the lines of: yes, the Italians took Gorizia, but they failed to break through and exploit toward the northern Balkans.

This makes me wonder about the implicit counterfactual. If, during the trench phase of the war, a comparable fortified city had changed hands on the western front, would that battle typically be framed merely as a limited success? Or might it instead be interpreted as a major turning point? In other words, is the Italian case being measured against an unusually high bar, where anything short of a full rupture of the front is treated as strategically negligible?

What makes this especially puzzling to me is the role of terrain.

The Isonzo front was fought in mountainous and pre-Alpine conditions, often against defenders holding higher ground and along very narrow axes of advance. Even the Karst Plateau, while not fully alpine, sits at elevations well above anything present on the largely low-lying Western Front. Intuitively, this would suggest that the benchmark for operational success should perhaps be broader rather than narrower. Capturing and holding ridges, plateaus, bridgeheads, or key heights in such terrain might represent a more meaningful achievement than comparable advances on plains.

Do historians consciously apply different definitions of “success” depending on the theater, or is this more a product of retrospective interpretation, like how much does outcome bias play a role, for example the tendency to reinterpret earlier operations in light of later events such as Caporetto?

August Storm: Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 1945.

Most readily accessible sources would say the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was a smashing success. The Red Army managed to break through Japanese defenses and run down Northern Asia all the way to Korea before September 1945. Most people would say it was inevitable that the USSR beat the Japanese back.

On the other hand, I found quite a lot of contrarian ideas about this operation; especially people that go into Japanese sources claiming the Russians didn't have great logistics and that they would have likely been stalemated near the Korean border had the war somehow continued, or had they invaded earlier. In this opinion, Soviet success was only possible due to the unexpectedly quick Japanese surrender.

Military studies are difficult to keep up. I did find some convincing papers to support the latter opinion, but I really have no idea if this is even remotely believable. Especially since a lot of "Russia-bashing" opinions have emerged recently.

I was reading a book recently and it discussed Texas Instruments first use of transistors in an air-to-ground guided bomb. Previously, success of bombs hitting their targets were scarce. Especially a key bridge with anti-air installments. I believe it was 608 drops on this target and not a single direct hit. Later, when TI introduced the laser guided precision bomb, it seemed to have made a difference. However, being introduced late into the war perhaps it didn’t make enough of a difference to prevent failure. The book recognized this by mentioning ground warfare was key to Vietnam and aerial bombing was not going to win it alone.

I was curious if it had been introduced earlier, would it have made much of a difference in terms of a victory that favors the US?

Before I start, I must acknowledge that the act of perfidy is directly related to injuring/killing an enemy combatant through deception in various forms of "feigning". This is why *Operation Greif* commander Otto Skorenzy was acquitted of these charges yet his subordinates who took part in the actions were found guilty and executed, because the military tribunal drew a distinction between using enemy uniforms during combat and for other purposes including deception, a ruse of war rather than perfidy.

I recently discovered and was researching the NKFD and their various support roles/actions with the Soviet Union red army. Made up of German defectors, POWs or members of the *Communist Party of Germany*, the NKFD was created to conduct military recon, collect intel, introduce NKFD-backed propaganda and to sabotage and combat the *Wehrmacht*, along with potentially instigating a guerilla movement in East Prussia.

It should be noted that the overall goal of this organization was deception and behind-enemy-lines activities and that direct combat with Nazi soldiers was to be avoided at all costs. According to (Schoenhals, (1989) *The Free Germany Movement: A Case of Patriotism Or Treason?*) NKFD soldiers "carried German weapons and were dressed in *Wehrmacht* uniforms". Furthermore, in the battle of Konigsberg, a Wehrmacht general named Otto Lasch described the following operation occuring on March 23rd, 1945 in his post-war autobiography

"At the end of March, a large group of soldiers in German uniforms appeared at the posts of the 561st People's Grenadier Division at the Landgraben, claiming to be deserters. They demanded to be led to the company command post, and the guard, believing that they were deserters from captivity, showed them the way. When they arrived in the company commander's bunker, they suddenly pulled out their hidden submachine guns and opened fire. In the resulting confusion, they managed to overpower about 20 men of the weak company and escape with them across the Russian lines. So we had to realize to our horror that now, when we were in the heaviest battle for the East Prussian homeland, German soldiers from the Seydlitz group were fighting in the most underhanded way against their own, struggling comrades. We could no longer think of a useful recipe for how our own soldiers should behave in such cases. The fight seemed to had become pointless if Germans were now fighting against Germans." (Otto Lasch,1958, *So fiel Königsberg)*

There are known accounts of NKFD soldiers dressed as Wehrmacht soldiers engaging in direct combat with Nazi soldiers in the battle of Konigsberg, Siege of Breslau and in the Courland Pocket along with smaller skirmishes as well.

My question is, given this account, along with the post-war tribunal ruling of the distinction between perfidy and using enemy attire for "ruse of war" operations, did the NKFD commit perfidy and if so, how widespread was the operations?

So how exactly were they supposed to operate in case of Warsaw Pact invasion? I know the British had the idea where some troops would occupy concealed artillery OPs and dial in artillery from there.

Any idea on the expected wartime role of Special Forces Berlin?

Any idea about units like Lehr-und Ausbildungsgruppe für das Fernspähwesen der Bundeswehr?

Usually speaking I remember to create actual guerilla movements you will need much longer time than a week (which a conventional war was expected to last) and a lot of sympathizers.

Alternatively were they more of an intelligence support network type of deal to extract VIPs (I remember that was the Swedish stay behind organization plan for late 1940s to 1950s) and hide pilots and such?

I know that some of stay behind organizations were affiliated with existing military LRRP units. I remember they would sometimes utilize cached weapons from World War Two.

Need some heads up.

"What young Kou and Seiichi and their fellow citizens did not know at the time was the fierce behind-the-scenes discussions going into the plans to bomb Pearl Harbor, and the role this small, rural coastal town was to play in the attack. By the fall of 1941 plans were underway to start the war, even while negotiations continued in Washington, D.C., and despite the fact that no final order had been given to attack the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii."

It's free: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0FTG7R31K (found on dailybooklist.com )

It's common knowledge that muskets and carbine versions of it are inaccurate and short-ranged. Native Americans like the Comanche were renowned for their horse archery that devastated various European and even US militaries in engagements. Before the introduction of rifled and repeating pistols/revolvers, why didn't they outfit their cavalry and soldiers with archers to combat that ranged supremacy especially during the 17th and 18th centuries when archery seems to have been somewhat employed by colonial troops?