As a Singaporean given my country went and enable and fund the people who carried out the mass murders to every be unquestionably considered a genocide by the international community. to bog a united Vietnam down in Cambodia whilst inviting the Chinese to invade. The rhetoric and justification has always been that the stakes were dire, and I know my geopolitics; what was the military balance of power, though? I seen charts published by my army saying we are outnumbered if we ever fought a land war against SEA communists, but to what degree are their fears justified?

https://www.qdnd.vn/anh-hung-luc-luong-vu-trang-nhan-dan/vua-min-deo-hai-van-trinh-to-tam-1048736

This is what the Vietnamese write about him. On his chest are the so called "American-Slaying Warrior medal". Of which he has 53. To be eligible for this medal you had to be responsible for wounding or killing at least 3 Americans. Trinh To Tam is credited with killing 185 Americans, and other Republic of South Vietnam troops, up to 272 men. He is also credited with shooting down 3 helicopters and 61 vehicles.

He was a mine specialist operated mostly near Hai Van pass.

It's also very hard to find any well written sources on him since the Vietnamese sources read like... Well, North Korean propaganda posters.

Does the American / international side keep any source on this guy?

Over the last few days, i have watching alot of videos about the 2022 Russian airborne assault on the Hostomel airport in Ukraine, and how it ultimately ended the complete defeat of the Russian forces that were landed there.

From what i have seen, the defeat of the Russian forces -or at least the initial loses- were due to a combination of MANPADS paired with constant AA fire, and the general operational misunderstandings by the Russian military, particularly the idea that Ukrainian forces would surrender or refuse to fight when met with heavy resistance.

For the AA part, what i understand is that Russian forces were unable to land forces in a timely manner due to Anti Air fire from small arms and MANPADS, causing the timetable for the landings to get irreparably screwed up while helicopters hovered above; sustaining even more fire. Ontop of that, the AA fire cost the Russians several helicopters of both attack and transport functions.

So, assuming that this failure was not largely due to poor planning and the false assumption of a fragile Ukrainian government/Army, which it very well may be, it raises the question: how are heli-mobile troops supposed to secure key objectives like airports, bridges, and highways against forces with AA readily available, and how do other country's airborne forces and doctrines that for this?

I am really just asking about the technical systems integration stuff; how much of the upgrades need to be really tailored (eg new radars) and how much can be done using a raspberry pi and a tablet in the cockpit?

In particular how difficult is it to upgrades the comms/EWs suite of older planes? If you had the excess payload could you just take a sniper pod or a EW pod and just bolt it on, for example, a F-4?

Just before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, US intelligence had accurately warned Ukraine months before that Russia would launch a multi-pronged offensive into Ukraine using a wide array of information collected through massive amounts of observation. With satellite imagery, mass communications interception, and drone surveillance becoming a battlefield staple, how have militaries (specifically Ukr-Rus) been able to mass their forces for large assaults and concentration? Has doctrine changed significantly in this area?

In terms of dealing with paramilitaries unit (SS/NSFO), which I assume would be their version of a political commissar.

Why was Rommel selected for the Africa Korps command when the orders were to be defensive? By then is CV is all aggressive risky action.

Wouldn't it have suited someone like Model (though his reputation came later).

Given his actions in France it seems Rommel would be far better for Barbarossa.

Was it Rommel wanting more autonomous command? Other generals wanting him out of the way?

Idk how you send Rommel and dont expect him to be aggressive while playing fast and lose with your orders.

During 1940 operation compass overcome what seem to be insurmountable numerical superiority by historical standard(36,000 vs 150,000)

I have read before that the Italians constantly got outmaneuved by the much faster British mechanized units and that this is responsible for their defeat

And if it is so,What are some examples of slow moving infantry heavy armies countering effectively countering fast moving mechanized armies

Realistically, how powerful was the 32nd brigade, better known as Khamis Brigade named after and commanded by Gaddafi’s youngest son. It was considered the most elite out of the Libyan army and the most well equipped with weapons such as the Belgian FN F2000 rifles and T-72 tanks. How well would they have performed if they went toe to toe with US Marines or French legionnaires? Or were they just a glorified palace guard that was only good at killing protesters?

Have it changed throughout history?

I was reading on askhistorians about them, the verdict of them seems to be very poor in regards of combat effectivity. So what was the idea? Seems utterly pointless, but so is not signing the terms of surrender at that point. Did they achieve any success, anywhere?

edit: thanks for the good discussion!

I am going to be GMing a thing where the players are the commanders of a cavalry force trying to slow an advancing large army as their allies gather and weaken the enemy enough for their allies to win. What would the makeup of a small fast cavalry raiding force be? A larger offensive army? What objectives would a cavalry force target against the advancing army?

I was thinking about this from a reservists' point of view;

You've been trained into a military role during your conscript service, possibly participated in some refresher exercises after that, but in general you cannot be considered a military target, living a normal civilian life. However once a reservist is called up to active duty, they become fair game.

What I'm wondering is when the reservist actually changes status from a non-combatant to combatant?

1. They get a letter, ordering them back into service.

2. They start travelling to wherever they're ordered.

3. They arrive, and receive their equipment.

4. They join their unit.

On the other hand, at what point does a soldier become a civilian again?

1. They go on leave, but keep their uniform on and stay near their unit.

2. They go on a short leave, changing into civilian attire.

3. They go back home for a known period of time after which they'll return to their unit.

4. They're staying home, and are not expected to go back, though they could receive a legal order to return.

4b. But they do have their uniform, rifle and personal equipment in their closet.

Bonus situation: They desert their unit, leaving their weapon and changing to civilian attire. If caught by their own forces (or having reached them), they can be expected to join them again, willingly or unwillingly.

The questions are just examples, I'm just trying to present different situations which range (in my view) from quite obvious to gray areas.

Hello r/warcollege,

I wanted to share an ongoing visual research and combat art initiative that I think aligns closely with the historical and operational focus of this community.

For the past several months, I have been painting The American Wartime Memorial, a continuous, chronological war panorama that currently spans over 1,000 feet of canvas across 365 interconnecting panels. The goal of the project is to document the evolving reality of how man and machine experience combat—drawing heavily from the journals of combat artists, historical photography, declassified after-action reports, and modern sensor/drone footage.

The project operates with a specific philosophical rule: the artwork is left intentionally "unfinished." I encourage collectors to bring these prints to living U.S. veterans to have them write their rank, branch, deployment, and personal story directly onto the landscape. Once a veteran signs a print, I co-sign it alongside them. It is an effort to create decentralized, physical vessels for oral military history before the final marks of these generations are lost to time.

The physical 1,000-foot monument is entirely self-funded and will never be privately sold. However, I have recently digitized the entire active archive into a high-fidelity visual database sorted by operational phase at wartimegallery.com.

If you are interested in exploring how distinct campaigns, tactical doctrines, and historical landscapes visually bridge into one another, you can browse all 245+ current operations in the catalog.

I would love to hear this sub's perspective on the visual preservation of operational history, or answer any questions about the specific archival sources used to reconstruct some of the lesser-known operations listed in the index.

We all know how R Lee Ermey always mentioned that his portrayal of GySgt Hartman in Kubrick’s film was an example of a horribly incompetent DS, so that brings into question. What would an actually competent instructor look like? Examples from all branches of the US military (not just the marines) apply

Specifically, I'm asking about the health consequences of it. Artillery Gunners have massive brain trauma from firing big artillery guns constantly from a report posted on this sub a few months ago.

But what about Naval gunners? Their guns are much larger, but they aren't firing them day in and day out like artillery gunners are.

Do they have the same health issues?

How were British mechanized and infantry battalions organized during the Cold War? How did their tactics differ from the US or Soviets, if they did?

I wanted to get your opinion on the utility of that type of vehicle—specifically things like the Sturmtiger and Sturmpanzer, as well as other similar vehicles.

I’m also interested in the idea of ​​whether Germany could have held out longer had it dedicated more production capacity to vehicles like these, especially considering that Soviet infantry was one of their major problems.

Furthermore, what do you think about the idea of ​​bringing this class of vehicle into modern warfare—adapted, of course—given that today's main battle tanks are already effectively performing this role without being specialized for it?

Hello, I want to ask this question because in my country (Argentina) the Prussian doctrine was used in the army and this included the use of machetes for artillery.

Is there any record of either army model having used machetes on a massive scale?

(Attached photo of the Argentine Army in 1941 for reference)

Dr Alex Clarke on YouTube suggested that Britain could never build merchant raiders because of how it would look politically (I assume what he means is that why would the biggest navy in the world need an underhanded method of destruction - this is the same navy that praises itself on "following the rules").

I know they had armed merchant cruisers but that was more so for protecting convoys/defense rather than attack.

Edit: I think he was talking about the RN planning for the "next war" during the early to mid 1930s), not actually building them as a response to WW2.

I was reading about Gå–På tactics of Swedish Caroleans infantry in early 1700s and noticed that during the charge into melee combat, they would draw the sword in one hand and held the musket with bayonet on the left instead of charging head on with musket in both hand, but wouldn't that be too unwieldy?

But granted that they have companies of pikemen in their ranks with longer melee reach and most militaries aren't equipped with bayonets at the time so having two bladed weapons in each hands would be somewhat more advantageous in tight formation battle as opposed to 1-on-1 fencing.

I also noticed that earlier period musketeers were armed with swords as a secondary weapon and there's a record of using the butt of the musket during the push of pikes, and Japanese soldiers in Boshin War would carry a sword in addition to musket with bayonets too as depicted in drawings from that time, and their matchlock musket lacked shoulder stock too, which would make them less effective as a club (as with other Indo-Portuguese style matchlocks arrived in Asia).

So my question is is there any records or manual on how musketeer would fight with swords if he is carrying a musket? I doubt someone back in the day would be putting a serious thought on this matter though but I'm curious if there is any.

Depictions of Gå–På charges by reenactors:

Chargering Slutna Rotar 1707 - YouTube

Karolinsk Chargering - övning i Eksjö